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STATEMENT OF JURISDICT ON
This is an interlocutory appeal from the summary judgment entered by the Second
District Court of Davis County. The Supreme Court granted the Appellant's Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal on February 11, 2010 (R. at 651-53).
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2009) and because the Okler from which Defendants are
appealing is an order of a court of record over which the Cpurt of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
Whether the trustor of a revocable trust which expl icitly provides the trustor with
powers of amendment, modification, or revocation of the trust, ccin whole or in part," has the
power to intentionally divest, by written amendment or partial revocation, a contingent
beneficiary's interest in the trust and particularly after said beneficiary abuses and commits
multiple felonies against the trustor, if the trust also contains a provision stating that Cw[t]he
interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to divestment which shall
continue until [the] Trust is revoked or terminated other thaij by death." (R. at 326-35,42236, 442-57, 625-28).
Standard of Review: Correctness.
Authority for Standard of Review: The validity of a tlrust is an issue of law, reviewed
for correctness. Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17,1f8, 71 P.3d 589; Groesbeckv. Groesbeck, 935
P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1997). So long as the reviewing cpurt confines its analysis to the

language of the trust instrument and does not resort to extrinsic evidence of intent, the
interpretation of a trust is an issue of law. Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, \1, 169 P.3d
750; Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) ("A contract's interpretation may
be either a question of law, determined by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact,
determined by extrinsic evidence of intent").
Further, summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c); Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 1999 UT 37,1J10, 977 P.2d 1205. When reviewing the trial
court's ruling in a motion for summary judgment, the reviewing court considers all facts and
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ^13,48 P.3d 918. The reviewing court reviews the
trial court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, according no deference to that
court's legal conclusions. Oxendine v. Overturf, 1999 UT 4, ^|7,973 P.2d417; State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). In addition, the reviewing court may affirm a grant of
summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it was not relied upon
below. Bailey v. Boyles, 2002 UT 58, |10, 52 P.3d 1158; Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(2009) and Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-606 (2009) are statutes
that are determinative, or of central importance, to this appeal. Additionally, this court's
interpretation of and review of the case of Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190, and
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its progeny, Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589 mdHtiggan v. flbggaw, 2007 UT 78,
169 P.3d 750, is determinative of, and of central importance to, this appeal.

The

aforementioned statutes and cases are attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit A.
STATEMENT OF THE CAS|E
Nature of the Case
This appeal arises from the Order Granting Plaintiff] s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and Denying Defendants' Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the
"Order"), entered on December 21, 2009 by the Second District Court, Davis County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Michael G. Allphin presiding. (R at 633-35, attached hereto as
Addendum, Exhibit B). The Order was affected by a Ruling on Plaintiffs and Defendants'
Cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment (the "Ruling"), that was entered by the
aforementioned court on November 30,2009. (R. at 622-29J attached hereto as Addendum,
Exhibit C).
This action, at its most basic level, concerns the interpretation of trust documents,
including the Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust (the wCFamily Trust"), created and
executed by Darlene Patterson ("Darlene") during her lifetime, and the effect of a written and
express partial revocation of this Family Trust whereby, Darlene, as trustee, undisputedly
attempted to modify the terms of the Family Trust so that Ron Patterson (uRon") was no
longer a beneficiary. Before Darlene attempted to partially revoke the Family Trust, thereby
excluding Ron as a beneficiary, Ron committed several crimes against Darlene. Ron was
prosecuted for the felony crime of "Elder Abuse" or ^Exploitation of an Elder", which after

negotiations was reduced to a felony attempt charge of the same crime. Darlene was the
complaining witness. In connection with his conviction, Ron was ordered to pay restitution
to Darlene in the amount of $52,935.00, and was sentenced to jail and probation. See
Addendum, Exhibit D. Ron also has admitted to unlawfully using Darlene's credit card
without authorization to make personal purchases.

See Supplemental and Corrected

Affidavit of Randy Patterson, attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit E, (R. at 474,1fl|4-5).
Ron was also the recipient of previous gifts from Darlene. See Final Amendment referenced
below.
After Darlene's death, Ron initiated this action, which pertains primarily to the
parties' dispute over the distribution of the Family Trust's property and the propriety of the
trust's modifications executed by Darlene prior to her death; more specifically, the validity of
a Final Amendment executed by Darlene after Ron committed the Elder Abuse crimes
against her whereby she stated she had provided for Ron during her lifetime and wished to
remove Ron as a beneficiary from the Family Trust.
The court's November 30, 2009 Ruling found that Darlene's modification to the
Family Trust, made on May 30, 2006, which effectively removed Ron as a beneficiary, was
invalid due to its complete divestment of Ron's vested interest in the Family Trust's property
without a complete revocation of the Family Trust, as the court determined is required by the
trust's terms. To come to this decision, the trial court relied heavily on and stated it was
bound by and must follow the Utah Supreme Court's precedent in Banks, Flake, and Hoggan
(attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit A).
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Randy Patterson ("Randy5'), both individually and ab trustee of the Family Trust,
appeals the Order and Ruling granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
denying Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because the legal precedent
relied on to grant Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be overturned.
Therefore, the Order should be reversed and this case shoulq be remanded to the trial court
with instructions to uphold and enforce the Final Amendment.
B.

Relevant Course of Proceedings
Ron filed a Complaint against the Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust and the

Estate of Darlene Patterson in this matter on October 25,2007, seeking, among other things,
a declaratory judgment that the Final Amendment to the Family Trust is void and should be
disregarded in distributing the trust property. (R. at 7-11). Kon claimed the trust should be
distributed giving no effect to the Final Amendment and hi should take under the Family
Trust even though Darlene expressly and explicitly intended to remove him as a beneficiary
to the Family Trust via her Final Amendment. Id. An Amended Complaint was filed by Ron
on May 3, 2008, which asked that specific findings of fact be made regarding, among other
things, the propriety of the Final Amendment. (R. at 78). The Amended Complaint was
answered by Randy on April 2, 2008, and by other Defendants on August 14, 2008. (R. at
155-61; 230-28).
Ron then filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgmeht and Memorandum in Support
on April 6, 2009, seeking summary judgment on his first cause of action; a declaratory
judgment that the Final Amendment is void and that Ron is entitled to receive property

according to the Restatement of the Family Trust executed March 12, 2001. (R. at 323-97).
On May 5, 2009, Randy, as trustee of the Family Trust, submitted a Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. at 422-36), along with a
Defendants' Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support
(R. at 418-19,398-411). Randy sought a summary judgment declaring the Final Amendment
valid and that it controls the disposition of the tmst estate. Id. The parties then stipulated
that the respective motions for partial summary judgment shall be submitted and considered
without respect to the parties' disputes of fact over the issue of "undue influence." (R. at
420-21).
Complete briefing was had on the respective motions for partial summary judgment,
and the same were submitted for decision on July 29,2009 (R. at 513-16). The Court held a
hearing on the motions on September 30, 2009 (R. at 615), and took the matters under
advisement.
C.

Disposition by the Court Below
The trial court, in its November 30, 2009 Ruling (R. at 622-29, attached hereto as

Addendum, Exhibit C) and December 21, 2009 Order (633-34, attached hereto as
Addendum, Exhibit B), decided the respective motions for partial summary judgment as to
the validity of the Final Amendment. The Ruling and Order granted Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and denied Defendants' Counter Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Id. In sum, the Ruling and Order determined that, as a matter of law, the Final
Amendment was void in that it attempted to completely divest Ron of his interest in the
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trust's property without completely revoking the Family Triist. The trial court determined
that such revocation was necessary to completely divest ope of the trust's beneficiaries
because the Family Trust contains the language: uthe interests of beneficiaries are presently
vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or
terminated other than by death". (R. at 625-28). The trial court placed much emphasis on the
fact that the Final Amendment caused a "complete" divestment of Ron's beneficial interest;
intimating that if Darlene would have left him somethin g, even one penny, the Final
Amendment would have been validated by the trial court and the trial court would have
instructed the trust estate to be distributed according to the teijms of the Final Amendment. Id.

D.

Statement of Undisputed Facts
1. On or about October 25, 2007, Ron initiated this action, which pertains primarily to

the parties' dispute over the distribution of trust property and the validity of trust
amendments and restatements executed by the trustor, Darlepe Patterson, prior to her death.
(R. at 1-10).
2. On or about July 30, 1999, Darlene Patterson created The Darlene Patterson Family
Protection Trust (the "Family Trust"). See Exhibit A of Complaint (R. at 13-36, attached
hereto as Addendum, Exhibit F). The initial co-trustees of the Family Trust were Darlene
Patterson and her husband, Rex E. Patterson. Id. at Art. VII § 7.6 (R. at 29, attached hereto
as Addendum, Exhibit F).
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3. The stated purpose of the Family Trust is "for the primary benefit of the Undersigned
[Darlene Patterson] during the Undersigned's [Darlene Patterson's] lifetime, [and] for the
Undersigned's family thereafter." Id. Art I § 1.1 (R. at 13). Darlene Patterson was the only
beneficiary of the Family Trust entitled to use the trust estate during her lifetime. See id.
generally, (R. at 338-61).
4. The Family Trust provides: wCAs long as the Undersigned is alive, the Undersigned
reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in part, including the
principal, and the present or past undisbursed income from such principal. Such revocation
or amendment of this Trust may be in whole or in part by written instrument." Id. at Art. Ill,
§3.1 (emphasis added), (R. at 15).
5. The Family Trust provides u[t]he interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested
interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated
other than by death." Id. at Art. Ill, § 3.2 (emphasis added) (R. at 15).
6. The Family Trust lists Plaintiff Ron Patterson among the trust's beneficiaries subject
to divestment. Id. at Art. I § 1.1-1.2, (R. at 13).
7. On May 31,2000, Darlene Patterson executed an amendment to the Family Trust (the
"First Amendment"), which provided Plaintiff Ron Patterson additional property upon the
distribution of the trust's property. See Exhibit B of Complaint, \\ (R. at 38-39, attached
hereto as Addendum, Exhibit G).
8. On or about March 12,2001, Darlene executed a restatement of the Family Trust (the
"Trust Restatement"); which, among other things, provided Plaintiff Ron Patterson with an
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additional specific devise and reduced the contingent beneficial interests of Defendants Gary
E. Patterson, Judy Ann Henry, and Rex A. Patterson. See Exhibit C of Complaint, Art. IX
(R. at 41-56, attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit H).
9. The terms of the Trust Restatement provided, in part, [that its purpose was to "amend
and restate in full the [Family Trust]." Id., (R. at 41).
10. The Trust Restatement, in Article IX.B.5, left a specifib distribution to Ron as follows
The home and five (5) acres of real estate shall be distributed to Ronald S.
Patterson, my son. The five (5) acres is a portion off the property located in
Davis County currently identified as Serial No. 14-040-0067. Such portion
shall be five (5) acres only (from this 14.34 acre parcel) and shall be the
approximately five (5) acres located in closest proximity to the North side of
the current home of Ronald S. Patterson. If Ronald S. Patterson has
predeceased me then this property shall be divided among the descendants of
Ronald S. Patterson by right of representation. Distribution of this share shall
be subject to the restrictions provided in paragraphs CI and C2 below. This
distribution is in addition to the share of the Trust Estate to be distributed in
paragraph C below.
See id., (R. at 52).
11. Article IX.C. of the Trust Restatement also devised ojie-third of the "remainder of the
Trust Estate" to Ron. See id., (R. at 53).
12. During the time when Ron was living with Darlene Patterson, Ron unlawfully used
Darlene's credit card without authorization to make personal purchases including fourwheelers for his business. See Supplemental and Corrected Affidavit of Randy Patterson at
1J4, (R. at 474, attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit E). Ron made many of these purchases
online through Ebay and PayPal. Id. When Darlene discovered that these transactions had
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taken place, she objected and notified PayPal that Ron had no authority to use her credit card.
Id.
13. In or about February of 2006, Darlene Patterson received a check from the State of
California in the amount of $52,936.53 payable to Darlene for a project involving real
property which Darlene owned in California. Id. at ][5. Ron, however, stole the check,
forged Darlene's signature, cashed the check, and used the check funds for his personal
benefit without Darlene's knowledge or pemiission. Id. Eventually, Ron's conduct was
discovered, and Ron was convicted of the felony crimes of "Elder Abuse" and "Exploitation
of an Elder." Id. In connection with his conviction, Ron was ordered to pay restitution in the
amount of $52,936.53, and was sentenced to jail and probation. Id; see also court case
dockets evidencing Ron's criminal actions against Darlene Patterson, attached hereto as
Addendum, Exhibit D).
14. After Darlene discovered Ron's wrongdoings indentified in paragraphs 13-14 above,
she asked Mr. Carver, her attorney at the time, to prepare another Amendment to the Darlene
Patterson Family Protection Trust. (R. at 474 TJ6).
15. On or about May 30, 2006, Darlene Patterson executed another amendment to the
Family Trust (the "Final Amendment"), which was intended to effectively remove Ron as a
beneficiary of the trust, by stating as follows:
I have intentionally not provided anything for my son Ronald S. Patterson (or
his descendants) since I have already properly provided for this son during his
lifetime as I felt was appropriate.
See Exhibit D of Complaint, at ^jC, (R. at 58-61, attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit I).
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16. Eleven months later, On April 30, 2007, and after executing the Final Amendment,
Darlene passed away. See Affidavit of Randy Patterson dated April 30, 2009, at TJ12, (R. at
414).
17. On or about April 6, 2009, Ron filed his Motion for (Partial Summary Judgment to
invalidate the Final Amendment. (R. at 323-25).
18. On or about May 5, 2009, Defendants filed a Counter Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment seeking a ruling that the Final Amendment was valid. (R. at 418-19).
19. On or about November 30, 2009, Judge Allphin entered the Ruling which granted
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and defied the Defendant's Counter
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding the issi^e of the validity of the Final
Amendment, and deeming it void due to the Banks' rationale. (R. at 622-29, attached hereto
as Addendum Exhibit C).
20. The Order from which this appeal is taken was entered on December 21,2009. (R. at
633-34, attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit B).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issue before this court is whether the trial court appropriately exalted form over
substance in voiding the Final Amendment to benefit Ron Patterson, who was expressly and
intentionally removed as a trust beneficiary via the Final Antiendment by his elderly mother
Darlene, acting as settlor, after it was discovered that Ron was exploiting and taking
advantage of her (which acts resulted in his felony conviction). The trial court erred in
voiding the Final Amendment because the substantive law relied upon in making said
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determination {Banks v. Means) has been significantly limited and now should be overturned,
and because the Utah Legislature has effectively overruled Banks by requiring only
substantial compliance to amend a revocable trust, giving elevated weight to the settlor's
intent. Therefore, the trust estate should be distributed according to the Final Amendment
which evidences Darlene's substantial compliance with the trust's terms and her clear and
undisputed intent.
Banks v. Means stands for the proposition that if a revocable trust contains language
giving beneficiaries a "present interest" or "vested interest subject to divestment" and that
such interests shall "continue until [the] Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death",
that the settlor can only divest a beneficiary's interest by complete revocation of the trust and
not by amendment or partial revocation, even when the settlor reserves powers to amend or
revoke the trust in whole or in part. Since rendering this decision, this Court has had
opportunity to reevaluate the position taken in Banks and has taken steps to ameliorate the
potential inequities and harshness that could result from that decision.

In Flake, a

substantially similar revocable trust was at issue. This Court determined that there is no
requirement of complete revocation where the beneficial interest is simply modified or
amended, but not terminated. Therefore, Flake stands for the proposition that had the Final
Amendment merely reduced Ron's beneficial share in the trust estate to one penny, rather
than completely divesting his beneficial share, the Final Amendment would be valid. Such a
result is inequitable and unjust. Further, in the Hoggan decision, this Court questioned the
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purpose and effect of the "vesting" language. The time Ms come to overturn the Banks
decision.
The Utah Legislature has taken further action to mitigate the Banks decision. In 2004
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 was enacted. Said section governs the revocation or amendment
of revocable trusts and states that a settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust by
substantially complying with a method provided in a trust, and if a method for amendment is
not expressly made exclusive, a revocable trust can be amended by a settlor by any method
manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent. By amending and partially
revoking the trust to divest Ron's interest in the trust esta te Darlene substantially, if not
wholly, complied with the terms of the trust governing amendment and partial revocation.
Further, the method of revocation and amendment provided in the trust is not made
exclusive, therefore any method manifesting Darlene's clear and convincing intent will
suffice. The Final Amendment provides as follows:

C

'I have intentionally not provided

anything for my son Ronald S. Patterson (or his descendants) since I have already properly
provided for this son during his lifetime as I felt was appropriate." Darlene's intent could not
be clearer. She did not want Ron to have a beneficial interest in the trust estate.
Therefore, because Banks should be expressly overturned by this Court, and because
Darlene's Final Amendment complied with Utah trust law, the Final Amendment is valid and
controlling. The trust estate should be distributed according to the Final Amendment.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE SUBSTANTIVE CASE LAW UPON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT
RELIED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE OVERTURNED
This appeal, in large part, is dependent upon this Court's interpretation and review of

the case of Banks v. Means, as it applies to the Family Trust. Appellant asks this Court to
overturn Banks v. Means as being contrary to accepted principles of law and justice, and
contrary to the public interest. Particularly in view of the facts of this case, the Banks v.
Means ruling allows Ron to perpetuate a serious wrong. Also determinative to the issue
raised are Banks 'progeny Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589 mdHoggan v. Hoggan,
2007 UT 78, 169 P.3d 750. All of these cases deal with trust language similar to that
contained in the Family Trust; all of which deal with the trustor attempting to modify the
terms of a trust. However, the following rule must be kept in mind before and while
reviewing Banks and its progeny: "In interpreting the terms of the trust, the inquiry is as to
the intent of the trustor." Leggroan v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 232 P.2d 746, 749
(1951) (emphasis added).
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 1999 UT 37 at ^ 10. As shown above in the Statement of Facts, the
material facts in this case are undisputed. Therefore, this appeal seeks a ruling that Ron is
not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, and that the oft-questioned law relied
upon by the trial court (i.e., Banks v. Means) is no longer good law.
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A.

Analysis of Banks v. Means, Flake v. Flake, and lloggan v. Hoggan, and Utah
Statutory Trust Law
In Banks, the Utah Supreme Court had to determine whether a trustor was entitled to

amend her revocable living trust agreement to change the! remainder beneficiaries. See
generally, Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190 (attached hereto as Addendum,
Exhibit A). The trustor created a "family protection tmst," t ansferred certain property into
the trust, and served as trustee until her death. Id. at ^[2. The Banks tmst originally provided
that upon the death of the grantor, her three children were to $hare equally in the proceeds of
the tmst estate. Id. at ^3.
Approximately seven years after the Banks trust was originally executed, the grantor
executed an amendment to the tmst. Id. at ]|5. The amendment changed the tmst
beneficiaries, and allocated the entire tmst estate to the grantor's older sister, with the
grantor's children being listed as alternate beneficiaries should the older sister predecease the
grantor. Id. After the death of the grantor, the beneficiaries disputed whether the 1999
amendment, or the original tmst agreement, governed the disposition of the tmst estate. Id. at

16The issue before the court was whether the trustor! had the power under the tmst
agreement to amend the tmst and divest the beneficiaries] interest. Id. at *[|6. The tmst
agreement provided that as long as the grantor was alive, slie "reserves the right to amend,
modify, or revoke this Tmst in whole or in part". Id. at ^4. It continued, "Such revocation or
amendment of this Tmst may be in whole or in part by written instrument." Id. The Banks
tmst also contained the following language: "The interests qfthe beneficiaries are presently
15

vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or
terminated other than by death?" Id. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court ruled that the italicized language above authorized the trustor to
divest the beneficiary's interest only if the trustor revoked the trust in its entirety. Id. at ^12.
Therefore, the Supreme Court gave no meaning to the express terms of the trust allowing for
partial revocations and partial amendments. Id. Although the trustor in Banks expressly
reserved the right "to amend, modify or revoke this Trust, in whole or in part" the Court ruled
and read into the trust language a requirement that an amendment or partial revocation could
not divest a beneficiary's interest. Id. at ^14. Because the 1999 amendment to the Banks trust
did not amount to a complete revocation, the purported amendment was held to be void and
the Court held that the disposition of the trust estate was governed by the original trust
agreement - not the 1999 amendment. Id. at ^15-17.
Since the Banks decision was reported, courts (including this Court), scholars, and
professionals have struggled to explain and apply its reasoning and logic, and Utah statutory
law has virtually overturned it legislatively. This struggle to explain the Banks decision and
attempts to mitigate the Banks decision's wide-reaching and harsh effects is first evidenced
in the Utah Supreme Court's 2003 Flake decision. In Flake, the Supreme Court was
confronted with trust language and circumstances substantially similar to that of Banks. See
generally, Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589 (attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit A).
However, in the Flake decision the court ruled that where the amendment reduced, but did
not completely eliminate, the challenging beneficiary's interest, the amendment would be
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valid, even if the trust was not completely revoked prior to the amendment. Id.
In Banks, the trustor's sister who was named beneficiary under the voided amendment
unsuccessfully argued that the provision in the trust instrument specifying that vested
interests were created in the children was intended to establish that the trust was not illusory,
not to restrict the settlor's ability to divest the children's interests. Banks, 2002 UT 65 at
^[13. In Flake, less than two years after the Banks decision, the Supreme Court was
distinguishing its Banks decision and analysis, and recognized that the purpose of the
^vesting" language in the trust was to insure that the revocable living trust was not deemed to
be an illusory trust. Flake, 2003 UT 17 at ^fl7. The Flake analysis attempted to reduce the
harshness and inequitable nature of Banks without expressly (jverruling it, and was successful
in significantly limiting the Banks effect. In short, Flake permitted an amendment partially
divesting a beneficiary's interest in a trust containing the same or substantially similar
language to that in the Banks trust.
Thus, from the Flake case, it is clear that the purpose of the language was not to
protect the beneficiary's interest from being deleted by an amendment, as seems to be the
perception in Banks, but rather to insure that the revocable living trust was not deemed
illusory.
In the most recent of the Banksy progeny, Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, 169 P.3d
750 (attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit A), the Supreme Court of Utah, once again,
questioned the Banks decision. In Hoggan, the trustor created a trust in 1987. Id. at ^|2.
Under the terms of the trust, the trust property was to be used for the trustor's benefit during
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her lifetime, and was to be distributed equally among her three children upon her death. Id.
The trustor expressly reserved the right to amend, modify, or revoke the trust, and the trust
contained a clause that stated as follows: 'The interest of the beneficiaries is a present
interest which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death."
Id. In 2002, the trustor executed an amendment to the trust modifying the allocation of trust
property upon her death. Id. at ^[3. She passed away two months after executing the
amendment, and a beneficiary sought to invalidate the 2002 amendment. Id. at TJ4. The
Supreme Court of Utah held that because the 2002 amendment merely modified the
beneficiary's interest in the trust, the amendment is valid. Id. at \\6.
However, in the Hoggan analysis, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the reasoning
behind the Banks decision. In doing so, the Court recognized the purpose of the language
asserting that beneficiaries have a "present interest" or a "presently vested interest" in a trust
was to ward off potential challenges to the trust on grounds that it is illusory. Id. at FN2.
The purpose of such language had nothing to do with protecting the beneficiary's interest
from being deleted by an amendment (this is contrary to the impetus behind the original
Banks analysis). Id. The Court recognized that the use of this phrase has the potential to
produce results not within the contemplation of the drafter of trusts or their clients and
language proclaiming beneficiaries have a "present interest" contradicts the operative terms
of the trust. Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that the term "present interest" or "vested
interest subject to divestment" is "more of an oxymoron than a meaningful legal term" and
expressly "disavowed" the use of the phrase in its entirety and the logic behind its use in trust
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documents. Id. However, the court did not expressly overrule Banks.
In its analysis, the Court relied heavily on the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which
wC

advocates the abandonment of such confusing and disingenuous terminology in favor of an

open recognition that there is no requirement that a beneficial's interest be either present or
vested." Id. (citing Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 25 reporter's notes, cmt. B (2003)).
Statements, such as the one at issue in this case, confuse the issue and the reader, and ignore
the reality that courts regularly and properly find valid trusts where settlors have retained
complete control, and where the other beneficiaries have otily future interests that are not
only defeasible by revocation or amendment, but also contingent upon surviving the settlor in
addition to other events. Id.
Finally, the Utah legislature has effectively overruled Banks' strict interpretation of
trust law by adopting the Uniform Trust Code's position on tlie revocation and amendment of
revocable trusts. Utah Code Annotated section 75-7-605 governs the revocation and
amendment of revocable trusts and states, in relevant part, as follows:
(3) The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable tru$t:
(a) by substantially complying with a method (provided in the terms of
the trust; or
(b) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method
provided in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by:
(i) executing a later will or codicil that expressly refers to the
trust or specifically devises property that would otherwise have
passed according to the terms of the trust; or
(ii) any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence
of the settlor's intent.
|
(4) Upon revocation of a revocable trust, the trustee shall deliver the trust
property as the settlor directs.
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Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)-(4) (2009) (note, this law was enacted by Chapter 89, in the
2004 General Session, after the Banks decision and before the Final Amendment was
executed by Darlene).
Therefore, under current trust law, a revocable trust may be revoked or amended by
"any ... method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent," unless the
terms of the trust not only specify a method, but also expressly make it exclusive. Id.
Further, even if the trust terms expressly provide an exclusive method of revocation or
amendment, substantial compliance (rather than strict compliance as required in Banks) will
be sufficient. Id.
B.

Scholarly authorities agree that Banks v. Means should be expressly overruled because
this court has substantially limited its effect and questioned its analysis in subsequent
case law and Utah has taken legislative steps that effectively overrule the decision
In a 2004 Utah Bar Journal article entitled wcCan you Amend that Revocable Trust?

Utah Estate Planning Lawyers Face a Trap for the Unwary", Charles M. Bennett, a Fellow in
the American College of Trust & Estate Counsel, a past chair of the Utah Estate Planning
Section, and an adjunct professor of law at the University of Utah, further questioned the
propriety of the Banks decision by declaring:
The Banks analysis is thus revealed to be seriously flawed. It is illogical to
believe that a trustor reserves the power "to amend, modify or revoke" only to
restrict the right to amend, but not the right to revoke. Such a reading truly
exalts form over substance. Under general contract law, uan interpretation that
will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only where the contract so
expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no other reasonable
interpretation to be given it." Pierce v. Pierce, ]fl9, 994 P.2d 193, 386 Utah
Adv. Rep. 38, 2000 UT 7 (citations omitted). Far from requiring an
unreasonable interpretation, the Banks trust language supports the opposite
conclusion. The trustor in Banks did not retain just the power ccto amend,
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modify or revoke." Instead, she retained the right "to dmend, modify or revoke
this Trust in whole or in part." Indeed, the trust document reiterated that the
revocation could be in whole or in part in the very next sentence: "Such
revocation or amendment of this Trust may be in whole or in part by written
instrument." The Court should have recognized tnat an amendment that
deletes one beneficiary and adds another is a revocation of the Trust "in part"
as to the deleted beneficiary's rights in the trust.
Charles M. Bennett, Can you Amend that Revocable Trust? Utah Estate Planning Lawyers
Face a Trap for the Unwary, 2004 Utah Bar Journal, available at
http ://webster.utahbar.org^aij oumal^
(attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit J).
Mr. Bennett is not alone in his disagreement with thi rationale and propriety of the
Banks decision. Since the Banks decision, Utah courts have peen scrambling to find ways to
mitigate the decision's harsh effects and explain its rationale (as illustrated above in Part A).
The court itself has taken proactive measures to substantially minimize the adverse effect of
Banks (see Flake and Hoggan, Addendum, Exhibit A), and the Utah Legislature has also
taken action to address Banks by replacing Banks' strict compliance rationale with an
intention of the settlor rationale.
Decisions such as Banks, while arguably at one time supported by traditional trust law
doctrines, not only are "intention defeating", but also "exalt form over substance" in ignoring
the practical reality that settlors of revocable trusts commonly use them as will substitutes
and consider the trust assets as their own, without limitation. See Alan Newman, Revocable
Trusts and the Law of Wills: An Imperfect Fit, at pp. 11-12, available at
http ://works .bepress. com/eg^
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section attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit K). For this reason, the Uniform Trust Code,
which Utah codified, relaxes considerably the rules followed by some jurisdictions in cases
such as Banks, under which, if the terms of the trust prescribe a method for revoking or
amending it, the settlor may do so only by employing the method so specified. Id.; see also
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)-(4) (2009). Rather than requiring the strict, "intentiondefeating" compliance with the trust language the Court specified in Banks, the Utah
Uniform Trust Code's trust revocation and amendment rules are "intent furthering." Id.
Based on the foregoing, Ron's argument is flawed. Ron would have this court believe
that Darlene Patterson intentionally reserved the power to amend, modify, or revoke her trust
in one part of the trust instrument, only to restrict the right to amend, but not the right to
revoke, in a latter part of the same instrument. (R. at 331-33). Such a reading of the Family
Trust truly exalts the form of the trust instrument over its substance. Instead, this court
should recognize that Darlene intended to reserve the right to disinherit or not provide for any
beneficiary not only by way of a revocation, but also by way of an amendment. It should also
be recognized that an amendment which eliminates the beneficial interest of one beneficiary
(such as the Second Amendment in this case) constitutes a total revocation of the trust as to
that beneficiary's rights in the trust estate. Thus, the total revocation Ron insists upon has, in
fact, taken place.
Further, the case analyses of Banks, Flake, and Hoggan above, evidence a desire by
this court to "soften" Banks and distance itself from the harsh effects of its earlier decision.
This worthy desire has, however, lead to the potential for extreme inequities that have been
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revealed in the case at hand. Under the Court's rationale in Banks, Flake, and Hoggan, as
argued by Ron, it would have been valid for Darlene to have effectively eliminated Ron's
beneficial interest in the trust estate by signing an amendment which reduced that interest to
no more than one penny. (R. at 333). Ron argued, however, that it was not valid for Darlene
to sign an amendment which expressly reduced Ron's interest to nothing.
Therefore, because this court has taken steps through subsequent case law to reduce
the potential inequities that could result from the Banks decision and acknowledged its
"vested interest" analysis in Banks may have been flawed, and because Utah law now places
an elevated interest on the clear intent of the settlor of the trust agreement, Banks should be
finally and expressly overruled. For these reasons, Defendant's Counter Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment should be granted.
II.

THE ASSETS OF THE FAMILY TRUST SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FINAL AMENDMENT
The assets of the Family Trust should be distributed pursuant to the Final Amendment

dated May 20, 2006. Ron suggests, by way of his Motion ibr Partial Summary Judgment,
that this Final Amendment ''violated the rules" of the Family Trust because it eliminated
Ron's interest in the trust estate upon the death of Darlen p Patterson. In support of his
position, Ron relies primarily on the case of Banks v. Means 52 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2002), and
its progeny. However, as explained previously, Ron's argument is flawed. The facts and law
of this case support the enforcement of the Final Amendment and Defendant's Counter
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
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A.

Darlene Patterson effectively amended and/ or partially revoked the Family Trust, and
its Trust Restatement, via the Final Amendment pursuant to the Utah Uniform Trust
Code and the provisions of the Family Trust, and its Trust Restatement
Because Darlene substantially, if not completely, complied with the terms of the

Family Trust (as amended by the Trust Restatement) when she amended and partially
revoked provisions of the trust by means of the Final Amendment, and because the Final
Amendment manifests the clear and convincing intent of Darlene, as settlor, to remove Ron's
beneficial interest from the trust, the Family Trust was effectively modified and the trust
estate should be governed by the terms of the Final Amendment.
As mentioned above, the Utah legislature, after the Banks decision, enacted trust laws
relaxing the strict compliance and adherence to traditional trust law which was relied on in
the Banks case. Rather than requiring strict compliance to a trust's language, Utah trust law
now requires only substantial compliance with the trust's terms to modify, revoke, or amend
revocable trust instruments. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)-(4) (2009). Further, unless a
revocable trust instrument ''expressly made exclusive" a means of modifying, revoking, or
amending a trust, any method will suffice that manifests "clear and convincing evidence of
the settlor's intent." Id.
Darlene's execution of the Final Amendment substantially complied with the
provisions of the Family Trust as restated by the Trust Restatement. The Trust Restatement
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
I reserve the right to amend or revoke this Trust in whole or in part. Such
amendment or revocation shall be by written instrument and shall be effective
upon the signing thereof by me without notice to any successor Trustee.
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See Trust Restatement, Art. II (R. at 42, attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit H). The Trust
Restatement also contains beneficiary interest language similar to that in the Family Trust
and provides: "The interest of the beneficiaries is a present inierest which shall continue until
this Trust is revoked or temiinated." Id. at Art. V.B, (R. at 43).
The Trust Restatement provides that a beneficiary's interest continues until the Trust
is revoked or terminated. Id. Further, the revoking languag^ states that a revocation can be
"in whole or in part" so long as the revocation is done by written instrument. Id. Nothing in
the Trust Restatements language requires the revocation to be a complete revocation to
discontinue a beneficiary's interest, and, unlike the trust in Banks, there is no specific
language in the Trust Restatement stating a complete revocation requires the trust property to
be returned to the settlor, thereby, distinguishing an amendment and a revocation.
By executing the Final Amendment on May 30, 2006, Darlene substantially, if not
wholly, complied with the terms of the Trust Restatement to amend the trust and revoke
Ron's beneficial interest in the trust estate. It is respectfully submitted that an amendment
that deletes one beneficiary (Ron) is a revocation of the trust uin part" as to the deleted
beneficiary's (Ron's) rights in the trust. The Final Amendment and revocation of Ron's
rights in the trust was done by a written instrument and signed by Darlene, thereby, satisfying
the only mandatory revocation requirement established by the trust. Therefore, Darlene
substantially complied with the terms of the Trust Restatement, and effectively, pursuant to
Utah trust law, removed Ron as a beneficiary by revoking tfye trust provision providing for
Ron's beneficial interest.
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Further, there is no language in the Trust Restatement making any method of
revocation or amendment of its provisions the exclusive method. Therefore, Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-7-605(3)(b)(ii) is relevant and provides: 'The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable
trust ... if ... the method provided in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by ... any
other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent." This is
consistent with longstanding common law trust interpretation policy that when interpreting
the terms of a trust, the proper focus of inquiry is the settlor's intent. See Leggroan v. Zion's
Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 232 P.2d 746, 749 (1951). Therefore, pursuant to Utah trust law,
because no means of revocation was made exclusive, Darlene could revoke Ron's beneficial
share in the trust estate by any method manifesting her clear and convincing intent.
B.

Darlene Patterson clearly intended not to provide for Ron under the Trust
In this case, and for purposes of the parties' respective motions for partial summary

judgment, Darlene's intent in executing the May 30, 2006 Final Amendment is undisputed.
The Final Amendment, executed by Darlene after she had discovered that Ron was
unlawfully using her credit card to make personal unauthorized purchases, and shortly after
Darlene discovered that Ron had stolen a $52,936.53 check from her, forged her signature,
and illegally used the funds, makes the intent of Darlene, as settlor, explicit and
incontrovertible by stating as follows:
I have intentionally not provided anything for my son Ronald S. Patterson (or
his descendants) since I have already properly provided for this son during his
lifetime as I felt was appropriate.
See Exhibit D of Complaint, at TJC, (R. at 58-61, attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit I) and
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see Supplemental and Corrected Affidavit of Randy Patterson at 1fl[4-5, (R-

at

474-84,

attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit E, and court docket, attached hereto as Addendum,
Exhibit D). The intent of Darlene is clear that she wishes to remove Ron as a beneficiary of
the Family Trust. Therefore, Darlene's partial revocation of Ron's interest in the trust estate
by means of the Final Amendment was sufficient, because it clearly manifested her intent to
not provide any part of the trust estate to Ron, and that she had already properly provided for
Ron as she felt was appropriate. The trust estate should be qistributed pursuant to the terms
of the Final Amendment.
Darlene Patterson Clearly Intended that She be the OAly Beneficiary With a Presently
Vested Interest in the Trust Estate Prior to the Date d>f Her Death.
Again, when interpreting the terms of a trust, the proper focus of inquiry is always the
grantor's intent. In the Banks case, on which Ron so heavily relies, the court seemingly
ignored the practical intent and purpose of the trust at issue ^nd, instead, placed great focus
on the grantor's use of the phrase "vested interests" in determining the rights of the
contingent future beneficiaries. That same mistake should not be made in the case at hand.
Rather, Utah should acknowledge and follow the increasing national trend to treat the
interest of a remainder beneficiary in a revocable trust during the lifetime of the settlor as a
mere expectancy. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 25 cmt. A (2003). The settlor of
a revocable trust who retains both the equitable life interest and the power to alter and revoke
the beneficiary designation has used the trust form to achieve the effect of testation. Only
nomenclature distinguishes the remainder interest created by such a trust from the mere
expectancy arising under a will. Consistent with this positioji, under the Restatement (Third)
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of Trusts, creditors of a remainder beneficiary of a revocable trust may not reach her interest
in the trust during the settlor's lifetime and, therefore, should not be treated as a vested
interest. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 56 cmt. B (2003); see also Alan Newman,
Revocable Trusts and the Law of Wills: An Imperfect Fit, at p.7, FN44, available at
http://works.bepress.coiri/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=alan_newman (citing
John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 1108,1113 (1984)) (relevant section attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit K).
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-606(1) (2009) provides cc[w]hile a trust is revocable and the
settlor has capacity to revoke the trust, rights of the beneficiaries are subject to the control of
and the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to, the settlor" (emphasis added).
Regardless of the inclusion of the phrase "vested interests", when the Family Trust is
read as a whole, it is clear that only Darlene Patterson held a vested beneficial interest in the
trust estate, and that she intended for her Children to have only a contingent beneficial
interest in the trust estate. The Family Trust was established "for the primary benefit of
[Darlene Patterson] during [her] lifetime," and was designed to benefit her children only after
her death. (R. at 13, attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit F). During Darlene's lifetime,
she was the only beneficiary of the Family Trust who was in any way entitled to the income
or principal of the trust estate. (R. at 14).
By contrast, Darlene's Children (including Ron) had no right to use, access, or
demand any portion of the trust estate during Darlene's lifetime. Accordingly, the interests
of the Children were contingent and not vested. Based on the underlying structure of the
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Family Trust, it is illogical for Ron to argue that Darlene intended for each of her Children to
have a present interest in the trust property that was terminable only by way of a total
revocation of the entire trust instrument. For all practical purposes, the Children had no such
interest. Thus, Darlene could properly amend the Trust during her lifetime to eliminate or
terminate a contingent beneficial interest previously provided in the Trust for Ron, and could
do so without the necessity of a complete revocation or termination of the entire Trust
Agreement. Only the trust or contingent beneficial interest for Ron needed to be terminated
or revoked, as opposed to the termination or revocation of the entire Trust. This is precisely
what Darlene did, and intended to do, by the Final Amendment.
D.

It Would be Illogical and Inequitable for the Court to Interpret the Plain Language of
the Family Trust as Creating a Presently Vested Beneficial Interest in Ron or His
Siblings
If Ron insists on a literal interpretation of the Family Trust, then the phrase "vested

interests", as used in Paragraph 3.2 of the original trust agreement, can only apply to those
individuals who had a present unconditional lifetime benericial interest in the trust estate
(i.e., only Darlene Patterson). In order for something to be 'Vested5', it must be an
"absolute", "unconditional", "completed", and "consummated right for present or future
enjoyment". BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 4837 (8th ed.2004). That is, a vested interest
cannot in any way be "conditional". Id. In this case, Darlene Patterson was the only
beneficiary of the Family Trust who had an absolute, unconditional, completed, and
consummated right to use any portion (or all) of the Fami y Trust estate. No other trust
beneficiary had such an interest. In fact, Ron's rights to the rust property (and the rights of
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the other beneficiary Children) only became absolute and unconditional upon Darlene's
death, and then only to the extent provided in the terms of the trust as modified. Until that
time, Darlene retained the absolute power to change the trust terms, to use all or any portion
of the trust estate for any purpose which she deemed fit, and/or to revoke the trust in part or
in its entirety. Darlene Patterson was under no obligation to continue the trust, or to
otherwise protect and preserve the trust property for the benefit of any person other than
herself. For Ron to claim that he had a vested absolute and unconditional interest in the trust
estate during the life of his mother, despite the fact that he had no right to any of the trust
property during that time, ignores the very definition of the term "vested," and defies logic.
Under the facts of this case, the only rational interpretation of Paragraph 3.2 is to
construe it as applying only to the active primary trust beneficiaries.

"The active

beneficiaries of a trust, as distinct from the contingent beneficiaries, are the individuals for
whose benefit and support the property is presently being managed." In re Estate of West,
948 P.2d 351,355 (Utah 1997). In other words, logic would suggest that the "beneficiaries"
being referred to in Paragraph 3.2 as having a "presently vested interest" are only those
beneficiaries who are presently (i.e., at the time in question) entitled to the trust property and
do, in fact, have an absolute and unconditional interest therein. In this case, the only such
beneficiary at the time of the creation of the Family Trust was Darlene Patterson.
Interpreting Paragraph 3.2 along those lines makes practical sense given the obvious fact that
the future contingent beneficiaries of the Family Trust (i.e., the Children) had no presently
actionable rights with regard to any trust property during the grantor's lifetime. {See
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Uniform Trust Code § 603(a) (endorses the general rule that djiring the settlor's lifetime, the
remainder beneficiaries, i.e., the children, may not enforce the trust).
This interpretation also coincides with the rulings of courts from other jurisdictions.
In California, for example, it has been held that "[s]o long as a trust is revocable, a
beneficiary's rights are merely potential, rather than vested [and] [t]he beneficiary's interest
could evaporate in a moment at the whim of the trustor . . f. Johnson v. Kotyck, 76 Cal.
>nd

App. 4th 83, 88 (Cal. App. 2

Dist. 1999). "Giving a beneficiary with a contingent,

nonvested interest all the rights of a vested beneficiary is untenable[J [w]e cannot confer on
the contingent beneficiary rights that are illusory, which the peneficiary only hopes to have
upon the death of the trustor." Id. During Darlene Patterson's lifetime, the beneficial rights
of Ron in the trust estate were potential, illusory, non-vested rights - nothing more.
Furthermore, under these circumstances, it would be wholly inequitable for the court
to award Ron an interest in the trust estate other than that which was left to him under the
Final Amendment. Under general contract law, wCan interpretation that will produce an
inequitable result will be adopted only where the contract so expressly and unequivocally so
provides that there is no other reasonable interpretation to pe given it". Peirce v. Peirce,
2000 UT 7, Tfl9, 994 P.2d 193. Because a trust is fundamentally a contractual relationship
between one or more individuals, these same principles woulg apply and should further dilute
Ron's claims.
Under the facts of this case, equity demands an interpretation of Paragraph 3.2
consistent with the foregoing portions of this Memorandum During the time when Ron was
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living with his elderly mother, Ron secretly used his mother's credit cards to purchase fourwheelers for his business without any permission to do so. Ron made these purchases
through the internet and, when discovered, made no attempt to repay the amounts that he had
stolen. During approximately February of 2006, Ron stole a $52,936.53 check from his
mother, forged his mother's signature, cashed the check, and used the funds for his own
personal benefit without his mother's knowledge or consent. After this wrongdoing was
discovered, Ron was convicted of the crimes of "Elder Abuse" and ''Exploitation of an
Elder", and was sentenced to forty five days in the county jail.
Darlene Patterson, after discovering the criminal conduct of Ron, then prepared and
executed the Final Amendment. Ron now has the temerity to ask this court to disregard his
prior conduct, ignore the changes his mother rightfully made to the Family Trust by way of
the Final Amendment, and interpret the trust language in a manner that favors his own selfish
financial interests to the detriment of others. Under these facts, Ron's interpretation of the
Family Trust (Paragraph 3.2 in particular) would produce a completely inequitable and
unconscionable result in the distribution of his deceased mother's estate. This court should
not sanction such misconduct by giving credibility to Ron's argument, and awarding him
funds to which he has no lawful or equitable entitlement.
E.

The facts of this case distinguish it from the Banks' case and the Banks' case should
not be determinative of the distribution of the Trust Estate, rather, this court should
order the distribution in accordance with the Final Amendment
Even if Banks is upheld by this court as good law, there are many factors

distinguishing the case at issue from the facts of Banks. A notable factor which the Banks'
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court relied upon in coming to this determination was that tjhe Banks' trust had a separate
provision indicating that in the case of complete revocation, rthe Trustee shall deliver to the
Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the instrument of revocation, all of the Trust
property \ Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65 atfflf4, 10. The court reasoned that this language,
being a specific provision of the trust, distinguished a "revocation" from an "amendment or
modification" and established that a revocation is not the same as an amendment or
modification in this trust. Id. at ^jll. Also noted by the court was "what the 1999
amendment did not do". Id. at FN5. Footnote 5 points out the amendment did not change the
purpose of the trust that Ms. Banks be provided for during her life and for the benefit of her
family after and did not change specific identifications by name and birthdate of the children
as her family. Id. Additionally, the court stated, accepting the 1999 amendment would
render some trust language null and void, and would contravene the stated purpose. Id,
However, unlike the Banks' trust, the Family Trust or Darlene Patterson, as restated
by the Trust Restatement, contains no language governing complete revocation. In fact,
nowhere in the Trust Restatement is complete revocation required, explained, or mentioned
Rather, the Trust Restatement explicitly provides revocation can be made in whole or in part
and only requires that such be done in writing and signed bv the settlor. Therefore, unlike
Banks, there is no distinguishing language in the Trust Restatement that would lead a party or
the court to believe that a complete revocation is necessary to divest a beneficiary of his or
her rights in the trust.
Further, the Banksy court placed emphasis on the fact the purpose of the trust would be
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nullified if it accepted the 1999 amendment. However, in this case, the Patterson Final
Amendment completely restated the beneficiaries of the trust and does not require any of the
Trust Restatement's language to be rendered null and void. The purposes of the trust are still
fulfilled, and all of its provisions can be followed, even after giving effect to the Final
Amendment.
Therefore, the Final Amendment should govern the disposition of the trust estate.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and Denying Defendants' Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be
reversed and this case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to uphold and
enforce the Final Amendment.

DATED this Z 0^ day of April, 2010
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

J&mes C. Je

Attorney for Plaintiff, Petitioner, and
Appellant
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EXHIBIT A
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
The following are the constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or
regulations determinative or of central importance to this appeal.
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 (2009)

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-606 (2009)

3.

Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190

4.

Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589

5.

Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78,169 P.3d 7$0

The aforementioned citations are set forth verbatim in this Exhibit A.
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§ 75-7-605. Revocation or amendment of revocable trust
(1) Unless the terms of a trust expressly provide that the trust is irrevocable, the settlor may revoke or amend the trust. This Subsection (1) does not apply to a trust created under an instrument
executed before May 1, 2004.
(2) If a revocable trust is created or funded by more than one settlor:
(a) to the extent the trust consists of community property, the trust may be revoked by either
spouse acting alone but may be amended only by joint action of both spouses; and
(b) to the extent the trust consists of property other than community property, each settlor may
revoke or amend the trust with regard to the portion of the trust property attributable to that settlor's
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(3) The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust:
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(b) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method provided in the terms is not
expressly made exclusive, by:
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(ii) any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent.
(4) Upon revocation of a revocable trust, the trustee shall deliver the trust property as the settlor
directs.
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(5) A settlor's powers with respect to revocation, amendment, or distribution of trust property
may be exercised by an agent under a power of attorney only to the extent expressly authorized by
the terms of the trust or the power.
(6) A conservator of the settlor or, if no conservator has been appointed, a guardian of the settlor
may exercise a settlor's powers with respect to revocation, amendment, or distribution of trust property only with the approval of the court supervising the conservatorship or guardianship.
(7) A trustee who does not know that a trust has been revoked or amended is not liable to the
settlor or settlor's successors in interest for distributions made and other actions taken on the assumption that the trust had not been amended or revoked.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-7-605, enacted by L. 2004, ch. 89, § 70.
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 2004, ch. 89, § 123 makes the act effective on July 1, 2004.
LexisNexis 50 State Surveys, Legislation & Regulations
Trusts
NOTES TO DECISIONS
REVOCATION.
Quitclaim deed purporting to transfer trust property did not revoke the trust because it did not
comply with the terms of the trust documents. Davis v. Young, 2008 UTApp 246, 190 P. 3d 23.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article,
part, chapter, subtitle, or title.
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CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Third District Court, Salt Lake, Utah, granted summary
judgment in favor of appellees, decedent's children, in their action against appellant, decedent's sister, seeking enforcement of a trust that
was purportedly modified by a later amendment. The sister appealed.

trust language that the sister reserved for herself the power to amend, modify, or revoke the
trust in whole or in part. A complete revocation
was required to divest the beneficiaries of their
vested interests. The amendment provided that
beneficiary interests were only subject to divestiture via a revocation of the trust, and property
had to be delivered to the sister. These requirements were not met. The sister did not divest the children of their vested interests in the
trust, as she did not completely revoke the trust
in the amendment. The amendment did not effect a revocation of the trust that would have
properly divested the children of their vested
interests under the terms of the trust itself.
OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed.

OVERVIEW: The sister argued that the trial
court erred by granting the children's motion
for summary judgment, denying her crossmotion for summary judgment, and admitting
the deposition testimony of the attorney. The
appellate court found that it was clear from the

CORE TERMS: beneficiary, revocation,
summary judgment, vested interests, revoke,
amend, reserved, modify, settlor's, vested, divested, revoked, trust estate, successor trustees,
divestiture, terminated, trust agreement, divest,
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[HN1] Summary judgment is appropriate where
there are no genuine issues of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c), When reviewing the trial court's ruling in a motion for
summary judgment, the appellate court considers all facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The appellate court reviews the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, according no deference to that court's legal conclusions. In addition, the appellate court
may affirm a grant of summary judgment on
any ground available to the trial court, even if it
was not relied upon below.

ability to deal with it as is expressly reserved to
him in the trust instrument. Thus, a settlor has
the power to modify or revoke a trust only if
and to the extent that such power is explicitly
reserved by the terms of the trust. Furthermore,
the creation of a trust involves the transfer of
property interests in the trust subject-matter to
the beneficiaries. These interests cannot be
taken from the beneficiaries except in accordance with a provision of the trust instrument.
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Beneficiaries > Single Beneficiaries
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Modification & Termination
[HN3] Vested beneficiary interests are subject
to being divested by the exercise of the reserved power to amend or revoke the indenture
in trust.
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Beneficiaries > Single Beneficiaries
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Modification & Termination
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Revocable
Living Trusts
[HN4] Even a revocable trust clothes beneficiaries with a legally enforceable right to insist
that the terms of the trust be adhered to.
COUNSEL: James H. Faust, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiffs.

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Beneficiaries > General Overview
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Modification & Termination
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Trustees
> General Overview
[HN2] A trust is a form of ownership in which
the legal title to property is vested in a trustee,
who has equitable duties to hold and manage it
for the benefit of the beneficiaries. Once the
settlor has created the trust he is no longer the
owner of the trust property and has only such

J. Jay Bullock, Clinton J. Bullock, Karen Bullock Kreeck, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
JUDGES: DURHAM, Chief Justice. Associate
Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Howe, Justice
Russon, and Justice Wilkins concur in Chief
Justice Durham's opinion.
OPINION BY: DURHAM
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[**1191] DURHAM, ChiefJustice:
INTRODUCTION
[*P1] Decedent's children, Kenneth Alan
Banks, Susan Banks Baker, and Bransford Michael Banks brought an action against decedent's sister, Nancy Means ("Ms. Means")
seeking enforcement of a 1992 trust that was
purportedly modified by a 1999 amendment.
Under the terms of the 1999 amendment, Ms.
Means would become the sole beneficiary of
the trust, while the Banks children would become contingent beneficiaries. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the
Banks children. Ms. Means appealed, arguing
that the trial court erred by (1) granting the
Banks children's motion for summary judgment, (2) denying Ms. Mean's cross-motion for
summary judgment, and (3) admitting the
[***2] deposition testimony of attorney Joseph
L. Piatt. We affirm the trial court's grant of
summary judgment and hold that the 1999
amendment did not effect a revocation of the
trust as required by the trust language. Therefore, the terms of the original trust document
govern the disposition of the trust estate and the
remaining issues are moot.
BACKGROUND
[*P2] On April 15, 1992, the decedent,
Betty A. Banks ("Ms. Banks"), executed a
document entitled the "Betty A. Banks Family
Protection Trust," which was prepared by her
attorney, Joseph L. Piatt ("Mr. Piatt"). As required by the terms of the trust, Ms. Banks, as
settlor, transferred certain property into the
trust and served as trustee until her death on
August 24, 1999.
[*P3] The trust provides that upon the
death of Ms. Banks, the Banks children were to
share equally in the proceeds of the trust estate
and serve as joint trustees. Article I of the trust,
"PURPOSES AND BIRTH DATES," declares
"This Trust is established for the primary benefit of the Undersigned during the Undersigned's

lifetime, for the Undersigned's family thereafter." The document then names Ms. Banks'
family as Kenneth Alan Banks, Susan Banks
Baker, [***3] and Bransford Michael Banks.
Article IV, "DISPOSITION ON THE DEATH
OF THE UNbERSIGNED," designates the
Banks children as joint beneficiaries of the trust
estate upon Ms. Banks' death. Article VI,
"TRUSTEE PROVISIONS," names the Banks
children as joint successor trustees.
[*P4] Tht trust agreement provides that
the trust is revocable, and that Ms. Banks, as
settlor, can amend certain portions of the trust,
subject to the provisions of the trust language.
Article III provides:
AMENDMENT, REVOCATION AND
ADDITIONS TO TRUST
3.1 Rights of the Undersigned. As long as
the Undersigned is alive, the Undersigned reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this
Trust in whole or in part, including the principal, and the present or past undisbursed income
from such principal. Such revocation or
amendment of this Trust may be in whole or in
part by written instrument. Amendment, modification or revocation of this instrument shall
be effective only when such change is delivered
in writing to tfre then acting Trustee. On the
revocation of tlfis instrument in its entirety, the
Trustee shall deliver to the Undersigned, as the
Undersigned may direct in the instrument of
revocation, all of the [***4] Trust property.
3.2 Interest^ of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the beheficiaries are presently vested
interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated
other than by death. As long as this Trust subsists, the Trust properties and all the rights and
privileges hereunder shall be controlled and
exercised by the Trustee named herein in their
fiduciary capacity.
[*P5] In August 1999, Ms. Banks executed an amendment to the trust. The amendment consists <^f three replacement pages in-
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serted into the trust document. It does not
change article I of the trust, which states that
the trust's purpose is to benefit Ms. Banks during her lifetime and her family thereafter, and
names the Banks children as her family. The
amendment does, however, change the beneficiaries and the successor trustees. The amendment changes article IV, "DISPOSITION ON
THE DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED,"
[** 1192] to allocate 100% of the trust estate to
Ms. Banks' older sister, Ms. Means, on the
death of Ms. Banks, with the Banks children
listed as alternate beneficiaries should Ms.
Means predecease Ms. Banks. In addition, article VI of the amendment, "TRUSTEE
PROVISIONS," changes [***5] the successor
trustee to Ms. Means, with the Banks children
to serve as joint successor trustees if Ms.
Means predeceases Ms. Banks.

ences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Peterson v.
Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, P13, 446 Utah
Adv. Rep. 40 . We review the trial court's grant
of summary judgment for correctness, according no deference to that court's legal conclusions. Oxendine v. Overturf, 1999 UT 4, P7,
973 P.2d 417; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994). In addition, we may affirm a grant
of summary judgment on any ground available
to the trial court, even if it was not relied upon
below. Bailey v. Boyles, 2002 UT 58, P10, _
P.3d _ ; Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d
231, 235 (Utah 1993).

[*P6] After Ms. Banks died in August,
1999, the parties disputed whether the 1999
amendment or the original trust agreement
governed the disposition of the trust. On October 14, 1999, the Banks children filed a complaint against Ms. Means seeking, among other
things, a finding that they were the rightful
trustees and beneficiaries of the trust, and were
therefore entitled to the trust proceeds. Ms.
Means counterclaimed, asserting that the 1999
amendment governed the disposition of the
trust and that she was the sole beneficiary. After a series of motions and cross-motions, the
trial court granted the Banks children's motion
for summary judgment, and this appeal followed.

[*P8] Ms. Means argues that the trial court
erred when it (1) granted the Banks children's
motion for summary judgment, (2) denied Ms.
Means' motion for summary judgment, and (3)
determined that the attorney-client privilege did
not protect Mr. Piatt's deposition statements. '
When the trial court granted summary judgment to the Banks children, it found that
the[0>ir<0] children's [***7| interest in the
trust was vested subject to divestiture only
through a revocation of the trust, that the trust
was never revoked, and that the Banks children
were therefore the sole beneficiaries of the trust
and entitled to receive disbursement of the trust
corpus as set forth in the original trust document.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P7] [HN1] Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c); Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 1999 UT 37,
P10, 977 P.2d 1205. When reviewing the trial
court's ruling in a motion for summary judgment, we consider all facts and [***6] infer-

ANALYSIS
[EDITOR'S NOTE: TEXT WITHIN
THESE
SYMBOLS
[0><0]
IS
OVERSTRUCK IN THE SOURCE.]

1 These statements were relevant to the
Banks children's claim of undue influence or lack of capacity to amend the
trust; because of our disposition of the
other questions on appeal, we do not
reach this issue.
I. THE TERMS OF THE ORIGINAL TRUST
AGREEMENT
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[*P9] It is well settled [HN2] that "[a]
trust is a form of ownership in which the legal
title to property is vested in a trustee, who has
equitable duties to hold and manage it for the
benefit of the beneficiaries." Continental Bank
& Trust Co. v. Country Club Mobile Estates,
Ltd., 632 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1981)(citmg Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 (1959)). "Once
the settlor has created the trust he is no longer
the owner [***8] of the trust property and has
only such ability to deal with it as is expressly
reserved to him in the trust instrument." Id. (citing Boone v. Davis, 64 Miss. 133, 8 So. 202
(Miss. 1886)). Thus, a settlor has the power to
modify or revoke a trust only if and to the extent that such power is explicitly reserved by
the terms of the trust. Continental Bank, 632
P.2d at 872; see also Kline v. Utah Dep't. of
Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)(citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§
330-331 (1959)); accord Clayton v. Behle, 565
P.2d 1132, 1133 (Utah 1977). Furthermore,
"the creation of a trust involves the transfer of
[** 1193] property interests in the trust subjectmatter to the beneficiaries. These interests cannot be taken from [the beneficiaries] except in
accordance with a provision of the trust instrument." George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert,
Trusts & Trustees § 998 (2d ed. rev. 1983).
Thus, our analysis begins with an examination
of the original trust language to see what powers Ms. Banks reserved for herself as the trustee
and what beneficial interests she created.2
2 Ms. Banks was the settlor of the trust,
the "Undersigned" in the trust document,
and the trustee of the trust once it was
created.
[***9]yl Revocation
[*P10]
Article
III,
entitled
"AMENDMENT,
REVOCATION
AND
ADDITIONS TO TRUST," clearly reserves the
settlor's right to amend, modify or revoke the
trust. Section 3.1 states "Rights of the Undersigned. . . . The Undersigned reserves the right

to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole
or in part
" The trust specifies that "revocation or amendment of this Trust may be in
whole or in part by written instrument.
Amendment, modification or revocation of this
instrument shall be effective only when such
change is delivered in writing to the then acting
Trustee." However, the trust indicates that in
the case of complete revocation, "the Trustee
shall deliver t^ the Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the instrument of revocation, all of the Trust property." Thus, the trust
specifies that for Ms. Banks to completely revoke the trust, all the property must be transferred back to Ms. Banks, after which she could
presumably create a new trust or dispose of the
property as she saw fit.
[*P11] It is clear from the trust language
that Ms. Banks reserved for herself the power
to amend, modify, or revoke the trust in whole
or in part. Any such changes [***10] were to
be specified in writing and delivered to her, but
in the case of a complete revocation, all the
property in the trust was also to be delivered to
Ms. Banks. Revocation is therefore a specific
provision of the trust language and is not the
same as an amendment or modification.
B. Beneficiary Interests
[*P12] Npxt, we examine the trust agreement to see wjhat interests Ms. Banks created
for the trust beneficiaries. Section 3.2 reads,
"Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of
the beneficiaries are presently vested interests
subject to divestment which shall continue until
this Trust is revoked or terminated other than
by death." By the plain language of the trust,
the beneficiaries have "vested interests" 3 that
continue until the interests are "revoked or terminated." Here, Ms. Banks reserved the power
to revoke, modify, or amend the trust in whole
or in part in section 3.1, but limited that power
in section 3.2 With regard to the beneficiaries.
Thus, a complete revocation was required to
divest the beneficiaries of their vested interests.
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3 A "vested" interest is something "that
has become a completed, consummated
right for present or future enjoyment; not
contingent; unconditional; absolute. . . .
An interest may be vested, even where it
does not carry a right to immediate possession, if it does confer a fixed right of
taking possession in the future." Black's
Law Dictionary 1557 (7th ed. 1999).
[***11] [*P13] Ms. Means relies on In re
Estate of Groesbeck, 935 P.2d 1255 (Utah
1997) for the proposition that the language in
section 3.2 merely proves that the trust is not
illusory and does not restrict Ms. Banks' rights
to divest the Banks children of their vested interests. Her reliance is misplaced. In Groesbeck
we held that a revocable trust can be created,
without being deemed illusory, as long as title
to the property passes to the trustee and vested
interests are created in the beneficiaries, even if
these interests are subject to divestiture. Id. at
1257-58 (citing Horn v. First Sec. Bank of
Utah N.A, 548 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1976)).
That is, a reservation of the power to revoke
does not make a trust invalid. Id. at 1257 . We
further observed that [HN3] vested beneficiary
interests are "subject to being divested by the
exercise of the reserved power to amend or revoke the indenture in trust." Id. at 1258. Thus,
we concluded that the trust was valid, even
though the Groesbecks had reserved the right to
revoke the trust and created vested beneficiary
interests that were subject [** 1194] to divestiture via the specific provisions [***12] of the
trust itself. 4 Id. at 1258. Groesbeck, therefore,
does not require us to disregard the requirements of the trust language.
4
The Groesbeck trust language was
remarkably similar to the trust language
at issue here: "The interest of the beneficiaries is a present interest which shall
continue until this Trust is revoked or
terminated other than by death." Id. at
1258. In that case, however, we were not

called upon to determine whether a revocation had taken place that would have
divested the beneficiaries of their interests. Id.
[*P14] Ms. Banks reserved the right to
amend, modify, or revoke the trust, specified
how such changes were to be accomplished,
and created vested beneficiary interests that
could be divested only though a complete revocation of the trust. Our next step, therefore, is
to look to the 1999 amendment to see whether
it complied with the terms of the trust.
II. THE 1999 AMENDMENT
[*P15] The 1999 amendment contains two
primary changes. First, it changes [***13] article IV, "DISPOSITION ON THE DEATH OF
THE UNDERSIGNED," to allocate 100% of
the trust estate to Ms. Means on the death of
Ms. Banks. Second, article VI, "TRUSTEE
PROVISIONS," changes Ms. Banks' successor
trustee from the Banks children to Ms. Means,
unless Ms. Means predeceases Ms. Banks.
Thus, the 1999 amendment sought to change
the beneficiary status of the Banks children,
thereby divesting them of their vested interests
in the trust. 5 As discussed earlier, the Banks
children had vested interests in the trust which
could only be divested according to the terms
of the original trust document. Therefore, the
1999 amendment falls within the purview of
article III, section 3.2 of the trust, which provides that beneficiary interests are only subject
to divestiture via a revocation of the trust, and
section 3.1, which requires that upon revocation the trust property must be delivered to Ms.
Banks.
5
Also notable is what the 1999
amendment did not do. It did not change
the language in article I, stating that the
purpose of the trust was for Ms. Banks
and her family thereafter, or the specific
identifications by name and birthdate of
the Banks children as her family. Accept-
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ing Ms. Means' interpretation of the 1999
amendment would thus render some language null and void, and contravene the
stated purpose of the Betty A. Banks
Family Protection Trust.
[***14] [*P16] Neither of these requirements were met. Ms. Banks did not divest the
Banks children of their vested interests in the
trust because she did not completely revoke the
trust in the 1999 amendment. In other words,
the 1999 amendment did not effect a revocation
of the trust that would have properly divested
the Banks children of their vested interests under the terms of the trust itself As we have
previously stated, [HN4] "even a revocable
trust clothes beneficiaries .. . with a legally en-

forceable right to insist that the terms of the
trust be adhered to." Continental Bank & Trust
Co. v. Country Club Mobile Estates, Ltd., 632
P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1981).
CONCLUSION
[*P17] We affirm the district court's grant
of summary judgment to the Banks children
and find that the Betty A. Banks Family Protection Trust dated April 15, 1992, governs the
disposition of the estate of Betty A. Banks.
[*P18] Associate Chief Justice Durrant,
Justice Howe, Justice Russon, and Justice Wilkins concur in Chief Justice Durham's opinion.
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Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Trustees
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[HN3] A trust is a form of ownership in which
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only to the limitations imposed by law or the
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[HN1] The validity of a trust is an issue of law,
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Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Beneficiaries > General Overview
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Trustees
> Duties & Powers > General Overview
Governments > Fiduciary Responsibilities
[HN2] A trust is an arrangement for the ownership of property. The nature of the arrangement
is such that the legal title of the property is held
by the trustee, but the benefit and enjoyment of
the property resides with the beneficiaries. It is
well settled that a trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the
person by whom the title to the property is held
the trustee to equitable duties to deal with the
property for the benefit of another person the
beneficiary, which arises as a result of a manifestation by the settlor, or trustor of an intention
to create it. There must be an intent by the
settlor to confer a beneficial interest in the
property in some other person. To create an inter vivos trust, a settlor must have an intent to
create a presently enforceable trust, the trust

Civil Procedure > Settlements > Settlement
Agreements > Modifications
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Interpretation
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Modification & Termination
[HN4] Absent fraud or mistake, a settlor has
the power to modify a trust only if and to the
extent that such a power was reserved by the
terms of the trust. The same rule applies to a
settlor's power to revoke a trust. Ordinarily, if a
power to modify is subject to no restrictions,
then a reserved power to amend or modify includes the power to revoke. However, the
settlor cannot modify the trust if, by the terms
of the trust, he did not reserve a power of modification. Likewise, if the settlor reserves a
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does not specify the method of modification,
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[HN5] A trust that specifies revocation of a
vested beneficiary interest through divestiture
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Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Modification & Termination
[HN6] The revocation of a trust is required
when terminating a vested beneficial interest.
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Beneficiaries > General Overview
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Modification & Termination
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Revocable
Living Trusts
[HN7] A revocable trust can be created, without being deemed illusory, as long as title to the
property passes to the trustee and vested interests are created in the beneficiaries, even if
these interests are subject to divestiture. The
reservation of a power to amend, modify, or
revoke does not make a trust invalid or incomplete. The vested beneficiary interests are subject to divestiture through operation of the spe-

cific provisions of the trust, namely the reserved power to amend, modify, or revoke.
Business & Corporate Law > Corporations >
Governing Documents& Procedures > Articles of Incorporation & Bylaws > General
Overview
[HN8] See Utkh Code Ann. § 48-2c-409.
Business & Corporate Law > Corporations >
Governing Documents & Procedures > Articles of Incorporation & Bylaws > General
Overview I
[HN9] A restated document that not only restates and integrates the operative provisions
but also amends the operative provisions shall
so state with the appropriate language. Utah
Code Ann. § 48-2c-409(2), (3). If the restated
articles only restate and integrate, and do not
further amend the provisions of the articles of
organization ^s previously amended or supplemented, and xhere is no discrepancy between
those provisions and the provisions of the restated articles), they must so state. § 48-2c409(4)(b).

Estate, Gift <&, Trust Law > Trusts > Administration
[HN10] See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-912.
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
[HN11] When faced with a question of statutory construction, and in attempting to determine legislative intent, an appellate court first
looks to the plain language of the statute. In
construing a [statute, the appellate court assumes that each term in the statute was used
advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless [ such a reading is unreasonably
confused or inoperable. Only if the appellate
court finds soibe ambiguity in the statute's plain
language neecjl it look further, and only then
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need the appellate court seek guidance from the
legislative history and relevant policy considerations.

[HN14] The terms and conditions of an oral
agreement must be sufficiently definite to allow
it to be enforced. In determining whether the
parties created an enforceable contract, a court
should consider all preliminary negotiations,
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > General offers, and counteroffers and interpret the various expressions of the parties for the purpose of
Overview
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
deciding whether the parties reached agreement
Insurance Law > Life Insurance > Beneficiar- on complete and definite terms. An agreement
ies > Changes
cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite or
[HN12] An appellate court will not look bedemonstrate that there was no intent to conyond the language to divine legislative intent;
tract.
the language is clear and unambiguous.
Contracts Law > Types of Contracts > Oral
Agreements
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Creation
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Revocable
Living Trusts
[HN13] A written agreement is not required to
alter interests created by an inter vivos trust.
The issue of whether an oral contract or agreement exists presents questions of both law and
fact. Whether a contract has been formed is ultimately a conclusion of law, but that ordinarily
depends on the resolution of subsidiary issues
of fact. While an appellate court does not defer
to the trial court's legal conclusions in reviewing them for correctness, it does defer to factual
findings, and will not set them aside unless they
are clearly erroneous. A trial court's finding of
fact is not clearly erroneous unless it is against
the clear weight of the evidence or we reach a
definite and clear conclusion that a mistake has
been made.

Civil Procedure > Settlements > Settlement
Agreements > Enforcement > General Overview
Contracts Law > Types of Contracts > Oral
Agreements
Contracts Law > Types of Contracts > Settlement Agreements

Contracts Law > Consideration > Enforcement of Promises > General Overview
Insurance Law > Life Insurance > Burial Insurance
Real Property Law > Estates > Present Estates
> Life Estates
[HN15] An agreement cannot be enforced if its
terms are indefinite or demonstrate that there
was no intent to contract.
Civil Procedure > Settlements > Settlement
Agreements > Enforcement > General Overview
Civil Procedure > Settlements > Settlement
Agreements > Validity
Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Waivers > General Overview
[HN16] Waiver is an intentional relinquishment
of a known right. It must be distinctly made,
although it may be express or implied. To constitute a waiver, there must be an existing right,
benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it. The relinquishment must be distinctly made, although
it may be express or implied.
Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Waivers > General Overview
[HN17] Waiver of a contractual right occurs
when a party to a contract intentionally acts in a
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manner inconsistent with its contractual rights,
and, as a result, prejudice accrues to the opposing party or parties to the contract.
Civil Procedure > Remedies > Costs & Attorney Fees > General Overview
Real Property Law > Nonmortgage Liens >
Judgment Liens
[HN18] See Utah Code Ann. § 38-12-103(a).
Civil Procedure > Remedies > Costs & Attorney Fees > General Overview
Real Property Law > Nonmortgage Liens >
Judgment Liens
[HN19] See Utah Code Ann. § 38-12-103(b).

Wilkins, and Judge Greenwood concur in Chief
Justice Durham's opinion. Having recused himself, Justice Howe does not participate herein;
Court of Appeals Judge Pamela T. Greenwood
sat.
OPINION BY: DURHAM
OPINION
[**591] DURHAM, ChiefJustice:
INTRODUCTION

[*P1] Decedent's spouse, Marian Flake
(Mrs. Flake), brought an action against the Almon J. Flake Family Trust, seeking enforcement of the trust dated September 22, 1987 (the
1987 Trust Agreement) and making numerous
claims regarding her rights as a beneficiary.
The
1987 Trust Agreement was purportedly
Civil Procedure > Remedies > Lis Pendens >
modified
or replaced by a subsequent trust
Notices
document entitled Restatement of the Almon J.
Real Property Law > Nonmortgage Liens >
Flake
Family Trust dated October 30, 1998 (the
Judgment Liens
1998
Restatement).
The 1998 Restatement purReal Property Law > Priorities & Recording >
ported to change significantly many of Mrs.
Lis Pendens
[HN20] Utah Code Ann. § 38-12-103(2) pro- Flake's benefits as outlined in the 1987 Trust
Agreement. Prior [***2] to the filing of any
vides for penalties to a lien claimant for nonaction, the parties met to discuss a possible setcompliance with the notice requirements or for
tlement. Joel Flake, as trustee (the trustee) filed
a willful refusal to release the lien.
a motion before trial to enforce the settlement
agreement that he claimed was reached on
April 14, 199^ (the 1999 Settlement AgreeContracts Law > Remedies > Restitution
ment).
[HN21] A trial court has power to order restitution in an independent suit, or upon a motion
[*P2] Th£ trial court addressed the issues
filed in the original. Restitution upon the reverin two phases. In the first phase, the court consal of a judgment is not of mere right. It is ex
sidered whether the parties had reached an engratia, resting in the exercise of sound discreforceable settlement agreement before the action.
tion was filed. The court held that the parties
had reached a valid settlement agreement on
COUNSEL: Matthew C. Barneck, Martha
several issues, but that there was no mutual reKnudson, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
lease of claims. The second phase considered
Mrs. Flake's claims of undue influence relating
Loren D. Martin, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
to the 1998 Restatement and the formation of
JALCOM, L.L.C., a family limited liability
JUDGES: DURHAM, Chief Justice. Associate
company. The trustee filed a motion to dismiss,
Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Russon, Justice
arguing that Mrs. Flake stated she had no evi-
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dence to offer and would rely solely on the
documents at issue. The trial court granted the
trustee's motion to dismiss in part. The court
concluded that the 1998 Restatement did not
fully supercede the 1987 Trust Agreement, specifically holding that under the 1987 Trust
Agreement Mrs. Flake was entitled to monthly
support from the trust. The [***3] court also
determined that Mrs. Flake was entitled to receive the decedent's social security and retirement funds as outlined in the 1987 Trust
Agreement.
[*P3] Mrs. Flake appealed, arguing that
the enforcement of an unexecuted agreement,
[**592] the 1999 Settlement Agreement, constitutes reversible error. She also contends that
she held certain rights under the trust which can
only be relinquished by express waiver. The
trustee filed a cross-appeal arguing, among
several issues, that the 1998 Restatement did in
fact supercede the 1987 Trust Agreement. The
trustee, therefore, contends that the Trust is entitled to a reimbursement of the support payments previously paid to Mrs. Flake. We affirm
the trial court's granting of the trustee's motion
to dismiss, but reverse the finding that the 1998
Restatement did not effect a revocation of the
trust. We find that the 1998 Restatement fully
replaced and superceded the original 1987
Trust Agreement. Therefore, the terms of the
1998 Restatement and subsequent 1999 Settlement Agreement govern the disposition of the
trust estate.

BACKGROUND
[*P4] Almon J. Flake (Mr. Flake) and his
first wife, Lois Flake, had five children. Mr.
[***4] Flake's first wife subsequently passed
away. On September 22, 1987, Mr. Flake executed the 1987 Trust Agreement by which he
created the "Almon J. Flake Family Trust."
Shortly thereafter, on October 5, 1987, Mr.
Flake married Marian R. Flake. Article II of the
1987 Trust Agreement states that "this trust is
specifically designed for the use and benefit of

the Undersigned Almon J. Flake, and spouse,
for the lifetime of the Undersigned, then for the
use and benefit of the Undersigned's children,
except as contained herein" (emphasis added).
The 1987 Trust Agreement made "Special Provisions" for Mrs. Flake. Article VII of the 1987
Trust Agreement provides as follows:
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
Upon the death of the Undersigned the
Trust shall care for the needs of MARIAN R.
FLAKE including her living arrangements in
the home of the Undersigned or other reasonable living quarters which may include a unit in
the Flake duplex, at her discretion.
B. The furnishings of the Flake home shall
be used by Marian until her death as needed.
C. Marian shall also enjoy Almon's social security and all existing retirement funds.
F. Upon the death of Almon and Marian, all
the remainder [***5] of this trust estate shall
be distributed to the Flake children, share and
share alike, per stirpes. THESE SPECIAL
PROVISIONS SHALL TAKE PRECEDENCE
OVER ANY AND ALL OTHERS OF THIS
TRUST AGREEMENT.
[*P5] The 1987 Trust Agreement also
stated that the trust was revocable, and that Mr.
Flake as settlor could amend certain portions of
the trust, subject to the provisions of the trust
language. Article XIII of the 1987 Trust Agreement:
Revocation and Amendment
A. As long as the Undersigned is alive, he
reserves the right, without the consent or approval of any other, to amend, modify, revoke,
or remove from this Trust the property that he
has contributed, in whole or in part, including
the principal and the present or past undis-
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bursed income from such principal. (Emphasis
added).
[*P6] On October 30, 1998, Mr. Flake
executed a document entitled the "Restatement
of the Almon J. Flake Family Trust" (the 1998
Restatement), which states that "Almon J.
Flake hereby amends and restates in full the
Almon J. Flake Family Trust dated September
22, 1987." (emphasis added). In her brief, Mrs.
Flake points out that Mr. Flake executed the
1998 Restatement during his final [***6] illness and within two weeks of his death. She
also suggests that Mr. Flakefs children facilitated the changes he made, significantly reducing the extent of her interest in the 1987 Trust
Agreement. However, we note that while Mrs.
Flake originally asserted a claim of undue influence in this case, during the second phase of
trial, she declined to pursue her claim. We are
therefore precluded from considering anything
that might be relevant to a claim of undue influence. Article IX of the 1998 Restatement
makes the following provisions for Mrs. Flake:
[**593] Disposition at my Death
C. Vehicles, If Marian R. Flake survives me
she shall be distributed the Cadillac.
D. Marian R. Flake, If Marian R. Flake
survives me, the main part of my home (located
at 604 East 540 North in Centerville) shall be
held in a separate trust as a life estate for her
benefit. The trust shall pay the following costs
associated with the property: property insurance, property taxes, electricity, heating fuel,
water, and other city utilities. Marian R. Flake
shall pay all other costs associated with the
property including telephone charges and maintenance and upkeep costs. However, the Trustee shall have [***7] discretion to pay such
part or all of the maintenance costs of the home
that the Trustee feels is appropriate.
[*P7] After Mr. Flake died on November
15, 1998, the parties disputed whether the 1987
Trust Agreement or the 1998 Restatement governed the disposition of the trust. The trustee's

position was that the 1998 Restatement had entirely replaced the 1987 Trust Agreement. Mrs.
Flake, however, contended that she was entitled
to certain rights under the original trust agreement which could only be relinquished through
express waiver. The parties met on April 14,
1999 in order to resolve their dispute and to
discuss a possible settlement agreement. Mrs.
Flake later filed a claim seeking enforcement of
the original 1987 Trust Agreement. Pending the
result of the litigation, Mrs. Flake filed a lis
pendens on property subject to the trust, and
argued that the recording of the lis pendens was
done in order to give constructive notice that
the property was subject to litigation. The trustee contends that Mrs. Flake improperly filed
the lien and failed to provide notice within
thirty days after recordation as required under
Utah Code Ann. sections 38-12-102 [***8]
and 103. Appellee also argues that Mrs. Flake
failed to release the lien within twenty days as
required under Utah Code Ann. section 38-9-4.
After a series of motions and cross-motions, the
trial court granted the trustee's motion to dismiss and ruled on the pending issue of the lis
pendens.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P8] [ffiil] The validity of the trust is an
issue of law, which we review for correctness.
Groesbech v. Groesbeck (In re Estate of
Groesbeck), 935 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1997).
The grant of a motion to dismiss is likewise a
matter of law, which the appellate court reviews for correctness. Thimmes v. Utah State
Univ., 2001 UTApp 93, P4, 22 P.3d257, 258.
ANALYSIS
[*P9] The determinative questions on appeal are as follows: (1) whether the trial court
erred in concluding that the 1998 Restatement
did not fully supercede the 1987 Trust Agreement; (2) whetjher the trial court erred when it
found that section 75-3-912 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code is not applicable to nonpro-
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bate transfers, such as trust administration in
decedent's estates, and therefore does not apply
to the 1999 Agreement; (3) [***9] whether
the trial court erred in failing to find that Mrs.
Flake was estopped to make claims beyond the
scope of the 1999 Settlement Agreement; (4)
whether the trial court erred in failing to award
attorneys' fees and costs relating to the lis
pendens; and (5) whether the court should direct removal of the trustee. We reverse the ruling of the trial court as to the first issue, and
affirm regarding the remaining issues.
[*P10] In granting the trustee's motion to
dismiss, the trial court found that the 1998 Restatement did not fully replace the 1987 Trust
Agreement, and that the documents must be
read together to determine the governing terms
of the trust. We disagree, and hold that the
1987 Trust Agreement was entirely superceded
by the 1998 Restatement. We further conclude
that Mrs. Flake and the trustee reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement at a meeting held on April 14, 1999. However, the 1999
Settlement Agreement did not resolve all the
issues between the parties, and thus did not include a release of claims nor did it preclude
Mrs. Flake from asserting other claims against
the trust to the extent they (1) are provided for
in the 1998 Restatement and (2) were not
[*** 10] discussed and agreed upon at the April
14, 1999 settlement meeting.

[**594] I. THE TERMS OF THE 1987
TRUST AGREEMENT
[*P11] [HN2] A trust is an arrangement
for the ownership of property. The nature of the
arrangement is such that the legal title of the
property is held by the trustee, but the benefit
and enjoyment of the property resides with the
beneficiaries. It is well settled that
[a] trust... is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by
whom the title to the property is held [the trustee] to equitable duties to deal with the property
for the benefit of another person [the benefici-

ary], which arises as a result of a manifestation
[by the settlor, or trustor] of an intention to create it.
In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah
1997) (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts §
2 (1959)). There must be an intent by the settlor
to confer a beneficial interest in the property in
some other person. To create an inter vivos
trust,
[a] settlor must have an intent to create a presently enforceable trust, . . . the trust property
must be clearly specified and set aside, . . . and
the essential terms of the trust [*** 11] must be
clear enough for the court to enforce the equitable duties that are the sine qua non of a trust
relationship.
Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 183-84
(Utah 1981) (citations omitted).
[*P12] [HN3] "A trust is a form of ownership in which the legal title to property is
vested in a trustee, who has equitable duties to
hold and manage it for the benefit of beneficiaries." Confl Bank & Trust Co. v. Country
Club Mobile Estates, Ltd, 632 P.2d 869, 872
(Utah 1981) (citing Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 2 (1959)). The trustee has exclusive
control of the trust property, subject only to the
limitations imposed by law or the trust instrument, and "once the settlor has created the trust
he is no longer the owner of the trust property
and has only such ability to deal with it as is
expressly reserved to him in the trust instrument." Id. (citation omitted). A trust must have
an identifiable beneficiary who is capable of
enforcing the equitable duties of the trustee.
The transfer of property interests to the beneficiaries "cannot be taken from them except in
accordance with a provision of the trust instrument . . . ." George G. Bogert & [***12]
George T. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees § 998 (2d
ed. rev. 1983).
A. Revocation
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[*P13] [HN4] Absent fraud or mistake, a
settlor "has the power to modify a trust only if
and to the extent that such a power was reserved by the terms of the trust." Kline v. Utah
Dep't of Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); see also Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 331. The same rule applies to a settlor's
power to revoke a trust. Restatement (second)
of Trusts § 331. Ordinarily, if a power to modify is subject to no restrictions, then a reserved
power to amend or modify includes the power
to revoke. Id. cmt. h. However, the settlor cannot modify the trust if, by the terms of the trust,
he did not reserve a power of modification. Id.
Likewise, "if the settlor reserves a power to
modify the trust only in a particular manner or
under particular circumstances, he can modify
the trust only in that manner or under those circumstances." Id. cmt. d. However, as is the case
with the 1987 Trust Agreement, if the settlor
does not specify the method of modification,
then "the power may be exercised by any
method which sufficiently manifests his intention to modify [***13] the trust." Id. cmt. c. In
interpreting the terms of a trust, the proper focus of inquiry is the settlor's intent. Leggroan
v. lion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 120 Utah 93,
99, 232 P.2d 746, 749 (1951).
[*P14] In Article XIII of the 1987 Trust
Agreement, Mr. Flake expressly reserved both
the power to modify and the power to revoke
the trust created in 1987. The terms of the 1987
Trust Agreement state that the "Undersigned"
reserves the right "to amend, modify, [or] revoke" the Trust, and thus it is clear that the
settlor, Mr. Flake, reserved the right to amend,
modify, or revoke.
Revocation and Amendment
A. As long as the Undersigned is alive, he
reserves the right, without the consent or approval of any other, to amend, modify, revoke,
or remove from this Trust the [**595] property that he has contributed, in whole or in part,

including the principal and the present or past
undisbursed income from such principal.
The 1998 Restatement clearly states that it
amends the 1987 Trust Agreement.
[*P15] We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the 1998 Restatement, absent an
explicit revocation, is construed only as a
modification of the 1987 Trust [***14]
Agreement. However, we find that although the
1998 Restatement amended, or modified, the
1987 Trust Agreement and did not revoke it in
its entirety, the terms and contents of the 1998
Restatement did fiilly supercede all of the operative provisions of the original 1987 Trust
Agreement.
B. Beneficiary Interests
[*P16] This court recently held in Banks
v. Means, 2002 UT 65 P14, 52 P.3d 1190, that
[HNS] a trust that specified revocation of a
vested beneficiary interest through divestiture
could only divest those beneficiary interests
through a complete revocation of the trust.
"Mrs. Banks reserved the power to revoke,
modify, or amend the trust in whole or in part,"
and "limited that power in [a subsequent section] with regard to the beneficiaries." Banks,
2002 UT 65 at P12. "[A] complete revocation
[or termination] was required to divest the
beneficiaries of their vested interest." Id. The
appellant in Banks relied on Groesbeck, 935
P. 2d 1255, arguing that the limiting language
merely proved that the trust was not illusory
and did not restrict the grantor's right to divest
the beneficiaries of their vested interests.
[***15] The court in Groesbeck held that a
reservation of the power to revoke does not
make a trust invalid. Id. at 1257. However, in
Banks, this court noted that Mrs. Banks reserved the right to amend, modify, or revoke
the trust, specified how such changes were to
be accomplished, and created vested beneficiary interests that could be divested only
through a complete revocation or termination
of the trust. Banks, 2002 UT 65 at PI4.'
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1 The trustee argues that to hold that a
vested interest cannot be revoked or that
the vested beneficiary assets cannot be
modified is to nullify thousands of outstanding trust agreements. However, we
do not hold that a vested beneficiary interest can never be revoked, but only that
the revocation is subject to the terms of
the individual trust agreement. Here, the
trust agreement specifically states that
the vested beneficiary interests can only
be divested or revoked through a complete revocation or termination of the
Trust.
[*P17] As [***16] in Banks, Mr. Flake
reserved the right "to amend, modify, [or] revoke" the trust and later stated that the vested
beneficiary interests shall continue until revocation or termination of the Trust other than by
death. Here, Article XIV of the 1987 Trust
Agreement states as follows:
Vested Interest of Beneficiaries
The interest of the beneficiaries is a present
vested interest which shall continue until the
Trust is revoked or terminated other than by
death.
The 1987 Trust Agreement language can be
distinguished from the language used in Banks.
The limiting language in Banks was subject to a
beneficial interest that was to be revoked or
terminated through a complete divestiture of
that beneficial interest. The relevant language
from the trust in Banks is as follows:
Article III
AMENDMENT,
REVOCATION
ADDITIONS TO THE TRUST

AND

3.2 Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested
interests subject to divestment which shall con-

tinue until this Trust is revoked or terminated
other than by death. (Emphasis added).
Banks, 2002 UT 65 at P4. This language at
issue lacks any reference [***17] to a complete divestiture. The beneficial interest of Mrs.
Flake was merely amended, and not completely
divested as was the case in Banks. The dispositive issue in the present case is whether there
was a complete divestiture of a beneficial interest as in Banks, or whether there was simply a
change in the quality, or scope, of the beneficial interest. We held in Banks that [HN6]
revocation was required when terminating a
vested beneficial interest. 2002 UT 65 at PI4.
[**596] Here, we find that there is no requirement of revocation where the beneficial interest
is simply modified or amended but not terminated. Therefore, Mrs. Flake's beneficial interest, as amended, was completely outlined in the
1998 Restatement, inasmuch as the 1998 Restatement contained all of the operative provisions of the Almon J. Flake Family Trust. The
purpose and primary effect of Article XIV in
the 1987 Trust Agreement is to save the Trust
from the doctrine of merger and to prove that
the Trust is not illusory.2
2 In Groesbeck, we held that [HN7] a
revocable trust can be created, without
being deemed illusory, as long as title to
the property passes to the trustee and
vested interests are created in the beneficiaries, even if these interests are subject
to divestiture. 935 P.2d at 1257-58 (citing Horn v. First Sec. Bank of Utah,
NA., 548 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1976)).
The relative Trust language in In re Estate of Groesbeck specified that "the interest of the beneficiaries is a present interest which shall continue until this
Trust is revoked or terminated other than
by death." 935 P.2d at 1258. The reservation of a power to amend, modify, or
revoke does not make a trust invalid or
incomplete. See Restatement (Second) of
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Trusts § 331, cmt. j . As in In re Estate of
Groesbeck, the vested beneficiary interests are subject to divestiture through operation of the specific provisions of the
trust, namely the reserved power to
amend, modify, or revoke.
[***18] II. THE 1998 RESTATEMENT
[*P18] We next examine whether the 1998
Restatement complied with the terms of the
original trust and either (1) effected a revocation of the 1987 Trust Agreement or (2) was
solely a modification as an amendment to the
1987 Trust Agreement.
[*P19] The question concerns the effect
and disposition of a "restated11 trust agreement.
The trial court held that absent an express revocation, the 1998 Restatement did not fully replace the 1987 Trust Agreement, and that the
documents therefore must be read together to
determine the governing terms of the trust. We
disagree, and hold that the 1998 Restatement
did, in fact, fully supercede the 1987 Trust
Agreement.
[*P20] The meaning of the term "restate"
as it applies to an inter vivos trust document
has not been established in Utah. We therefore
look to other areas of trust law and the law of
other states for guidance. In the law of business
trusts, the meaning of a "restated" trust has
been defined by statute in several states. These
statutes address the meaning of a restated trust
as it applies to various forms of corporate governance. For example, in Nevada "a certificate
of trust may be restated [***19] by integrating
into a single instrument all the provisions of the
original certificate [or trust instrument], and all
amendments to the certificate, which are then
in effect or are to be made by the restatement."
(Emphasis added). Nev. Rev. Stat. 88A.220(2)
(2002); see also Del Code Ann.
12 § 3810
(c)(1) (2002); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 47-14A45 (2002). Thus, state legislatures in some
states have codified the meaning of a restated
business trust, providing that a trust may be re-

stated by integrating into a single instrument all
of the operative provisions of the trust.3
3 We do not intend to imply that a trust
may only be restated if it has been expressly authorized by statute; we merely
look to these various statutes to clarify
the meaning of the terms "restated" and
"restatement" in the 1998 Restatement
Agreement.
[*P21] I^i the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act (the Act), the Utah legislature [***20] addressed, in another context,
the meaning of the term "restatement." Utah
Code Ann. § 48-2c-409. The Act states that
[HN8] "[a] company may integrate into a single
document all of the provisions of its articles of
organization #nd amendments thereto, and it
may . . . further amend its articles of organization, by adopting restated or amended and restated articles of organization." Id. The Act further clarifies that [HN9] a restated document
that not only restates and integrates the operative provisions but that also amends the operative provisions shall so state with the appropriate language. Id. § 48-20-409(2), (3). "If the
restated articles only restate and integrate, and
do not further amend the provisions of the articles of organization as previously amended or
supplemented, and there is no discrepancy between those provisions and the provisions of
the restated articles, they must so state." Id. §
48-2c-409(4)(b).
[*P22] In this case, the 1998 Restatement
was titled a "Restatement" and declared that
[**597] it "amended and restated in full" (emphasis added) the 1987 Trust Agreement. Although it did not detail the provisions of the
trust that [***21] were specifically amended,
as a restatement it merged all of the operative
provisions of the 1987 Trust Agreement together with amendments in a single instrument,
and therefore superceded the 1987 Trust
Agreement. The clear and unambiguous language of the 1998 Restatement demonstrated
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that it was intended to supplant the terms of the
1987 Trust Agreement with amended and restated terms. The 1998 Restatement unambiguously references the "Almon J. Flake Family
Trust dated September 22, 1987" as "amended
and restated in full," and therefore reflects the
settlor's intent to supplant the 1987 Trust
Agreement. See Restatement (Second) OF
Trusts § 331, cmt. c (stating that if the settlor
reserves a power to modify or revoke the trust
without specifying the method of modification,
the power can be exercised in any manner
which manifests the intent of the settlor to
modify). In particular, the 1987 Trust Agreement provisions that provide for the "needs of
MARIAN R. FLAKE" and which state that
"Marian shall also enjoy Almon's Social Security and all existing retirement funds" were superceded due to their omission from the 1998
Restatement. Mrs. Flake is entitled only to what
was provided [***22] for in the operative provisions of the 1998 Restatement.
III. THE 1999 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
[*P23] On April 14, 1999, prior to filing
any claims, the parties met to discuss the possibility of a settlement agreement. The 1999 Settlement Agreement confirmed the distribution
of the Cadillac to Mrs. Flake, as outlined in the
1998 Restatement. It was also agreed that Mrs.
Flake would be the beneficiary of the life estate
as outlined in the 1998 Restatement. The trust
agreed to pay certain specified debts, and Mrs.
Flake agreed to immediately close the accounts
giving rise to the debts. Provisions concerning
the disposition of additional assets were also
outlined in the 1999 Settlement Agreement,
including a provision releasing the trust from
any other claim that Mrs. Flake may have been
able to make under the 1987 Trust Agreement.
Since family settlement agreements are "favorites of the law," it is the general policy to encourage these types of agreements. In re Estate
of Grimm, 784 P. 2d 1238, 1243 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah
1990) ("it is said that the law looks with favor

upon an agreement of compromise among
members [***23] of a family . . . . " (quotations
and citations omitted)).
A. Oral Agreements
[*P24] Mrs. Flake contends that the 1999
Settlement Agreement, as an oral agreement
with testamentary effect, is unenforceable and
is subject to section 75-3-912 of the Utah Code,
which provides as follows:
[HN10] Subject to the rights of creditors
and taxing authorities, competent successors
may agree among themselves to alter the interests, shares, or amount to which they are entitled under the will of the decedent, or under the
laws of intestacy, in any way that they provide
in a written contract executed by all who are
affected by its provisions. The personal representative shall abide by the terms of the agreement, subject to his obligation to administer the
estate for the benefit of creditors, to pay taxes
and costs of administration, and to carry out the
responsibilities of his office for the benefit of
any successors of the decedent who are not parties. Personal representatives of decedents' estates are not required to see to the performance
of trusts if the trustee thereof is another person
who is willing to accept the trust. Accordingly,
trustees of a testamentary trust are successors
[***24] for the purposes of this section. Nothing contained in this section relieves trustees of
any duties owed to beneficiaries of trusts.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-912 (emphasis
added). Mrs. Flake argues that the legislative
history, official text, and comments, indicate
that the Utah Probate Code was designed to
establish uniform rules to govern all testamentary documents, including inter vivos trusts,
and thus section 75-3-912 should apply to trusts
as well as to wills.
[*P25] [**598] [HN11] When faced with
a question of statutory construction, and in attempting to determine legislative intent, this
court first looks to the plain language of the
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statute. State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, PI2, 52
P.3d 1276; Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc.,
935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997); Savage Indus,
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 671
(Utah 1991). In construing a statute, we assume
that "each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally,
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused
or inoperable." Id. at 670. "Only if we find
some ambiguity [in the statute's plain [***25]
language] need we look further," Schurtz v.
BMW of N. Am., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah
1991), and only then "need we seek guidance
from the legislative history and relevant policy
considerations." World Peace Movement of
Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253,
259 (Utah 1994).
[*P26] We turn to the specific language of
the statute, which states that "competent successors may agree among themselves to alter
the interests, shares, or amount to which they
are entitled under the will of the decedent, or
under the laws of intestacy, in any way that
they provide in a written contract executed by
all who are affected by its provisions." Utah
Code Ann. § 75-3-912 (emphasis added). Thus,
according to the plain language of the statute of
the Utah Probate Code, the requirement of a
written contract to alter beneficiary interests
applies only to interests created by will or by
the laws of intestacy. Mrs. Flake suggests that
the statute was poorly drafted and that the
drafters intended, but failed, to make the necessary revisions to include agreements affecting
interests created by trusts. She may be correct,
but there [***26] is no evidence thereof in the
statute. Its plain terms limit the requirement of
a written contract in altering beneficiary interests to a will or the laws of intestacy. [HN12]
We will not look beyond the language to divine
legislative intent; the language is clear and unambiguous. Stephens, 935 P.2d at 522 (citing
Brinkerhojf v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686
(Utah 1989)). [HN13] A written agreement is
not required to alter interests created by an inter
vivos trust.

[*P27] The issue of whether an oral contract or agreement exists presents questions of
both law and fact. "Whether a contract has been
formed is ultimately a conclusion of law, but
that ordinarily depends on the resolution of
subsidiary issues of fact." Nunley v. Westates
Casing Serv., Inc., 1999 UT 100P17, 989 P.2d
1077, 1083 (citing O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d
1289, 1290-91 (Utah 1981)). While we do not
defer to the trial court's legal conclusions in
reviewing them for correctness, we do defer to
its factual findings, and will not set them aside
unless they are clearly erroneous. See Reliance
Ins. Co. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 858 P.2d
1363, 1366 (Utah 1993). [***27] A trial
court's finding of fact is not clearly erroneous
unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence or we reach a definite and clear conclusion that a mistake has been made. See Dep't of
Human Serv. v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 682
(Utah 1997).
[*P28] The April 14, 1999 meeting resulted in an enforceable oral agreement that
was later memorialized by a writing, the 1999
Settlement Agreement. [HN14] The terms and
conditions of an oral agreement must be sufficiently definite to allow it to be enforced. See
Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357,
363 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In determining
whether the parties created an enforceable contract, a court should consider all preliminary
negotiations, offers, and counteroffers and interpret the various expressions of the parties for
the purpose of deciding whether the parties
reached agreement on complete and definite
terms. See 1 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 2.1, at 101 (rev. ed. 1993). Based on
the actions of the parties prior to and after the
April 14, 1999 settlement meeting, we conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that the
parties entered into an enforceable settlement
[***28] agreement. The parties were each accompanied by legal representatives at the meeting. The parties agreed to essential terms regarding the life estate, distribution of the Cadillac, payment of outstanding creditors, owner-
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ship in the life insurance policies and funeral
plan, disposition of the tax proceeds, use and
condition of a barn, as well as additional items
of personal property. [HN15] "An agreement
cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite or
demonstrate [**599] that there was no intent
to contract." Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern,
928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) (citing Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 UT 2d 61, 63, 362 P.2d
427, 428 (Utah 1961)); Perillo, supra § 4.3 at
569. Here, the agreed terms were specific and
definite, and the facts found by the trial court
demonstrate an intent by the parties to comply
with the terms of the 1999 Settlement Agreement.
B. Waiver
[*P29] Mrs. Flake contends that the 1999
Settlement Agreement was an unexecuted
agreement and as such is unenforceable. As we
stated in the foregoing section, the 1999 Settlement Agreement was a valid and enforceable
oral settlement agreement. Mrs. Flake further
contends that [***29] the 1987 Trust Agreement and the 1998 Restatement granted certain
rights that could only be relinquished through
express waiver. [HN16] "Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. 'It must
be distinctly made, although it may be express
or implied.'" Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 886
P.2d 92, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing Webb
v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 773 P.2d 834, 839 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989)). With respect to waiver, this
court has often used the following formulation:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment
of a known right. To constitute a waiver, there
must be an existing right, benefit, or advantage,
a knowledge of its existence, and an intention
to relinquish it. [The relinquishment] must be
distinctly made, although it may be express or
implied.
Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993) (citing Phoe-

nix Inc. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d
308, 311-12 (1936)).
[*P30] Thus, we have previously stated
that a "waiver is an intentional relinquishment
of a known right." Interwest, 886 P.2d at 98.
To constitute a waiver, there must be an existing [***30] right, benefit or advantage, a
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to
relinquish it. Mrs. Flake argues that the waiver
'"must be distinctly made, although it may be
express or implied.'" Hunter v. Hunter, 669
P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983) (quoting Am. Sav.
Loan Ass'n v. Bloomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 292,
445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968)). While it is true that a
waiver, or the relinquishment of a known right,
must be distinctly made, it still may be express
or implied. Mrs. Flake relies on language in
Hunter, 669 P.2d at 432, which sought to
elaborate restrictively on what specific facts
might be necessary to support a finding of intent. Hunter stated that "to constitute waiver,
one's actions or conduct must be distinctly
made, must evince in some unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and must be inconsistent
with any other intent." Id. The language in
Hunter, stating the need for an unequivocal intent to waive a known right, was later addressed by this court. In Soter's, 857 P.2d at
942, this court reiterated that the legal standard
of Phoenix is the correct standard required to
establish waiver. "A waiver [***31] is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To
constitute waiver, there must be an existing
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its
existence, and an intention to relinquish it."
Soter's, 857 P.2d at 942 (citing Phoenix, 61
P.2d at 311-12). Soter's further clarified that
the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct,
and this determination is made by looking at
the totality of the circumstances. Soter's, 857
P. 2d at 942. The court noted that in Utah, a distinct intent to waive may only be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 942, n.6.
[*P31] [HN17] "Waiver of a contractual
right occurs when a party to a contract inten-
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tionally acts in a manner inconsistent with its
contractual rights, and, as a result, prejudice
accrues to the opposing party or parties to the
contract." Interwest Const., 886 P.2d at 98; see
also Cooper v. Forresters Underwriters, Inc.,
2 Utah 2d 373, 376-77, 275 P.2d 675, 677
(1954) (holding defendant did not waive the
right to enforce a contract because defendant's
actions were not inconsistent with terms of contract nor did defendant [***32] induce belief
that it did not intend to enforce terms of contract). Here, the evidence shows that the actions
of Mrs. Flake were intended to relinquish
known rights. She agreed to assign ownership
to the trust of the life insurance policy as well
as the funeral plan, and acted accordingly. She
agreed to close the outstanding credit accounts
in compliance [**600] with the Trust's agreement to pay those outstanding debts, and again
acted accordingly. Mrs. Flake agreed to and
received the distribution of the Cadillac. She
agreed to the terms of the life estate as outlined
in the 1998 Restatement. When looking to the
totality of the circumstances, Mrs. Flake's actions were consistent with the terms of the 1999
Settlement Agreement, and thus her actions satisfy the elements of waiver.
IV. LIS PENDENS
[*P32] The trustee argues on cross-appeal
that the trial court erred in failing to award fees
and costs resulting from Mrs. Flake's failure to
remove a lis pendens from certain trust property. Under Utah Code Ann. sections 38-9-4
and 38-12-102, 103, appellee argues that Mrs.
Flake filed a lien and failed to provide notice
within thirty days after recordation as required
[***33] under Utah Code Ann. § 38-12-102.
Appellee argues that this subjects Mrs. Flake to
liability of "$ 1,000 or for treble actual damages," whichever is greater, and for reasonable
attorney fees and costs. Utah Code Ann. section
38-12-103(l)(a) states that [HN18] "[a] person
who fails to meet the notice requirements" is
"precluded from receiving an award of costs
and attorney's fees from the person against

whom a notice of lien has been filed." However, Utah C$de Ann. section 38-12-103(l)(b)
provides that [HN19] "subsection (l)(a), a person's failure to meet the notice requirements,
"does not create a right to costs and attorneys'
fees."
[*P33] Mrs. Flake argued that the lis
pendens was recorded to give constructive notice that the property was the subject of litigation. The trial court found that based on Mrs.
Flake's withdrawal of her claims of undue influence all lis pendens filed on property in this
case should be released. The trial court considered the trustee's argument and declined to
award the statutory penalty for failing to give
notice. Utah Code Ann. section 38-12-103(2)
[HN20] provides [***34] for penalties to the
lien claimant for noncompliance with the notice
requirements or for a willful refusal to release
the lien. After the trial court's finding that all lis
pendens should be released, Mrs. Flake filed a
Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and Further
Order of the Court. The trial court issued its
final Order Dissolving Lis Pendens on July 11,
2001. During the pendency of the litigation, the
lis pendens did not create any actual damages
to the litigant^. The lis pendens did not cloud
title because, other than an attempt to refinance,
there was no attempt to transfer or convey the
underlying property. Our review of the record
does not indicate that the trial court's finding
was clearly erroneous. We agree with the trial
court that there was no willful refusal to release
the notice of lien, and therefore that Mrs. Flake
should not have been ordered to pay damages.
CONCLUSION
[*P34] Fpr the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial cjourt's ruling granting the motion
to dismiss, but reverse as to the enforceability
of the original 1987 Trust Agreement. We find
that the 1998 Restatement and the 1999 Settlement Agreement govern the disposition of the
estate of [***^5] Almon J. Flake. Accordingly,
Mrs. Flake is Entitled to the following distribu-
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tions: (i) the life estate as outlined in the 1998
Restatement; (ii) the distribution of the Cadillac; (iii) the payment of the commercial debts
as outlined in the 1999 Settlement Agreement;
(iv) the right to the funeral plan maintained by
the trust; and (v) the right to the upper level of
the barn as a storage facility. Mrs. Flake is not
entitled to monthly support from the trust, nor
is she entitled to receive the decedent's social
security, according to the 1998 restatement, 4
and retirement funds as outlined in the 1987
Trust Agreement.
4 We are at a loss to understand this
particular provision, inasmuch as social
security benefits are determined by the
Social Security Administration and are
not subject to allocation by trust documents.

and we believe that the trial court should undertake the disposition of the trustee's claims here,
as was observed in Capital Transit Co.,
The disposition of a claim for restitution may
well involve issues of fact and law, conflicting
equities, and problems of legal and administrative policy. These can best be dealt with and
disposed of initially by the [trial court]....
213 F.2d 176 at 196. We agree also with the
comment that,
In view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, cit. supra
295 US. 301, 79 L. Ed. 1451, 55 S. Ct. 713
(1934) that restitution upon the reversal of a
judgment 'is not of mere right. It is ex gratia,
resting in the exercise of a sound discretion . . .
Ml

[*P35] The trustee contends that the trust
is entitled to repayment of the support payments paid through the time of trial and posttrial. In light of our decision, this case is remanded for [***36] a determination of the
amount of payments, if any, that Mrs. Flake
must repay to the trust. See Capital Transit
[**601] Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 93 U.S.
App. D.C. 194, 213 F.2d 176, 195 (B.C. Cir.
1954) (citing Cox v. Dixie Power Co., 81 Utah
94, 16 P.2d 916 (Utah 1932)). [HN21] 'The
trial court has power to order restitution in an
independent suit, or upon a motion filed in the
original proceeding^]" id. (citation omitted),

[***37] Id. at 196 (citations omitted). Thus, it
is appropriate for the trial court to consider this
claim in the first instance.
[*P36] Associate Chief Justice Durrant,
Justice Russon, Justice Wilkins, and Judge
Greenwood concur in Chief Justice Durham's
opinion.
[*P37] Having recused himself, Justice
Howe does not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge Pamela T. Greenwood sat.
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CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Third District Court, Salt Lake, Utah, ruled that the decedent's amendment to her trust was valid and
that appellee trustees were therefore entitled to
partial summary judgment on appellant's, another trustee and brother to the trustees, suit to
invalidate the amendment. The brother appealed.
OVERVIEW: The brother argued that the district court erred in concluding that the 2002
amendment was valid and in entering findings
of fact and conclusions of law that exceeded
the findings and conclusions articulated in its

initial memorandum decision. The supreme
court held that the decedent retained the right to
amend the trust amendment where she had reserved the right to amend, modify, or revoke
the trust. She could not amend the trust to completely divest one of the beneficiaries of his or
her interest without first revoking the trust. The
supreme court found that because the brother's
interest in the trust was not completely divested
but only modified, the amendment did not violate the terms of the trust and was therefore not
valid.
OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed.
CORE TERMS: beneficiary's, amend, settlor,
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disbursed, articulated, invalidate, contingent,
enjoyment, exceeded, reserved, drafters, uphold
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes
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Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Interpretation
[HN1] On summary judgment, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the district court's legal
conclusions for correctness. So long as a court
confines its analysis to the language of the trust
instrument and does not resort to extrinsic evidence of intent, the interpretation of a trust is
an issue of law.

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Modification & Termination
[HN2] Absent fraud or mistake, a settlor has
the power to modify a trust only if and to the
extent that such a power was reserved by the
terms of the trust.
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Beneficiaries > General Overview
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Interpretation
[HN3] The Utah Supreme Court agrees with
the analysis of the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts § 25, which advocates the abandonment
of confusing and disingenuous terminology in
favor of an open recognition that there is no
requirement that a beneficiary's interest be either present or vested: Issues are obscured and
litigation invited by confusing or unsound dicta
often found in opinions that attempt to explain
why something is or is not a present trust. Asking whether something is a "trust" or a "mere
agency" is at best question begging. So is the
suggestion in many opinions that, in order to
uphold a disposition, a court must find a "pre-

sent" or "vested" interest in one or more beneficiaries other than the settlor; in fact these
statements are untrue unless they mean, simply,
"presently existing" interests. And assertions
that a settlor must relinquish "dominion and
control" over the property are merely erroneous
dicta. These statements confuse the issue, and
maybe the reader, ignoring the reality that these
very courts regularly and properly find valid
trusts where settlors have retained complete
control, and where the other beneficiaries usually, if drafting is competent, have only future
interests that are not only defeasible (by revocation or amendment) but also "contingent"
upon surviving the settlor and maybe other
events as well.
COUNSEL: J. Jay Bullock, Clinton J. Bullock,
Karen Bullock Kreeck, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
Matthew C. Barneck, Brian C. Webber, Steven
W. Call, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
JUDGES: PARRISH, Justice. Chief Justice
Durham, Justice Durrant, Justice Nehring, and
Judge Ludlow concur in Justice Parrish's opinion. Having disqualified himself, Associate
Chief Justice Wilkins does not participate
herein; District Judge Eric A. Ludlow sat.
OPINION BY: PARRISH
OPINION
[**751] PARRISH, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
[*P1] Shortly before she passed away,
Leona Hoggan ("Leona") amended a trust that
she had created some fifteen years earlier. The
amendment provided that, upon Leona's death,
her son John Hoggan (a.k.a. "Jack") would be
forgiven a loan Leona made to him, rather than
receiving a one-third interest in the trust property. Jack asserts that the language of the trust
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document did not authorize Leona to effect
such an amendment. We disagree. Under our
previous interpretations of very similar trust
language in Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52
P.3d 1190, and Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of
Flake), 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589, Leona retained the power to modify Jack's interest.
BACKGROUND
[*P2] [***2] Leona executed the original
trust document in 1987. Under the terms of the
trust, the trust property was to be used for
Leona's benefit during her lifetime. Upon her
death, the trust property was to be distributed
equally among her three children—Jack, Bonnie
Weber ("Bonnie"), and William Hoggan ("William"). Article XI of the trust, entitled "Revocation and Amendment," provides: "As long as
the Undersigned is alive, she reserves the
right[] to amend, modify, revoke, or remove
from this Trust any and all property that she has
contributed, in whole or in part, including the
principal, and the present or past undisbursed
income from such principal." This section also
contains the following sentence: "The interest
of the beneficiaries is a present interest which
shall continue until this Trust is revoked or
terminated other than by death."
[*P3] In 2002, Leona signed an amendment to the trust that modified the allocation of
the trust property upon her death. Under the
amended distribution scheme, William was to
receive an automobile, while the remainder of
the trust property was to be either divided between William and Bonnie or transferred to the
survivor of the two. As his only share of the
[***3] trust property, Jack was to be forgiven
any remaining indebtedness he owed to Leona
at the time of her death. Leona passed away
two months after executing the amendment.
[*P4] Later that same year, Jack filed suit
against William and Bonnie individually and
against William in his capacity as trustee. The
lawsuit sought to invalidate the amendment under various theories. Specifically, Jack asserted

that the amendment was the result of undue influence on the part of William and that Leona
suffered from diminished capacity. Jack also
sought to invalidate the amendment and reform
the trust documents under the theory that the
amendment violated the terms of the trust. Jack
subsequently filed a motion for partial summary judgment under the latter theory. William
and Bonnie then filed cross-motions for partial
summary judgment, arguing that the second
amendment was valid or, in the alternative, that
the terms of the trust should be reformed to reflect Leona's intent.
[*P5] In a memorandum decision, the district court ruled that the amendment was valid
and that William and Bonnie were therefore
entitled to partial summary judgment. William
and Bonnie then submitted to the district court
proposed findings [***4] of fact and conclusions of law. Jack objected on the basis that the
proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
exceeded the scope of the issues addressed in
the district court's memorandum decision. The
district court overruled Jack's objections and
entered an order consistent with William and
Bonnie's proposed findings and conclusions.
[*P6] The parties stipulated that Jack's
claims of undue influence and reduced capacity
would be dismissed with prejudice so that the
partial summary judgment would become final
and appealable. Jack now appeals the partial
summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P7] [Hlkl] "On summary judgment, we
review the [district] court's legal conclusions
for correctness." Quaid v. U.S. Healthcare,
Inc., 2007 UT27, P 8, 158 P.3d525. So long as
a court confines its analysis to the language of
the trust instrument and does not resort to extrinsic evidence of intent, the interpretation of a
trust is an issue of law. [**752] See Kimball v.
Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) ("A
contract's interpretation may be either a question of law, determined by the words of the
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agreement, or a question of fact, determined by
extrinsic evidence of intent."). Because we restrict our review in this [***5] case to the language of the trust instrument, we cede no deference to the district court.
ANALYSIS
[*P8] Jack has raised two challenges to the
summary judgment entered by the district
court. First, he argues that the district court
erred in concluding that the 2002 amendment
was valid. Second, he asserts that the court
erred when it entered findings of fact and conclusions of law that exceeded the findings and
conclusions articulated in its initial memorandum decision.
I. VALIDITY OF THE 2002 AMENDMENT

erty, rather than the trust instrument. This reading is nonsensical, however, because one does
not typically amend, modify, or revoke property, but rather, written legal documents. In interpreting nearly identical trust language in
Flake, 2003 UT 17, P 14, 71 P3d 589, ' we eschewed this rather odd literal reading and interpreted the language to mean that the settlor had
reserved the right to amend, modify, or revoke
the trust. Consistent with this precedent, we
hold that Leona retained the right to amend the
trust instrument.
1 The analogous Flake trust language
read:
As long as the Undersigned is alive, he reserves
the right, without the consent
or approval of any other, to
amend, modify, revoke, or
remove from this Trust
[***7] the property that he
has contributed, in whole or
in part, including the principal and the present or past
undisbursed income from
such principal.

[*P9] [HN2] "Absent fraud or mistake, a
settlor 'has the power to modify a trust only if
and to the extent that such a power was reserved by the terms of the trust.'" Flake v.
Flake (In re Estate of Flake), 2003 UT 17, P
13, 71 P.3d589 (quoting Kline v. Utah Dep't of
Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1989));
accord Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, P 9, 52
P. 3d 1190; Restatement (Second) of Trusts §
331 (1959). We accordingly begin by analyzing
the terms of the trust to determine whether
Leona reserved the right to amend the trust
2003 UT17,P 14, 71 P. 3d 589.
document. Because we find that she did, we
[*P11] Her power to amend the trust,
then examine the scope of her authority to
however, was circumscribed. Article XI of the
amend the trust and whether she exceeded any
trust
also states, "The interest of the beneficiarlimitations placed upon that power.
ies is a present interest which shall continue
[*P10] Leona retained [***6] a broad
until this Trust is revoked or terminated other
grant of authority to amend the trust. Article XI
than by death." 2 In Banks, we [**753] held
of the trust instrument provides: "As long as the
that very similar trustlanguage 3 required "a
Undersigned is alive, she reserves the right[] to
complete revocation . . . to divest the beneficiamend, modify, revoke, or remove from this
aries of their vested interests." 2002 UT 65, P
Trust any and all property that she has contrib12, 52 P. 3d 1190. In accordance with this inuted, in whole or in part, including the princiterpretation of the trust language, we invalipal, and the present or past undisbursed income
dated an amendment to the Banks trust that
from such principal." Under a literal reading of
completely divested named beneficiaries of
the trust language, the object of the phrase "to
their interests. Id. PP 15-16. Therefore, under
amend, modify, [and] revoke" is the trust propthe very similar language of the Hoggan trust,

Page 5
2007UT78,*;169P.3d750,**;
588 Utah Adv. Rep. 24; 2007 Utah LEXIS 183, ***

Leona could not amend the trust to completely
divest one of the beneficiaries of his or her interest without first revoking the trust. Jack relies on Banks in arguing that the amendment
violated the terms of the trust.
2 Language asserting that beneficiaries
have a "present interest" or a "presently
vested interest" in a trust has apparently
become common within trusts drafted in
[***8] Utah. We suspect that drafters include such language with the intent of
warding off potential challenges to the
trust on grounds that it is illusory. See
Banks, 2002 UT 65, PP 12-13, 52 P.3d
1190. Unfortunately, such phrases have
been the focus of recent litigation and
have the potential to produce results not
within the contemplation of the drafters
of trusts or their clients. Indeed, the potential for confusion is great because in
many living trusts, like the one at issue
here, the beneficiaries have no immediate
right of possession or enjoyment of the
trust property. In such instances, the insertion of language proclaiming that the
beneficiaries have a "present interest"
simply contradicts the operative terms of
the trust. See Black's Law Dictionary 816
(7th ed. 1999) (defining a present interest
as "[a] property interest in which the
privilege of possession or enjoyment is
present and not merely future; an interest
entitling the holder to immediate possession"). Similarly, trusts in which the
settlor retains the right to amend or revoke the instrument do not convey "presently vested rights" to beneficiaries because their interests are contingent upon
the settlor not amending or revoking the
[***9] trust. See id. at 1557 (defining the
term "vested" as a "consummated right
for present or future enjoyment; not contingent; unconditional; absolute").
The impetus for including such
phrases within trust agreements appears

to originate, unfortunately, from our
holding that a trust is invalid unless the
beneficiary's interest vests during the
settlor's lifetime. Alexander v. Zion's Sav.
Bank & Trust Co., 2 Utah 2d 317, 273
P.2d 173, 174 (Utah 1954), affd on reh'g, 4 Utah 2d 90, 287 P.2d 665 (Utah
1955). But see Restatement (Second) of
Trusts §\59 cmt. c (1959) ("A provision
in the tehns of the trust under which interests of the beneficiaries do not vest until a future time is not invalid unless such
interests | may not vest within the period
of the rule against perpetuities . . . ."). In
an apparent effort to uphold prior precedent while at the same time avoiding the
invalidation of countless trusts intended
to serve as substitutes for wills, we later
said that such trusts created vested interests that were subject to divestment.
Horn v. \First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A.,
548 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1976). Although the term "vested interest subject
to divestment" is more of an oxymoron
than a meaningful legal term, over
[***10] the decades this phrase has been
used by this court to uphold trusts in
which the beneficiaries' interests were
not vested under the traditional meaning
of the term. See Banks, 2002 UT 65, P
13, 52 P. 3d 1190; Groesbeck v. Groesbeck (hi re Estate of Groesbeck), 935
P.2d 1255, 1257-58 (Utah 1997).
We hereby disavow the use of this
phrase and the antiquated and now
widely discredited rule articulated in
Alexander that gave rise to it. [HN3] We
agree with the analysis of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which advocates
the abandonment of such confusing and
disingenuous terminology in favor of an
open recognition that there is no requirement that a beneficiary's interest be
either present or vested:
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Issues are obscured and
litigation invited by confusing or unsound dicta often
found in opinions that attempt to explain why something is or is not a present
trust. Asking whether something is a "trust" or a "mere
agency" is at best question
begging. So is the suggestion
in many opinions that, in order to uphold a disposition, a
court must find a "present"
or "vested" interest in one or
more beneficiaries other than
the settlor; in fact these
statements are untrue unless
they mean, simply, "presently existing" [***11] interests. And assertions that a
settlor must relinquish "dominion and control" over the
property are merely erroneous dicta.
These statements confuse the issue, and maybe
the reader, ignoring the reality that these very courts
regularly and properly find
valid trusts where settlors
have retained complete control, and where the other
beneficiaries usually, if
drafting is competent, have
only future interests that are
not only defeasible (by revocation or amendment) but
also "contingent" upon surviving the settlor and maybe
other events as well

Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 25 reporter's notes, cmt. b (2003).
3 The analogous Banks trust language
read: "The interests of the beneficiaries

are presently vested interests subject to
divestment which shall continue until this
Trust is revoked or terminated other than
by death." 2002 UT 65, P 4, 52 P.3d
1190.
[*P12] Jack's reliance is misplaced in light
of our subsequent decision in Flake. We clarified in Flake that such trust language invalidates only amendments that effect a complete
divestment of an interest in the trust. In interpreting trust language very similar to that in
Banks and nearly identical to the language
found in the Hoggan trust,4 we [***12] held:
The beneficial interest of Mrs.
Flake was merely amended, and
not completely divested as was the
case in Banks. The dispositive issue in the present case is whether
there was a complete divestiture of
a beneficial interest as in Banks, or
whether there was simply a change
in the quality, or scope, of the
beneficial interest. We held in
Banks that revocation was required
when terminating a vested beneficial interest. Here, we find that
there is no requirement of revocation where the beneficial interest is
simply modified or amended but
not terminated.
Flake, 2003 UT 17, P 17, 71 P.3d 589 (citation
omitted).
4 The analogous Flake trust language
read: "The interest of the beneficiaries is
a present vested interest which shall continue until the Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death." 2003 UT 17,
P 17, 71 P. 3d 589.
[**754] [*P13] Under the clear precedent
of Banks and Flake, if the 2002 amendment
completely divested Jack of any interest in the
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trust, the amendment would violate a condition
placed upon the power to amend because Leona
failed to revoke the trust first. If the amendment
merely changed the quality or scope of Jack's
beneficial interest, however, it would be valid.
The amendment changed Jack's interest
[***13] in the trust from an equal share in the
trust property to forgiveness of any remaining
indebtedness to Leona at the time of her death.
Jack does not contest that he still owed his debt
to Leona at the time of her death and that the
forgiveness of this legal obligation to pay the
debt is a benefit conferred upon him under the
amendment. Because Jack's interest in the trust
was not completely divested but only modified,
the amendment does not violate the terms of
the trust and is therefore valid.
[*P14] Jack argues that we should overrule Flake because the holding in that case
would allow settlors to effectively eliminate a
beneficiary's interest in a trust by merely modifying that interest to a negligible amount. We
decline such an invitation. First, Jack does not
assert that the benefit he received from the trust
was nominal. Therefore, his argument applies
only to hypothetical future cases and would not
be dispositive in this case. Second, the potential
outcome that Jack finds objectionable is under
the control of the drafters of trust instruments.
If a settlor deems such an outcome to be unpalatable, it can easily be avoided through careful
drafting.

II. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF
THE DISTRICT [***14] COURT
[*P15] Jack also argues that the district
court erred in adopting findings of fact and
conclusions of law that were not articulated in
its original memorandum decision. He primarily asserts th$t the additional findings of fact
relating to Leona's state of mind and her intent
in including certain provisions of the trust were
improper and that we should therefore refuse to
consider these additional findings. We need not
address the merits of this argument because the
findings to which Jack objects are unnecessary
to our holding. The only facts necessary to our
holding are the terms of the trust and the undisputed existence of Leona's outstanding loan to
Jack. The additional findings and conclusions
to which Jack objects are simply irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
[*P16] Because the 2002 amendment
merely modified Jack's interest in Leona's trust,
the amendment is valid, and we therefore affirm the summary judgment entered by the district court.
[*P17] Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, Justice Nehring, and Judge Ludlow concur
in Justice Parrish's opinion.
[*P18] Having disqualified himself, Associate Chief Ju$tice Wilkins does not participate
herein; District Judge Eric A. Ludlow sat.
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I N THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT
Ron Patterson,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Judy Ann Henry and Randy D.
Patterson, as Trustees of the
Darlene Patterson Family
Protection Trust; Estate of
Darlene Patterson, et a I.
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DENYING DEFENDANTS'
COUNTER MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 070700586
Honorable Judge Allphin

The Court held a hearing on September 30, 2009 on several motions
and has ruled on the following Motions:
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and Defendants'
counter motion for partial summary judgment.
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment sought declaratory
relief, asking the Court to hold that a certain "Final Amendment" executed by
the Parties' mother on May 30, 2006 is void as a matter of law due to its
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion For Partial Summary Ju
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complete divestment of the plaintiff's vested interest in the trust's property
without a revocation of the original Family Trust, as is required by the Family
Trust's terms. Defendants' counter motion for partial summary judgment
sought a declaration that the Final Amendment is valid. The parties reserved
any issues regarding whether "undue influence" affected the execution of
any of the respective trust documents.
Having read the pleadings, heard the argument of counsel, and being
apprised in the premises, the Court hereby orders the following:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted.
2. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied.
The Final Amendment is invalid and the assets of the estate shall be
distributed without regard to any provision contained in the Final
Amendment.
Provided, however, that this Order is without prejudice to the Parties'
ability to raise the issue of whether undue influence affected the execution of
any of the respective trust documents.
IT JS
IS HI
HEREBY, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the

/o

day of

_2009.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE MIC
DISTRICT COUR
Approved as to Form:
^newsea^

James C. Jenkins
Attorney for Defendant

Craig T. Peterson
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing,
postage pre-paid to the following:
Cathcart & Peterson, LLC
80 North Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 840io
James C. Jenkins
Olson & Hoggan, P.£.
130.South Main St., Suite 200
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
on this O r d day of December 2009.
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SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RON PATTERSON,
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S AND
DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTIONS FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDY ANN HENRY and RANDY D.
PATTERSON, as trustees of the Darlene
Patterson Family Protection Trust; ESTATE
OF DARLENE PATTERSON; JUDY ANN
HENRY; RANDY D. PATTERSON; GARY
E. PATTERSON; REX A. PATTERSON;
VICKY D. ROMERO; RICKY A.
PATTERSON; and/or JOHN DOES 1-10 and
JANE DOES 1-10,

Case No. 070700586
Judge Michael G. Allphin

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs and the defendants' cross motions for
partial summary judgment. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along
with their supporting documentation. The Court also held a hearing on the matters on September
30, 2009. Having considered all of the arguments, being fully advised in the premises, and for
the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS the plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment, and DENIES the defendants' counter motion for partial summary judgment.
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BACKGROUND
The following are the undisputed material facts relevant to the parties' cross motions for
summary judgment:
On July 30, 1999, Darlene Patterson and Rex E. Patterson executed, and thus, created
The Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust (herein, the "Family Trust") See Family Trust.
The stated purpose of the Family Trust is "for the primary benefit of the Undersigned during the
Undersigned's lifetime, [and] for the Undersigned's family thereafter." Id. at Art. I, § 1.1.
Moreover, the Family Trust provides that, "[t]he interests of the beneficiaries are presently
vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or
terminated other than by death." Id. at Art. Ill, § 3.2.2 Further, the Family Trust states that upon
the death of Darlene Patterson and Rex. E. Patterson and, "[ajfter all the surviving children of the
Undersigned attain age 25, the Trustee shall divide the remaining principal and income of the
Trust Estate into as many equal shares as there are children of the Undersigned then living[.]" Id.
at Art. V, § 5.2. However, the Family Trust also provides that, "[a]s long as the Undersigned is
alive, the Undersigned reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in
part, including the principal, and the present or past undisbursed income from such principal," Id.
at Art. Ill, §3.1.
On May 31, 2000, Darlene Patterson executed an amendment to the Family Trust (herein,
the "First Amendment"), which provided Plaintiff Ron Patterson additional property upon the
distribution of the trust's property. See First Amendment, | L
1

The Court notes that the parties have agreed and stipulated that the parties' cross motions for partial summary
judgment shall be submitted and considered without respect to the parties' respective dispute of facts over the issue
of "undue influence" in the execution of the amendments and restatement to the Family Trust by Darlene Patterson
prior to her death.
Notably, the Family Trusts lists Plaintiff Ron Patterson among the trust's beneficiaries with a presently vested
interest subject to divestment. See Family Trust, Art. I, § 1.2.
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Subsequently, on March 12, 2001, Darlene Patterson executed a restatement of the
Family Trust (herein, the "Restatement"), which, among other things, provided Plaintiff Ron
Patterson with an additional specific devise and reduced the beneficiary interests of Defendants
Gary E. Patterson, Judy Ann Henry, and Rex A. Patterson. See Restatement, Art. IX.
Additionally, the Restatement included similar provisions regarding the Family Trust's
revocability and the presently vested interests of the trust's beneficiaries. Id. at Art. II & V, § B.
Thereafter, on May 30, 2006, Darlene Patterson executed another amendment to the
Family Trust (herein, the "Final Amendment"), which effectively removed Plaintiff Ron
Patterson as a beneficiary of the trust, stating:
"I have intentionally not provided anything for my son Ronald S.
Patterson (or his descendants) since I have already properly provided for
this son during his lifetime as I felt was appropriate"
Final Amendment, TfC.
Darlene Patterson died on April 30, 2007.
On October 25, 2007, the plaintiff initiated this action, which pertains primarily to the
parties' dispute over the distribution of the Family Trust's property and the propriety of the
trust's amendments and restatement executed by Darlene Patterson prior to her death.
On April 6, 2009, the plaintiff filed the instant motion for partial summary judgment,
requesting a declaratory order that the Final Amendment to the Family Trust be invalidated due
to its complete divestment of the plaintiffs vested interest in the trust's property without a
revocation of the Family Trust, as is required by the Family Trust's terms. The defendants
opposed the plaintiffs motion and filed the instant counter motion, for partial summary judgment

Page 3

on May 5, 2009, requesting the Court disregard prior Utah appellate case law based on the
equities of this matter.
Following complete briefing of the parties' cross motions for partial summary judgment
and the same being submitted for decision on July 29, 2009, the Court held a hearing on the
matters on September 30, 2009, and took the matters under advisement.4 Accordingly, the Court
finds that the parties' cross motions for partial summary judgment are now ripe for
determination.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Further, "[o]n a motion for summary judgment a trial court
should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material issues of
fact exist" to determine if judgment may be rendered as a matter of law. Draper City v. Estate of
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995).
3

The Court notes that on May 29, 2009, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike portions of the Affidavit of Randy
Patterson, which the defendants submitted in support of their counter motion for partial summary judgment. The
plaintiff argued that certain paragraphs within the affidavit are not based on Randy Patterson's personal knowledge
and have no foundation, and regardless, are irrelevant to the issues before the Court. The defendants subsequently
amended the affidavit on July 1, 2009, removing many of the disputed statements. On July 29, 2009, the plaintiff
submitted his motion to strike for decision. In reviewing the Supplemental and Corrected Affidavit of Randy
Patterson, and given the parties' stipulation to limit the issues pertaining to their cross motions for partial summary
judgment and the relevant Utah appellate case law on such issues, the Court agrees with the plaintiff that the
information within the affidavit is largely irrelevant to the Court's analysis. However, the Court finds that the
plaintiffs motion to strike is rendered moot by the Court's ruling on the plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment.
4
The Court notes that also pending at the September 30, 2009 hearing were the plaintiffs motion to strike pleadings
and enter default judgment regarding the defendants' failure to provide discovery, and the defendants' motion for
Rule 56(f) relief. However, at the hearing, the plaintiffs counsel agreed to provide the defendants with an additional
ten (10) days to provide the requested discovery, which timely occurred on October 9, 2009. Further, the defendants'
counsel indicated at the hearing that given the parties stipulation to the limitation of issues with regard to the parties'
cross motions for partial summary judgment, the defendants' motion for Rule 56(f) relief is unnecessary and moot.
Accordingly, the Court finds that both the plaintiffs motion to strike pleadings and the defendants' motion for Rule
56(f) relief are moot.
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In the instant matter, the Court is asked to determine the validity of the Family Trust's
Final Amendment, which by its terms completely divested the plaintiffs beneficiary interest in
the Family Trust without revoking the same, as is required by the Family Trust's terms. "So long
as a court confines its analysis to the language of the trust instrument and does not resort to
extrinsic evidence of intent, the inteipretation of a trust is an issu$ of law." Hoggan v. Hoggan,
169 P.3d 750, 751 (Utah 2007).5
"It is well settled that a trust is a form of ownership in which the legal title to property is
vested in a trustee, who has equitable duties to hold and manage it for the benefit of the
beneficiaries." Banks, 52 P.3d at 1192 (Internal quotations omitted). "Once the settler has created
the trust he is no longer the owner of the trust property and has onlly such ability to deal with it as
is expressly reserved to him in the trust instrument." Id. (Emphasis added). "Thus, a settlor has
the power to modify or revoke a trust only if and to the extent that such power is explicitly
reserved by the terms of the trust." Id.; see also Flake, 71 P.3d at 594 (''Likewise, if the settlor
reserves a power to modify the trust only in a particular manner or under particular
circumstances, he can modify the trust only in that manner or under those circumstances.")
(Internal quotations omitted); Hoggan, 169 P.3d 750, 752 (Utah 2007) ("Absent fraud or
mistake, a settlor has the power to modify a trust only if and to the extent that such a power was
reserved by the terms of the trust.") (Internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, "[t]he transfer of
property interests to the beneficiaries cannot be taken from them except in accordance with a
provision of the trust instrument[.]" Flake, 71 P.3d at 594.
5

The Court notes that the defendants' inclusion of additional facts pertaining to parlene Patterson's intent and the
equity of a finding that the Final Amendment is invalid are largely irrelevant to fjhe Court's analysis of the issues
under existing Utah appellate case law and the Court's interpretation of the Family Trust's plain language. See
Banks v. Means, 52 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2002); see also Flake v. Flake, 71 P.3d 589 (Utah 2003); Hoggan, 169 P.3d
750. While the defendants have requested the Court disregard this case law as b^d precedent, the Court declines
such request. This Court is bound to follow the precedent of the Utah appellate courts and the defendants' attempt to
change this precedent is more appropriate on appeal.
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In the instant matter, the parties acknowledge that the Utah Supreme Court has
interpreted trust language, identical in relevant part, to that of the Family Trust's modification
and revocation requirements regarding the trust's beneficiaries' presently vested interest in the
trust's property. In Banks v. Means, the Utah Supreme Court held that an attempted amendment
that completely divested a beneficiary's vested interest in a trust's property was invalid due to
the settlor's failure to make the amendment in accordance with the trust's terms. 52 P.3d 1190.
The Banks Court stated that, "[b]y the plain language of the trust, the beneficiaries have Vested
interests' that continue until the interests are 'revoked or terminated."' Id. at 1193. However, the
Banks Court also found that "[the settlor] reserved the power to revoke, modify, or amend the
trust in whole or in part ..., but limited that power ... with regard to the beneficiaries." Id. 'Thus,
a complete revocation [of the trust] was required to divest the beneficiaries of their vested
interests." Id. In reaching this decision, the Banks Court emphasized that, "as we have previously
stated, 'even a revocable trust clothes beneficiaries ... with a legally enforceable right to insist
that the terms of the trust be adhered to." Id. at 1194 (quoting Continental Bank & Trust Co. v.
Country Club Mobile Estates, Ltd., 632 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1981)).
Here, just as in Banks, the Family Trust, as amended by the First Amendment and the
Restatement, permitted Darlene Patterson to modify and/or revoke the trust, but limited this
power by stating that "the interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to
divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death."
Family Trust, Art III, § 3.2; see also Restatement, Art. V, § B ("The interest of the beneficiaries
is a present interest which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated.").6 With

6

The Court notes that in Hoggan v. Hoggan, the Utah Supreme Court criticized the use of terms such as "vested
interest subject to divestment" within trusts due to the confusion and unintended consequences that may occur from
the use of such language. 169 P.3d at 753 fh.2. However, the Hoggan Court explicitly upheld its prior precedent of
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respect to the Final Amendment to the Family Trust, Darlene Patterson attempted to completely
divest the plaintiff of his beneficiary interest in the trust's property, to wit:
"I have intentionally not provided anything for my son Ronald S.
Patterson (or his descendants) since I have already properly provided for
this son during his lifetime as I felt was appropriate!-"
Final Amendment, f C. However, the Final Amendment clearly did not revoke the Family Trust
or the Restatement, as is required by the documents' plain language to effectuate a complete
divestment. Consequently, and in accord with the Utah Supreme Court's precedent in Banks, 52
P,3d 1190, Flake, 71 P.3d 589, and Hoggan, 169 P.3d 750, the Court must find that the Final
Amendment is invalid based upon Darlene Patterson's failure to comply with the Family Trust's
and the Restatement's terms for completely divesting a beneficiary's vested interest in the trust's
property. The Court must, therefore, GRANT the plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment, and DENY the defendants' counter motion for partial summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment, and DENIES the defendants' counter motion for partial summary judgment.
Consistent herewith, the Court finds that the plaintiffs motion to strike portions of the Affidavit
of Randy Patterson is moot. The Court directs the plaintiff to prepare and submit an order that is
consistent with and reflects this Ruling.

Patched:
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DISTRICT (£OlJRT JUD$£
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J Hi
4£\

^r
UTAH

^UNMSiS**

Banks, 52 P.3d 1190, and Flake, 71 P.3d 589, asserting that "[i]f a settlor deems such an outcome to he unpalatable.
it can easily be avoided through careful drafting." Id. at 754.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON
PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT postage pre-paid, to the following on this date:

\u^olo\

Craig T. Peterson
CATHCART & PETERSON, LLC
80 North Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
L. Miles LeBaron
LEBARON & JENSEN, PC
476 West Heritage Park Blvd., Suite 200
Layton, Utah 84041
James C. Jenkins
OLSEN & HOGGAN, PC
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE

OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH vs. RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON
CASE NUMBER 061903836 State Felony

CHARGES
Charge 1 - 76-5-111.1(4A) - ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION OF DISABLD
OR ELDER ADLT 2nd Degree Felony (amended) to 3rd Degree Felony
Offense Date: January 19, 2006
Plea: February 22, 2007 Guilty
Disposition: February 22, 2007 Guilty

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
MICHAEL DIREDA
PARTIES
Defendant - RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON
Plaintiff -

STATE OF UTAH

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON
Offense tracking number: 14800775
Date of Birth: June 03, 1957
Law Enforcement Agency: OGDEN CITY POLICE
Prosecuting Agency: WEBER COUNTY
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

0.75
0.75
0.00
0.00

PAPER BOND TOTALS Posted:
Forfeited:
Exonerated:
Balance:

10,000.00
0.00
10,000.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:
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0.75
0.75
0.00
0.00

NONMONETARY BOND DETAIL - TYPE: Surety
Posted By: BEEHIVE BAIL BONDS
Posted:
10,000.00
Forfeited:
0.00
Exonerated:
10,000.00
Balance:
0.00
CASE NOTE
APP PROBATION
PROCEEDINGS
09-27-06 Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN assigned.
09-27-06 Warrant ordered on: September 27, 2006 Warrant Num: 981083438
Bail Allowed
Bail amount:
10000.00
09-27-06 Warrant issued on: September 27, 2006 Warrant Num: 981083438
Bail Allowed
Bail amount:
10000.00
Judge: ROGER S DUTSON
Issue reason: Based on Affidavit and Order for Warrant of
Arrest
09-27-06 Note: Michael Murphy enters his appearance of counsel.
09-27-06 Note: Undertaking of bail by Beehive Bail Bonds $10,000.00 to
WCJ 9-22-2006.
09-27-06 Bond Account created
Total Due:
10000.00
09-27-06 Bond Posted
Non-Monetary Bond:
10,000.00
09-27-06 Case filed
09-27-06 Filed: From an Information
09-27-06 Filed: Information
09-28-06 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on October 19, 2006 at 09:00 AM in
3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
09-28-06 Warrant recalled on: September 28, 2006 Warrant num: 981083438
Recall reason: Based on Court order
09-28-06 Filed: NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR MICHAEL MURPHY FOR DEF
09-28-06 Filed: Motion AND REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
10-02-06 Filed: AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR MURPHY FOR DEFENDANT
10-02-06 Filed: AMENDED MOTION AND FOR DISCOVERY REQUEST
10-19-06 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on November 30, 2006 at 09:00 AM
in 3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
10-19-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance
Judge:
PARLEY R. BALDWIN
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s
MURPHY, MICHAEL D

Printed: 04/22/10 15:58:57
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Video
Tape Number:

PRB101906

Tape Count: 10:15-10:17

rage j uio

INITIAL APPEARANCE
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant,.
The Information is read.
Advised of charges and penalties.
Defendant is present with private counsel, Michael Murphy.
Preliminary hearing is requested and set for 11/30/Q6.
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 11/30/2006
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN
11-30-06 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on December 28, 2006 at 09:00 AM
in 3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
11-30-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRELIMINARY HEARING
Judge:
PARLEY R. BALDWIN
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D
Video
Tape Number:

PRB113006

Tape Count: 10:18-10:1^

HEARING
This is time set for preliminary hearing. Defendant is present and
is represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel.
The defendant waives his preliminary hearing, and the Court
accepts the waiver. The Court arraigns the defendant on the
information and holds him for trial.
ARRAIGNMENT
A copy of the information is given to the defendantAdvised of rights and penalties.
The information is read.
Defendant enters a plea of not guilty to the charge. Court sets a
pre-trial on 12/28/06 @ 9:00 a.m.
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 12/28/2006
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Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN

11-30-06 Charge 1 Plea is Not Guilty
12-28-06 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on February 01, 2007 at 09:00 AM
in 3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
12-28-06 JURY TRIAL scheduled on February 27, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
12-28-06 JURY TRIAL scheduled on February 28, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
12-28-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
Judge:
PARLEY R. BALDWIN
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D
Video
Tape Number:

PRB122806

Tape Count: 9:45-9:46

HEARING
This is time set for pre-trial conference. Defendant is present
and is represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel.
Jury trial is requested and set for 2/27 and 2/28/07 @ 9:00 a.m.
Pre-trial is requested and set for 2/1/07.
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 02/01/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN
JURY TRIAL.
Date: 02/27/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN
JURY TRIAL.
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Date: 02/28/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN
02-01-07 DISPOSITIOIN scheduled on February 22, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
02-01-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

Judge:
PARLEY R BALDWIN
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: HEWARD, GARY R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D
Video
Tape Number:

PRB020107

Tape Count: 9:16-9:17

HEARING
This is time set for pre-trial conference. Defendant is present
and is represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel.
Mr. Murphy makes a motoin to strike the trial date and continue
this case for the defendant to enter a plea of guilty. Court grants
the request.
DISPOSITIOIN is scheduled.
Date: 02/22/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN
02-01-07 JURY TRIAL Cancelled.
02-22-07 Filed order: Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea
and Certificate of Counsel and Order
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN
Signed February 22, 2007
02-22-07 APP SENTENCING scheduled on April 05, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
02-22-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for DISPOSITION
Judge:
PARLEY R BALDWIN
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D
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Video
Tape Number:

PRB022207

Tape Count: 9:41-9:46

HEARING
This is time set for disposition. Defendant is present and is
represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel.
State makes a motion to amend the charge to Attempted Exploitation
of Disabled or Elder Adult, a third degree felony, Court grants the
motion.
The Court relies on the Statement of Defendant in Support of
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel to supplement a Rule 11
colloquy. Plea agreement executed in open court.

Defendant enters a plea of guilty to the amended charge of
Attempted Exploitation of Disabled or Elder Adult, a class third
degree felony.
Pre-sentence is requested with sentencing continued to 4/5/07.
APP SENTENCING is scheduled.
Date: 04/05/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN
02-22 07 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty
02-22 07 Charge 1 amended to 3rd Degree Felony
04-05 07 Minute Entry - Minutes for APP SENTENCING
Judge:
PARLEY R BALDWIN
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D
Video
Tape Number:

PRB040507

Tape Count: 10:16-10:34

HEARING
This is time set for sentencing. Defendant is present and is
represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel. Court proceeds with
sentencing.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION OF
DISABLD OR ELDER ADLT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
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the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION OF
DISABLD OR ELDER ADLT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 45 day(s)
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole.
Defendant to serve 45 day(s) jail.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah State
Department of Adult Probation & Parole and comply strictly with its
terms and conditions.

The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections and to
the court whenever required.
The defendant shall violate no law, either federal, state or
municipal.
The defendant shall not consume alcohol or illegal drugs.
The defendant shall submit to random search, seizure, and chemical
testing.
The defendant shall not frequent establishments where alcohol is
the chief menu item nor associate with persons usinig alcohol or
illegal drugs.
The defendant shall provide a DNA sample, to be obtained by Adult
Probation and Parole, and pay all costs.
The defendant shall serve 45 days in the Weber County Jail with
credit for time served granted.
The defendant shall report to the Weber County Jail on 4/9/07 @
8:00 a.m. and may be released to the Kiesel facility for
employment.
The defendant shall not have a power of attorney while on
probation.
The defendant shall complete any treatment deemed necessary under
the direction of Adult Probation and Parole.
The defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of $52,935.00 on
behalf of the victim, Darlene Patterson, payable through Adult
Probation and Parole.
04-05-07 Bond Exonerated
-10>000.00
04-09-07 Judgment #1 Entered $ 52935.00
Creditor: DARLENE PATTERSON
Debtor:
RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON
52,935.00 Restitution
52,935.00 Judgment Grand Total
04-09-07 Filed judgment: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment
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Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN
Signed April 05, 2007
10-18-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.75
10-18-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.75
Note: 1.00 cash tendered.
0.25 change given.
03-16-09 APP MOTION TO TERMINATE scheduled on March 26, 2009 at 09:00 AM
in 2nd Floor Southwest with Judge DIREDA.
03-16-09 Judge MICHAEL DIREDA assigned.
03-2 6-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for APP MOTION TO TERMINATE
Judge:
MICHAEL DIREDA
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: TREE, TERAL L
Defendant not present

Video
Tape Number:

2D032609

Tape Count: 12:23-12:27

HEARING
This is time set for a motion to terminate formal probation with

Adult Probation & Parole. The Court denies the motion until all
restitution has been paid in full.
02-10-10 APP MOTION TO TERMINATE scheduled on February 25, 2010 at 09:00
AM in 2nd Floor Southwest with Judge DIREDA.
02-25-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for APP MOTION TO TERMINATE
Judge:
MICHAEL DIREDA
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: WILLOUGHBY, BENJAMIN B
Defendant not present

Audio
Tape Number:

2D022510

Tape Count: 9:13-9:16

HEARING
This is time set for a motion to terminate formal probation with
Adult Probation & Parole. Defendant is not present.
The Court grants the motion for unsuccessful termination and
reduces the fines, fees and restitution to a civil judgment and
transfers them to the Office of State Debt Collection.
02-25-10 Filed order: Progress Violation Report (Approved Unsuccessful
Termination)
Judge MICHAEL DIREDA
Signed February 25, 2010
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James C. Jenkins (#1658)
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
13 0 South Main, Suite 200
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Telephone (435) 752-1551
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Attorneys for Randy Patterson, Trustee of The
Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust
RECEIVED JUN 3 0 2009
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS

RON PATTERSON,

v.

)
)
])
)
]

RANDY D. PATTERSON, as Trustee of the
Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust,
ESTATE OF DARLENE PATTERSON, et
al.,

;
)
)
]!

Civil No. 070700586

]I

Judge: Michael J. Alphin

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Cache

SUPPLEMENTAL
ANp CORRECTED
AFFIDAVIT OF RANDY
PATTERSON

)
: ss.
)

RANDY PATTERSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

I am a Defendant in the above captioned matter, I am a child of Darlene

Patterson, and I am a brother of Plaintiff, Ron Patterson.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the following except where otherwise stated,

and I am competent to testify.

Patterson v. Henry, et al
Civil No. 070700586
Affidavit of Randy Patterson
Page 1 of 4
VD29160920

pages: 12

3.

I am aware that on July 30, 1999, Darlene Patterson created the Darlene

Patterson Family Protection Trust (the "Family Trust"). The Family Trust was prepared
by Darlene's attorney, David Ray Carver.
4.

Before and after our mother's death, Plaintiff admitted to me that during

the time when Plaintiff was living next to Darlene Patterson, Plaintiff unlawfully used
Darlene's credit card without authorization to make personal purchases including fourwheelers for his business. Plaintiff acknowledged that he made many of these purchases
online through Ebay and PayPal.

Plaintiff also acknowledged that when Darlene

discovered that these transactions had taken place, she objected and notified PayPal that
Plaintiff had no authority to use her credit card.
5.

In or about February of 2006, Darlene Patterson received a check from the

State of California in the amount of $52,936.53 payable to Darlene for a project involving
real property which Darlene owned in California, Plaintiff, however, stole the check,
forged Darlene's signature, cashed the check, and used the check funds for his personal
benefit without Darlene's knowledge or permission. Plaintiff has admitted these facts to
me before and after our mother's death. Eventually, Plaintiffs conduct was discovered,
and Plaintiff was prosecuted for the felony crime of "Elder Abuse" or "Exploitation of an
Elder", which after negotiations was reduced to a felony attempt charge of the same
crime. Darlene was the complaining witness. In connection with his conviction, Plaintiff
was ordered to pay restitution to Darlene in the amount of $52,935.00, and was sentenced
to jail and probation. Plaintiff has acknowledged these facts to me.

(See also the

attached Exhibit "A").
6.

Soon after Darlene discovered Plaintiffs wrongdoing discussed in

Paragraph 5 above, she asked Mr. Carver to prepare another amendment to the Darlene
Patterson Family Protection Trust (the "Final Amendment"), which she executed on May
30, 2006. I was present when Darlene asked Mr. Carver to prepare the Final Amendment
and when she executed it on May 30, 2006.
7. I have read the foregoing Supplemental Affidavit, know the contents thereof
and state the same to be true.

Patterson v. Henry, et al.
Civil No. 070700586
Affidavit ofRandy Patterson
Page 2 of 4

DATED this X7

day of June, 2009.

Randy Patterson

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1^\

day of June, 2009.

NOTARY PUBLIC
m
JAMES C. JENKINS
kx
* My Commission # 575633
My Commission Expires
Sept. 12,2012
STATE OF UTAH

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this "Zf\ day of June, 2009,1 mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL AND CORRECTED AFFIDAVIT OF
RANDY PATTERSON, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, to the following:
L. Miles LeBaron
Tyler J. Jensen
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C.
476 West Heritage Park Blvd., Suite 200
Layton, Utah 84041
Craig T. Peterson
CATHCART & PETERSON, LLC
80 North Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for Individual Defendants

Patterson v. Henry, et al
Civil No. 070700586
Affidavit ofRandy Patterson
Page 3 of 4

JJCJ/Pleadings/Patterson Estate/Supplemental Affidavit of Randy Patterson, doc

Patterson v. Henry, et al.
Civil No. 070700586
Affidavit of Randy Patterson
Page 4 of 4

EXHIBIT _ A
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON
CASE NUMBER 061903836 State Felony

CHARGES
Charge 1 - 76-5-111.1(4A) - ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION OF DISABLD
OR ELDER ADLT 2nd Degree Felony (amended) to 3rd Degree Felony
Offense Date: January 19, 2006
Plea: February 22, 2007 Guilty
Disposition: February 22, 2007 Guilty

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
MICHAEL DIREDA
PARTIES
Defendant - RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON
Plaintiff -

STATE OF UTAH

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON
Offense tracking number: 14800775
Date of Birth: June 03, 1957
Law Enforcement Agency: OGDEN CITY POLICE
Prosecuting Agency: WEBER COUNTY
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

PAPER BOND TOTALS Posted:
Forfeited:
Exonerated:
Balance:

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

0.75
0.75
0.00
0.00
10,000.00
0.00
10,000.00
0.00

0.75
0.75
0.00
0.00
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NONMONETARY BOND DETAIL - TYPE: Surety
Posted By: BEEHIVE BAIL BONDS
Posted:
10,000.00
Forfeited:
0.00
Exonerated:
10,000.00
Balance:
0.00
CASE NOTE
APP PROBATION
PROCEEDINGS
09-27-06 Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN assigned.
09-27-06 Warrant ordered on: September 27/ 2006 Warrant Num: 981083438
Bail Allowed
Bail amount:
10000.00
09-27-06 Warrant issued on: September 27, 2006 Warrant Num: 981083438
Bail Allowed
Bail amount:
10000.00
Judge: ROGER S DUTSON
Issue reason: Based on Affidavit and Order for Warrant of
Arrest
09- 27-0 6 Note: Michael Murphy enters his appearance of counsel.
09- 27-0 6 Note: Undertaking of bail by Beehive Bail Bonds $10,000.00 to
WCJ 9-22-2006.
Total Due:
10000.00
09- 27-0 6 Bond Account created
Non-Monetary Bond:
10,000.00
09- 27-0 6 Bond Posted
09- 27-0 6 Case filed
09- 27-0 6 Filed: From an Information
09- 27-0 6 Filed: Information
09- 28-0 6 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on October 19, 2006 at 09:00 .AM in
3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
09-28-06 Warrant recalled on: September 28, 2006 Warrant num: 981083438
Recall reason: Based on Court order
09-28-06 Filed: NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR MICHAEL MURPHY FOR DEF
09-28-06 Filed: Motion AND REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
10-02-0 6 Filed: AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR MURPHY FOR DEFENDANT
10-02-06 Filed: AMENDED MOTION AND FOR DISCOVERY REQUEST
10-19-06 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on November 30, 2006 at 09:00 AM
in 3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
10-19-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance
Judge:
PARLEY R. BALDWIN
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D
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Video
Tape Number:

PRB101906

Tape Count: 10:15-10:17

INITIAL APPEARANCE
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
The Information is read.
Advised of charges and penalties.
Defendant is present with private counsel, Michael Murphy.
Preliminary hearing is requested and set for 11/30/06.
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 11/30/2006
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN
11-30-06 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on December 28, 2006 at 09:00 AM
in 3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
11-30-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRELIMINARY HEARING
Judge:
PARLEY R. BALDWIN
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D
Video
Tape Number:

PRB113006

Tape Count: 10:18-10:19

HEARING
This is time set for preliminary hearing. Defendant is present and
is represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel.
The defendant waives his preliminary hearing, and the Court
accepts the waiver. The Court arraigns the defendant on the
information and holds him for trial.
ARRAIGNMENT
A copy of the information is given to the defendant.
Advised of rights and penalties.
The information is read.
Defendant enters a plea of not guilty to the charge. Court sets a
pre-trial on 12/28/06 @ 9:00 a.m.
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 12/28/2006
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Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court

2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84 401
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN
11-30-06 Charge 1 Plea is Not Guilty
12-28-06 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on February 01, 2007 at 09:00 AM
in 3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
12-28-06 JURY TRIAL scheduled on February 27, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
12-28-06 JURY TRIAL scheduled on February 28, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
12-28-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
Judge:
PARLEY R. BALDWIN
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D
Video
Tape Number:

PRB122806

Tape Count: 9:45-9:46

HEARING
This is time set for pre-trial conference. Defendant is present
and is represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel.
Jury trial is requested and set for 2/27 and 2/28/07 @ 9:00 a.m.
Pre-trial is requested and set for 2/1/07.
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 02/01/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN
JURY TRIAL.
Date: 02/27/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN
JURY TRIAL.
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Date: 02/28/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN

02-01-07 DISPOSITIOIN scheduled on February 22, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
02-01-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
Judge:
PARLEY R BALDWIN
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: HEWARD, GARY R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D
Video
Tape Number:

PRB020107

Tape Count: 9:16-$:17

HEARING
This is time set for pre-trial conference. Defendant is present
and is represented by Michael Murphy, private Counsel.
Mr. Murphy makes a motoin to strike the trial date and continue
this case for the defendant to enter a plea of guilty. Court grants
the request.
DISPOSITIOIN is scheduled.
Date: 02/22/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN
02-01-07 JURY TRIAL Cancelled.
02-22-07 Filed order: Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea
and Certificate of Counsel and Order
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN
Signed February 22, 2007
02-22-07 APP SENTENCING scheduled on April 05, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN.
02-22-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for DISPOSITION
Judge:
PARLEY R BALDWIN
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D
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Video
Tape Number:

PRB022207

Tape Count: 9:41-9^46

HEARING
This is time set for disposition. Defendant is present and is
represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel.
State makes a motion to amend the charge to Attempted Exploitation
of Disabled or Elder Adult, a third degree felorjy. Court grants the
motion.

The Court relies on the Statement of Defendant in Support of
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel to supplement a Rule 11
colloquy. Plea agreement executed in open court.
Defendant enters a plea of guilty to the amended charge of
Attempted Exploitation of Disabled or Elder Adult, a class third
degree felony.
Pre-sentence is requested with sentencing continued to 4/5/07.
APP SENTENCING is scheduled.
Date: 04/05/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN
02-22-07 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty
02-22-07 Charge 1 amended to 3rd Degree Felony
04-05-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for APP SENTENCING
Judge:
PARLEY R BALDWIN
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D
Video
Tape Number:

PRB040507

Tape Count: 10:16-10:34

HEARING
This is time set for sentencing. Defendant is present and is
represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel. Court proceeds with
sentencing.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION OF
DISABLD OR ELDER ADLT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
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the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION OF
DISABLD OR ELDER ADLT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 45 day(s)
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole.
Defendant to serve 45 day(s) jail.
PROBATION CONDITIONS

The defendant shall enter into an agreement, witfh the Utah State
Department of Adult Probation & Parole and comply strictly with its
terms and conditions.
The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections and to
the court whenever required.
The defendant shall violate no law, either federal, state or
municipal.
The defendant shall not consume alcohol or illegal drugs.
The defendant shall submit to random search, seizure, and chemical
testing.
The defendant shall not frequent establishments where alcohol is
the chief menu item nor associate with persons using alcohol or
illegal drugs.
The defendant shall provide a DNA sample, to be obtained by Adult
Probation and Parole, and pay all costs.
The defendant shall serve 45 days in the Weber County Jail with
credit for time served granted.
The defendant shall report to the Weber County Jail on 4/9/07 @
8:00 a.m. and may be released to the Kiesel facility for
employment.
The defendant shall not have a power of attorney while on
probation.
The defendant shall complete any treatment deemed necessary under
the direction of Adult Probation and Parole.
The defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of $52,935.00 on
behalf of the victim, Darlene Patterson, payable through Adult
Probation and Parole.
04-05-07 Bond Exonerated
-10,000.00
04-09-07 Judgment #1 Entered $ 52935.00
Creditor: DARLENE PATTERSON
Debtor:
RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON
52,935.00 Restitution
52,935.00 Judgment Grand Total
04-09-07 Filed judgment: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment
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Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN
Signed April 05, 2007
10-18-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.75
10-18-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.75
Note: 1.00 cash tendered.
0.25 change given.
03-16-09 APP MOTION TO TERMINATE scheduled on March 26, 2009 at 09:00 AM
in 2nd Floor Southwest with Judge DIREDA.
03-16-09 Judge MICHAEL DIREDA assigned.
03-2 6-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for APP MOTION TO TERMINATE
Judge:
MICHAEL DIREDA
PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: TREE, TERAL L
Defendant not present

Video
Tape Number:

2D032609

Tape Count: 12:23-12i27

HEARING
This is time set for a motion to terminate formal probation with
Adult Probation & Parole. The Court denies the motion until all
restitution has been paid in full.
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THE
DARLENE PATTERSON
FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST

This Agreement is made and entered into this 30th day of July, 1999, by and
between Darlene Patterson, (hereinafter referred to as the "Undersigned"), of West Point,
Davis County, State of Utah, and Darlene Patterson and Rex E. Patterson, (hereinafter
referred to as "Trustees").
The name of this trust shall be The Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust.
Darlene Patterson hereby transfers and delivers to the Trustees (or their successor
Trustees) the property listed in the attached Schedule "A" (which is incorporated herein),
and the Trustees agree to hold said property and any other property which may be
transferred to this trust by either inter vivos or testamentary transfer; and all said property
shall be part of the trust and shall be held, administered and distributed by the Trustees
according to the terms and conditions stated herein.

ARTICLE I
PURPOSES AND BIRTH DATES
1.1
Puipose of the Trust. This Trust is established for the primary benefit of
the Undersigned during the Undersigned's lifetime, for the Undersigned's family
thereafter.
1.2
Family and Birth Dates. The Family of the Undersigned consists of,
among others, the following:
Spouse of the Undersigned:
Rex E. Patterson
Children of the Undersigned:
Gary E. Patterson, January 16, 1944
Judy Ann Henry, born December 20,1946
Rex A. Patterson, born January 14, 1947
Vicky D. Romero, born December 31,1950
Ronald S. Patterson, June 3, 1957
Ricky A. Patterson, bom April 28, 1958
Randy D. Patterson, bom December 19, 1964

The dates of birth above referred to may be relied upon by the Trustees for all purposes.
13
Community Property. If the Undersigned transfers property to this Trust
which constitutes community property pursuant to the laws of any community property
state having jurisdiction over such property, such property shall retain its character as
community property while held hereunder until the earlier of the death of the
Undersigned or the Undersigned's spouse. If the Undersigned removes such property
from this Trust, such property shall continue to retain its character as community
property. In addition, as to all community property which is transferred to this Trust, this
Trust shall:
(a)
Remain revocable in whole or in part during the joint lives of the
Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse,
(b)
All said property that is transferred to this Trust shall remain
community property and any withdrawals therefrom shall be community property of the
Undersigned's spouse,
(c)
During the joint lives of the Undersigned and the Undersigned's
spouse, the Trustees of this Trust shall have powers no more extensive than those
possessed by the Undersigned or the Undersigned's spouse under the statutory provisions
setting forth the rights and powers with regards to any community personal and real
property generally; and
(d)
As to community property, this Trust shall be subject to
amendment or alteration during the joint lives of the Undersigned and the Undersigned's
spouse upon their joint consent.

ARTICLE II
DISPOSITION DURING THE LIFE OF THE
UNDERSIGNED OR INCAPACITY
2.1
Income and Principal. During the lifetime of the Undersigned, such or all
of the principal of the Trust Estate and any income which such principal shall generate
shall be paid or delivered to such persons and in such manner from time to time as the
Undersigned shall direct in writing or, in the absence of such direction, the Trustees shall
pay or apply for the benefit of the Undersigned, such amounts to such persons as in the
sole and absolute discretion of the Trustees is deemed necessary and proper for the health,
support, maintenance and welfare of the Undersigned, in accordance with the
2

Undersigned's accustomed manner of living at the date of this instrument. The Trustees
shall exercise in a liberal manner the power to invade principal included in this paragraph
2.1, and the rights of the remainderman in the Trust shall be considered of secondary
| importance.
2.2
Guardianship. During physical or mental incapacitation, the Undersigned
herein appoints the successor Trustees to succeed his or her place as a successor Trustee,
guardian, or other legal capacity, whether appointed orally or in writing, and to supervise
all matters in which the Undersigned had a right to act if the Undersigned had not become
incapacitated.

ARTICLE III
AMENDMENT, REVOCATION AND ADDITIONS TO TRUST
3.1
Rights of the Undersigned. As long as the Undersigned is alive, the
Undersigned reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in part,
including the principal, and the present or past undisbursed income from such principal.
Such revocation or amendment of this Trust may be in whole or in part by written
instrument. Amendment, modification or revocation of this instrument shall be effective
only when such change is delivered in writing to the then acting Trustee or Trustees. On
the revocation of this instrument in its entirety, the Trustees shall deliver to the
Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the instrument of revocation, all of the
Trust property.
3.2
Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the beneficiaries are
presently vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is
revoked or terminated other than by death. As long as this Trust subsists, the Trust
properties and all the rights and privileges hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by
the Trustees named herein in their fiduciary capacity.
3.3
Additions to Trust. It is understood that the Undersigned or any other
person may grant, and the Trustees may receive as part of this Trust, additional real and
personal property by assignment, transfer, deed, or otheif conveyance, or by any other
means, testamentary or inter vivos, for inclusion in the Trust herein created. Any such
property so received by the Trustees shall become part of the Marital Trust or Family
Trust (hereafter described) to which said property is appointed and into which it is
transferred and shall become subject to the terms of this Trust Agreement. If such
property is not specifically appointed to either the Marital Trust or the Family Trust in
particular, it shall be held, administered and distributed according to the terms of this
entire Trust instrument.
3

3.4
After-Acquired Property. It is specifically the intention of the
Undersigned that all real and personal properties now owned by the Undersigned, except
for joint tenancy property, may be added to this Trust; provided further that all future real
and personal properties acquired by the Undersigned may become a part of this Trust at
the time acquired by the Undersigned.

ARTICLE IV
DISPOSITION ON THE DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED
4.1
Basic Trust Division, Trust Names, and Survivorship. At the death of the
Undersigned, if the spouse of the Undersigned is then living, the Trustees shall divide the
Trust Estate into two separate trusts, hereinafter designated as the "Marital Trust" and the
"Family Trust", respectively, to be held, administered and distributed according to this
Article VI as hereinafter stated. At the death of the Undersigned, if the spouse of the
Undersigned has predeceased the Undersigned, then the trustees shall hold, administer
and distribute the assets of this trust in accordance with Article V. In case of
simultaneous death between the Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse, whoever has
the smallest estate shall be presumed to have survived the other in order to effect the
lowest combined federal and state estate or inheritance taxes. The preceding sentence
and Section 4.3 shall be interpreted to achieve the lowest possible combined state and
federal estate taxes for the Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse.
4.2
Debts and Taxes. All debts, expenses of last illness and funeral expenses,
attorneys fees, and other costs incurred in the administration of the estate of the
Undersigned, and all foreign, federal, estate, transfer, inheritance, and succession taxes
payable by reason of the death of the Undersigned, may in the sole discretion of the
trustees, be paid out of the Trust assets contributed to the Trust by the Undersigned. The
Undersigned absolves his or her surviving spouse, if any, from any liability for any of
said debts or expenses. The Trustees shall have power to determine whether or not any or
all of the secured debts shall be paid (including debts secured by property passing by joint
tenancy) and thus exonerate particular properties from debt. Hence, the Trustees may pay
secured debts, may obtain renewals or extensions of secured debts, may distribute
property subject to such debts, and may do other acts which the Trustees deem
appropriate and for the best interest of the Trust and the beneficiaries thereof. The
Trustees shall have discretion to require that the recipients of any assets included in the
federal gross estate of the Undersigned pay their proportionate share of any federal, state
or any taxes. The aforementioned is subject to two exceptions: (i) none of the said
hereinbefore described debts, expenses or federal, state, foreign estate or other taxes shall
be borne by the surviving spouse of the Undersigned with respect to any such non probate
assets or probate assets qualifying for the Marital deduction, but shall be charged to the
4

Family Trust; and (ii) the proceeds received from any life insurance policies on the
Undersigned's life or from qualified pension or profit sharing plans, and which may or
may not be included in the gross estate of the Undersigned, shall not be liable for, or paid
toward the debts, expenses, death taxes, or other charges against the estate of the
Undersigned, if there are other assets available for such payment. Further, any proceeds
received from insurance policies or retirement plans because of the death of the
Undersigned, and which are not included in the federal taxable estate of the Undersigned,
shall become assets of the Family Trust and not the Marital Trust. The reason for this is
to keep those assets from being taxed in the estate of the Undersigned. The Trustee is
given authority to do whatever is necessary to keep those assets out of the federal taxable
estate of the Undersigned.
4.3
Initial Corpus of the Marital Trust. If the Undersigned's spouse shall
survive the Undersigned, the Trustee shall set aside, transfer and pay over to the Marital
Trust all of the assets of this Trust. Notwithstanding anything contained in this
paragraph, if a reduction of the property passing to the Marital Trust under this paragraph
would not result in any increase in the federal estate tax upon the Undersigned's estate
(after taking into account all credits allowable against such tax), said amount shall be
reduced by the largest amount which will result in no increase in federal estate tax upon
the Undersigned's estate, and such amount shall not pass under this paragraph but instead
shall pass and be governed by the provisions of Article 4.5 of this Trust. In determining
the amount of any such reduction, the final determination in the federal estate tax
proceeding in the Undersigned's estate shall control, and there shall be taken into account
all property passing or which shall have passed to or for the benefit of the Undersigned's
spouse under this Trust, the Undersigned's Will or otherwise. Such reduction shall be
deemed a dollar amount reduction, and the property passing as a result thereof under
Article 4.5 of this Trust shall not participate in increases or decreases during the
administration of the Undersigned's estate. To the extent possible, assets with respect to
which the marital reduction is not allowable for purposes of federal estate tax on the
Undersigned's estate, or with respect to which a credit for foreign death taxes is allowable
for such purposes, shall be allocated to the property passing to the Trust created under
Article 4.5 of this Trust.
4.4
Marital Trust Purposes. The Marital Trust shall be held by the Trustees,
separately in trust, for the following purposes:
4.401 Income Distribution. The Trusteed shall pay to the surviving
spouse of the Undersigned, commencing as of the date of the Undersigned's death, all of
the income from the Trust in monthly or other convenient installments, but in no event
less frequently than in quarter-annual installments.
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4.402 Principal Distribution. Whenever the Trustees determine that the
funds available to the surviving spouse of the Undersigned from all sources, including the
income from the Marital Trust, are not sufficient for proper care, maintenance, support
and travel, including but not limited to the needs arising from illness, accident or
misfortune of the surviving spouse of the Undersigned, and funds required to permit the
purchase of residences, the Trustees at any time and from time to time may, in their sole
discretion, pay or distribute to the surviving spouse of the Undersigned so much of the
principal of the Trust as they shall deem necessary or advisable under the circumstances,
and the rights of the remaindermen in the Trust shall be considered of secondary
importance.
4.403 Distribution on Death of Surviving Spouse. Upon the death of the
surviving spouse of the Undersigned, the Trustees shall continue to hold and distribute
the rest, residue and remainder of this Trust as subject to and under the provisions of
Article V; provided, however, that the Trustees may, in their discretion, first pay from the
Marital Trust all debts, expenses and death taxes of the Undersigned's spouse.
4.404 Disclaimer. The surviving spouse of the Undersigned, or his or her
executor, after the Undersigned's death, may disclaim in writing the surviving spouse's
interest in the Marital Trust. If the surviving spouse of the Undersigned disclaims part or
all of the interest given to the Marital Trust as referred to in Article IV, the disclaimed
properties shall pass to and become part of the Family Trust, and shall be distributed as
set forth therein.
4.5
The Initial Corpus and Purposes of the Family Trust. The Family Trust
shall contain the balance of the Trust Estate remaining after setting aside all property of
the Trust Estate that is included in the Marital Trust. The Family Trust shall not be
subject to the payment of the debts and death taxes of the Undersigned. The Family Trust
shall be held by the Trustees separately in trust for the following purposes:
4.501 Principal and Income Distribution. During the lifetime of the
spouse of the Undersigned, the Trustees may distribute, commencing as of the date of the
Undersigned's death, to said spouse and any children or grandchildren of the
Undersigned, such part or all of the principal and income of the Family Trust as the
trustees, in their sole discretion, deem necessary or appropriate for the support and
maintenance of the surviving spouse and said children and grandchildren in the standard
of living to which they are accustomed, including reasonable and adequate health,
medical, mental, hospital, nursing and invalidism expenses.
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4.502 Primary Consideration of Spouse and Minor Children. In
exercising the discretions imposed upon the Trustee, the Trustees are directed that
primary consideration be given to the surviving spouse and the surviving minor children,
inasmuch as they shall likely be the ones with the greatest needs.
4.503 Exclusive Special Power of Appointment Exercisable Inter Vivos
or Testamentarily; Gift Over in Default. Notwithstanding any of the provisions above,
during the life or at the death of the surviving spouse of the Undersigned, the Trustees
shall hold, administer or distribute the assets of the Family Trust to or for the benefit of
any one or more of (i) the Undersigned's issue; (ii) spouses of the Undersigned's deceased
issue; or (iii) siblings or any issue of the siblings of the Undersigned, as the surviving
spouse of the Undersigned shall appoint by exercise of this exclusive special power of
appointment provided herein. Such special power of appointment shall be exercised
either inter vivos by a written direction delivered to the Trustees of this Trust or by a Will
made after the death of the Undersigned, which specifically refers to the power herein
given. Any appointment by the spouse of the Undersigned may be of such estates and
interest and upon such terms, trusts, conditions, powers ^nd limitations as the surviving
spouse shall determine.
Any appointment may exclude any one or more of the beneficiaries of any
enumerated class. If, or to the extent that, the spouse of the Undersigned does not
exercise this testamentary special power of appointment, at the death of the spouse of the
Undersigned, said assets of the Family Trust shall pass as directed in Article V.
However, this special power shall not apply to any trust property which the holder of the
power at any time gifted to the Undersigned which would be included in the estate of the
holder for federal estate tax purposes if the holder were tp leave such power under IRC
Section 2038.

ARTICLE V
DISPOSITION ON THE DEATH OF THE UM)ERSIGNED
AND THE UNDERSIGNED'S SPOUSE
All Trust principal with all accumulated income thereof, directed to be disposed
of under the provisions of Article V shall, upon the death of the Undersigned and the
Undersigned's spouse, be held in trust for the benefit of the then living children of the
Undersigned, and the then living issue of any deceased children of the Undersigned, and
shall be disposed of as follows:
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5.1
Support and Education. All remaining Trust assets (principal and income)
shall be held, administered and distributed as follows: Until the youngest living child of
the Undersigned is age 25, the Trustees, in their sole discretion, shall distribute such
funds from income or principal of the Trust Estate, as they deem necessary for the
support, maintenance and education of the Undersigned's children, and grandchildren (if
the Trustees deem the grandchildren to be in need); such payments need not be equal in
amounts. The Trustees shall take into account the needs, ages, assets and other available
sources of income and support of the Undersigned's children. The Undersigned further
particularly directs the Trustees that in exercising their discretion hereunder, they should
make reasonable allowance for the degree of educational expenses at undergraduate
college and post-graduate college level that have been expended for various of their
children and that should thereafter be expended for various others of their children, in
order to treat their children with some degree of fairness with respect to the receipt of
educational funds from them. The Trustees shall determine the amount to be distributed,
the beneficiary to whom distributions are to be made, and the time and manner of
distributions made under this Section, and shall distribute the amounts according to the
various needs of the beneficiaries, even if such distribution is unequal. Any such
payment is to be charged against the Trust Estate as a whole, rather than against the
ultimate distributive share of the beneficiary to whom payment is made. If amounts are
not disbursed under this provision after the youngest living child has reached age 25; then
the remainder shall be distributed according to Section 5.2.
5.2
Distribution. After all the surviving children of the Undersigned attain age
25, the Trustee shall divide the remaining principal and income of the Trust Estate into as
many equal shares as there are children of the Undersigned then living, and children of
the Undersigned then deceased with issue then living; provided, further, that each of said
equal shares shall either be distributed or held and administered, and later distributed by
the Trustees as separate trust, as follow:
5.201 Living Children. One share shall be set aside for the benefit of each
of the Undersigned's children who may then be living and distributed or held in trust as
follows:
Each of the Trusts mentioned above for a separate child of Undersigned
shall be held as a life estate and in trust for the life of the respective child of the
Undersigned. The Trustees during the life of each Trust beneficiary (who is a child of the
Undersigned) shall invest the income, add it to principal, and shall be granted a power of
invasion over the principal and income of the Trust and may exercise that power of
invasion, in the Trustee's sole and uncontrolled discretion, for the support, education,
medical care and maintenance of the respective Trust beneficiary during his lifetime. The
beneficiary is given no power of invasion over the Trust.
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At such time as a Trust beneficiary (a child of the Undersigned) dies, or if
said child dies prior to the Undersigned, then his or her share shall continue to be held in
Trust for the benefit of his children (grandchildren of the Undersigned) until the youngest
of said children reach the age of 25. Until the youngest of said children reach the age of
25, the Trustee shall continue to hold the assets of the trust estate and may invade the
income and principal of the Trust for the support, maintenance, medical care and
education for the beneficiaries of the Trust as the trustee in the trustee's sole and
uncontrolled discretion deems best. At such time as th^ youngest living child of a
deceased child of the Undersigned reaches the age of 25, then that Trust shall terminate
and be paid out in equal shares by right of representation to the issue of each child of the
Undersigned for whose benefit the trust is set up. By way of example, upon the death of
Gary E. Patterson, his Trust shall continue to be held for the benefit of his issue, if he
then has any. At such time as the youngest child of GaiV E. Patterson reaches the age of
25, the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee shall pay the Trust assets out to the issue of
Gary E. Patterson by right of representation. In the event a child of the Undersigned dies
without having issue surviving, then in that event their respective share shall be
transferred in equal shares to the other Trusts established for the children of the
Undersigned pursuant to this paragraph, to be held, administered and distributed in
accordance with said Trust terms.
For each Trust which is otherwise to be established under this Trust
instrument and to which any of the Undersigned's generation-skipping exemption is
allocated, unless the Trust thereby has a generation-skipping inclusion ratio of zero, the
Trustee shall instead establish two separate Trusts so that each separate Trust has a
generation-skipping inclusion ratio of either zero (the Exempt Trust) or one (the
Nonexempt Trust). This is to be accomplished by allocating to the Nonexempt Trust the
minimum amount of property necessary to establish that Trust with an inclusion ration of
one, while leaving the Exempt Trust with an inclusion r^tio of zero.
5.3
Alternative Distribution. If all of the aboVe distributions fail, then the
Trustee shall distribute the property of this Trust equally to those persons who would
constitute heirs at law of the Undersigned, in the proportions provided by the law of
descent and distribution of the state whose laws govern this Trust.

ARTICLE VI
TRUSTEE AND EXECUTOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
6.1
In General. The personal representative of the estate of the Undersigned
and the Trustees of this Trust shall have as complete power and discretion with respect to
administration and management of the Undersigned's estate and this Trust, as the
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Undersigned had over the Undersigned's property while living; such power and discretion
shall include, by way of illustration and not of limitation, and in addition to any inherent,
implied or statutory power not inconsistent with the other provision of this Trust, and the
Undersigned's Will, the power thereinafter enumerated in this Article. The word
"Trustees" hereinafter shall refer to the Trustees of this Trust, and the personal
representative of the Undersigned's estate and "Trust Estate" shall refer to the Trust Estate
of the Trust and the estate outside of this Trust of the Undersigned.
6.2
Investments. The Trustees may purchase or otherwise acquire and retain,
whether originally a part of any Trust Estate hereunder or subsequently acquired, any and
all stocks, bonds, notes and other such securities or any variety of real or personal
property, including stocks or interests in investment trusts, mutual funds and common
trust funds (including common trust funds maintained by the Trustees) as the Trustees
may deem advisable, whether or not such investments be of a character permissible for
investments by fiduciaries. Investments need not be diversified and may be made or
retained with a view toward possible increase in value, notwithstanding the amount or
absence of income therefrom.
6.3
Types of Transactions. The Trustees may sell, exchange, lease, pledge,
mortgage, transfer, convert, or otherwise dispose of or grant options with respect to any
and all properties at any time forming a part of the Trust Estate, in such manner, at such
time or times, for such purposes, for such prices and upon such terms, credits and
conditions as the Trustees may deem advisable. Any lease or contract made by the
Trustees may extend beyond the period fixed by statute for leases or contracts made by
fiduciaries and may extend beyond the duration of any trust hereunder.
6.4
Borrowing. The Trustees may borrow money from any source, including
the Trustees, for the benefit of the Trust Estate created hereunder, and as security for any
such loan, may mortgage or pledge any property in any Trust Estate created hereunder.
6.5
Management. The Trustees may vote in person or by general or limited
proxy with respect to any shares of stock or other securities held by the Trustees, may
become a party to or deposit securities or other property under or accept securities issued
under any voting trust agreement (whether or not extending beyond the duration of any
trust hereunder) any may rescind, terminate or amend any such voting trust agreement,
make consents, directly or through a committee or agent, to any recapitalization,
reorganization, consolidation, merger, dissolution or liquidation of any corporation,
partnership or association in which any Trust created hereunder may have an interest, and
may make any payments, assignments, or subscriptions and take any other steps which
the Trustees may deem necessary or proper to enable the Trust created hereunder to
obtain the benefits of any such transaction.
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6.6
Insurance. The Trustees may effect and keep in force life, fire, rent, title,
liability or casualty insurance or any other insurance of any nature in any form and in any
amount, including without limitation, insurance on or with respect to any dwelling and
the contents thereof in which any beneficiaries reside and any automobile which any
beneficiary uses, whether or not such dwelling, contents or automobile are part of the
Trust Estate.
6.7
Principal and Income. The Trustees may determine what is principal or
income of any trust and apportion and allocate in their discretion its receipts, taxes and
other expenses and charges between the two. A separate income account need not be
maintained. Any income not distributed in accordance with the provisions hereof shall
become principal.
6.8
Alternative Valuation Date and Tax Choices. The Trustees, in selecting
the valuation date for purposes of Federal estate and state death taxes, may select a date
which results in the lowest tax burden on the Undersigned's estate, considering the effect
of the Federal estate tax and all state death taxes, and also income tax of the property
included in the Undersigned's estate and the same shall be binding upon all such
beneficiaries, without further adjustment to any share or portion due a beneficiary.
Trustees may also choose between taking certain deductions, or both. The Trustees shall
not restore to principal from income the amount by which the Federal estate taxes are
increased by the estate's loss of any such deductions.
6.9
Settlement of Claims. The Trustees shall have power to renew, assign,
alter, extend, compromise, release, with or without consideration, or submit to arbitration,
obligations or claims held by or asserted against the Tru$t Estate.
6.10 Income and Gift Taxes. The Trustees shall have power to join with the
surviving spouse in federal and state income tax returns for any period prior to the first of
the Undersigned's death; and also for federal gift tax purposes, to consent to the splitting
of gifts made by the Undersigned to third persons so that such gifts may be treated for the
purpose of computing gift tax or refunds, including deficiencies, interest and penalties as
they result from so doing, even though not attributable to the Undersigned's own income
or property, and even to determine that all sums so payable shall be paid out of the
Undersigned's Trust Estate, without giving or obtaining any consideration therefor.
6.11 Trustee Transactions with Other Family Trusts or Estates. The Trustees
may enter into any transactions authorized by this Article with any other decedent's estate
or any inter vivos or testamentary trust in which the Undersigned or issue or any of them
has beneficial interest, even though any fiduciary of such other estate or trust is also a
fiduciary under this Trust or the Undersigned's Will. The Trustees may enter into any
transaction authorized by this Article with the Trustees or legal representatives of any
11

other trust or estate in which any beneficiary hereunder has a beneficial interest even
though such Trustee or legal representative is also a Trustee hereunder. Without limiting
the generality of the foregoing, the Trustees may advance funds to, purchase assets from,
or sell assets to the personal representatives of the estate of the Undersigned and may pay,
with or without arrangements for reimbursement, any sums necessary for the settlement
of the estate of the Undersigned subject to Section 4.3.
6.12 Reserves for Amortization, Obsolescence, Depreciation and Depletion.
The Trustees may charge to operating expense all current costs of amortization,
obsolescence, depreciation and depletion of any properties of the Trust and provide
adequate reserves for such amortization, obsolescence, depreciation and depletion.
6.13 Agents. The Trustees may hold investments in the name of a nominee and
may employ custodians of any Trust property, brokers, agents and attorneys.
6.14 Distribution in Kind. The Trustees may make any distribution or
payments in kind, or cause any shares to be composed of cash, property or undivided
fractional interests in property different in kind from any other share and determine the
value of such shares. The Trustees may acquire assets for distribution in kind to the
beneficiaries hereunder. Such assets may include property, real and personal, stocks,
bonds, notes and other securities, life insurance contracts and annuities.
6.15 Trustees Expenses. The Trustees may pay from either income or principal
of the Trust the expenses of administering the same. The Trustees shall have a lien on the
Trust Estate from either principal or income or from both, all advances made for the
benefit or protection of the Trust Estate or its properties and all expenses, loss and
liabilities not resulting form the negligence or other default of the Trustees incurred in
connection with the administration of the Estate.
6.16 Payments to Minors or Disabled Beneficiaries. If, in the Trustees
discretion, any beneficiary (whether under or over age 25) is incapable of making proper
disposition of any sum of income or principal that is payable or appointed to said
beneficiary under the terms of this Trust Agreement, the Trustees may apply said sum to
or on behalf of the beneficiary by one or more of the following methods: (i) by payment
on behalf of the beneficiary to any one with whom the beneficiary resides; (ii) by
payments in discharge of the beneficiary's bills or debts, including bills for premiums on
insurance policies; or (iii) by paying an allowance to the beneficiary directly. The
foregoing payments shall be made without regard to other resources of the beneficiary,
and without the intervention of any guardian or like fiduciary; provided, however, that the
Trustees shall endeavor to apply the funds for the benefit of the beneficiary, that the funds
will not be used by any adult person, or any other person for a purpose other than the
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direct benefit of the beneficiary, and particularly so that said funds will not be diverted
from the purpose of support and education of the beneficiary.
6.17 Trustees May Rely on Will. In ascertaining whether there has been an
amendment of this Trust by the Last Will and Testament of the Undersigned or whether
there has been an exercise of any powers which have b^en granted to any of the
beneficiaries herein and which may be exercised by an>| such beneficiary's Last Will and
Testament, the Trustees shall be protected in relying upon an instrument admitted to
probate in any jurisdiction as the Last Will and Testament of the Undersigned or as the
Last Will and Testament of any beneficiary who has such power. Unless the Trustees
have actual notice of the admission to probate of such a Will within six (6) months after
the death of the Undersigned or any such beneficiary, it | will be conclusively presumed
that no such Will has been admitted to probate, and no Such Will exists, and that the
Undersigned or beneficiary, as the case may be, died intestate and the Trust Estate shall
be administered accordingly, whether or not such Will is thereafter found to exist.
6.18 Commingling. The Trustees may commingle the funds and assets of any
Trust Estate hereunder with any other Trust Estate created hereunder so long as proper
records are kept of the assets allocable to any such trust. The Trustees shall not be
required to physically divide any of the investments or any other property unless
necessary or deemed advisable for the purpose of distribution, but may keep the same or
any part hereof in one or more funds in which the separate and distinct trust or shares or
fraction shall have undivided interests.
6.19 Parties Dealing With the Trustees. No purchaser, and no issuer of any
stock, bond or other person dealing with the Trustees hereunder with respect to any
properties hereunder as a purchaser, lessee, party to a contract or lease, or in any other
capacity whatsoever, shall be under any obligation whatsoever to see to the disbursing of
monies paid to the Trustees or to the due execution of this Trust in any particular, but
such person shall be absolutely free in dealing with the Trustees on the same basis as
though the Trustees were the absolute owners of said property, without any conditions,
restrictions or qualifications whatsoever.
6.20 Trustees Liability. No successor Trustee shall be held liable for any
mistakes, negligence or willful misconduct of any preceding Trustee. Without limiting
the generality of the foregoing, no Trustee shall be held liable for failing to make detailed
examinations of the actions or accounts of any preceding Trustee unless such improper
actions of the preceding Trustee are brought to the attention of the successor Trustee. An
honest, non-negligent error of judgment shall never be c^use of liability of any Trustee.
The heirs of the Undersigned while serving as Trustees ^hall be liable only for willful
fraud. Other Trustees shall be liable for their acts and oifiissions in accordance with the
laws of the State of Utah.
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6.21 Limitations on Power of Individual Trustees. Notwithstanding specific
provisions in this instrument to the contrary, and individual serving as a Trustee shall
have no voice or power in the determination of distributions of principal (including trust
terminations) or accumulations of income for said individual Trustees, or to or for any
person to whom said individual Trustees owes a legal obligation of support, nor shall said
individual fiduciary have any voice or power in any other determination which would
cause Trust principal to be includible in such individual's estate for tax purposes or which
would cause Trust income to be taxed to such individual, but such deteiminations shall be
made in the sole discretion and at the direction of any Co-Trustee or successor Trustees.
Even though any successor Trustees are not then serving full time, they shall serve as a
Trustee for this limited purpose.
6.22 Miscellaneous Trustee Provisions. In order to carry out the provisions of
the Trusts created by this instrument, the Trustee shall have the following powers, in
addition to those now or hereafter conferred by law, such powers to be exercised in good
faith and in accordance with the Trustees' fiduciary obligations:
(a)
To lend money to any person, including the probate estate
of the Undersigned, provided that any such loan shall be adequately secured and shall
bear a reasonable rate of interest.
(b)
To purchase property at its fair market value as determined
by the Trustees in the Trustees' discretion, from the probate estate of the Undersigned.
(c)
To borrow money on such terms and conditions as the
Trustees consider advisable, and to encumber Trust property by mortgage, deed of trust,
pledge or otherwise for the debt of the Trust or a Co-owner of Trust property.
(d)
To commence or defend, at the expense of the Trust, such
litigation with respect to the Trust or any property of the Trust Estate as the Trustees
consider advisable, and to compromise or otherwise adjust any claims or litigation against
or in favor of the Trust.
(e)
To withhold from distribution in the Trustees' discretion, at
the time for distribution of any property in this Trust, without payment of interest, all or
any part of the property, as long as the Trustees, in their discretion, shall determine that
such property may be subject to conflicting claims, to tax deficiencies, or to liabilities,
contingent or otherwise, property incurred in the administration of the Estate.
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(f)
To purchase bonds and to pay such premiums in connection
with the purchase as the Trustees, in their discretion, consider advisable; provided,
however, that each premium shall be repaid periodically to principal out of the interest on
the bond in such reasonable manner as the Trustees shall determine and, to the extent
necessary, our of the proceeds on the sale or other disposition of the bond.
(g)
To purchase bonds at such discount as the Trustees in their
discretion consider advisable; provided, however, that the discount shall be accumulated
periodically as interest in such reasonable manner as the Trustees shall determine, and to
the extent necessary paid out of the proceeds on the sale or other disposition of the bond
or out of principal.
(h)
To purchase, in the Trustees discretion, at less than par,
obligations of the United States of America issued before March 4, 1971, that are
redeemable at par in payment of any federal estate tax liability of the Undersigned, in
such amounts as the Trustees deem advisable. The Trustees shall exercise the Trustees'
discretion and purchase such obligations if the Trustees have reason to believe that the
Undersigned is in substantial danger of death, and may borrow funds and give security
for that purpose. The Trustees shall resolve any doubt concerning the desirability of
making the purchase and its amount in favor of making the purchase and in purchasing a
larger, even though somewhat excessive, amount. The Trustees shall not be liable to the
Undersigned, any heir of the Undersigned, or any beneficiary of this Trust for Losses
resulting form purchases made in good faith. The Trustees are directed to redeem any
such obligations that are part of Trust corpus to the fullest extent possible in payment of
the federal estate tax liability of the Undersigned.
6.23 Income accrued or unpaid on trust property when received into the Trust
shall be treated as any other income. Income accrued or held undistributed by the
Trustees at the termination of the Trust created herein shall go the next beneficiaries of
the Trust in proportion to their interest in it. Among successive beneficiaries of this
Trust, all taxes and other current expenses shall be prorated over the period to which they
relate on a daily basis.
6.24 Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, during the lifetime of the
surviving spouse of the Undersigned, said spouse shall have the power to require the
Trustees to make all or part of the principal of the Marital Trust productive or to convert
promptly any unproductive part into productive property. This power shall be exercised
by the surviving spouse of the Undersigned in a written instrument delivered to the
Trustees.
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6.25 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, it is the Undersigned's intention
to have the Marital Trust qualify for the marital deduction under Section 2056 of the
Internal Revenue Code and the regulations pertaining to that Section or any
corresponding or substitute provisions applicable to the Trust estate. In no event shall the
Trustee take any action or have any power that will impair the marital deduction, and all
provisions regarding the Marital Trust shall be interpreted to conform to this primary
objective.
6.26 For each trust which is otherwise to be established under this Trust
instrument and to which any of the Undersigned's generation-skipping exemption is
allocated, unless the trust thereby has a generation-skipping inclusion ratio of zero, the
Trustee shall instead establish two separate trusts so that each separate trust has a
generation-skipping inclusion ratio of either zero (the Exempt Trust) or one (the
Nonexempt Trust). This is to be accomplished by allocating to the Nonexempt Trust the
minimum amount of property necessary to establish that trust with an inclusion rate of
one, while leaving the Exempt Trust with an inclusion ration of zero.

ARTICLE VII
TRUSTEE PROVISIONS
7.1
Accounting. With respect to each separate Trust created herein, any
corporate Trustee shall render at least annually an account of income and principal,
including a statement of all receipts, disbursements and capital changes, to all
beneficiaries then eligible to receive income or to the natural or legal guardians of such
beneficiaries. However, individual Trustees shall render such annual accounting only if
requested by at least one beneficiary of the Trust, and as need for tax returns. So long as
the Undersigned serves as a Trustee of this Trust, an counting requested by beneficiaries
of this Trust shall be limited to a list of assets currently held by the Trustees as part of this
Trust. Any time a Trustee resigns, is removed or dies in accordance with Sections 6.5
and 6.10, then the resigning Trustees, the removed Trustees, or the surviving Co-Trustee
or successor Trustee, in case of death of a single Trustee, shall submit an accounting to all
the living beneficiaries of the Trust who shall object in writing to said Trustee's
accounting within sixty (60) days of said accounting shall be deemed approved by the
beneficiaries.
7.2
Acting in Other Jurisdictions. If for any reason the Trustee is required or
deems it advisable to take any actions in any jurisdiction in which it is not permitted
under the laws of such jurisdiction to qualify as a Trustee, the Trustee may appoint to act
in such other jurisdiction such person or corporation as the Trustee deems advisable.
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7.3
Bond. No bond shall be required of the Original Trustees hereunder or of
any successor Trustees or, if bond is required by law, no surety on such bond shall be
! required.
7.4
Compensation. Any individual Trustee shall serve as Trustee without
compensation; however, a reasonable compensation shall be paid if the individual Trustee
so requests by a writing attached to this Trust, and when a copy of such request is
delivered to the then existing income beneficiaries. Any corporate Trustee shall be
entitled to a reasonable fee for its services commensurate with fees charged by the
Trustees for similar services. Any corporate Trustee may charge a reasonable fee for
transfers to a successor Trustee and for any final distribution of any share of the Trust
Estate based upon the work involved in such transfer or final distribution.
7.5
Resignation. Any Trustee may resign by giving thirty (30) days written
notice to all of the then current, adult, competent beneficiaries of any Trust created
hereunder.
7.6
Trustees. The following will act as original Trustees, and as replacement
Trustees in the following order of succession:
(a)
Darlene Patterson and Rex E. Patterson, jointly as original CoTrustees. If either shall fail or cease to serve, then the survivor shall serve alone.
(b)
Judy Ann Henry, Vicky D. Romero, to serve jointly. If either shall
fail or cease to serve, then the other shall serve with the next listed Trustee, so that there
are always two individuals serving jointly.
(c)

Rex A. Patterson

(d)
Trustee or Trustees as the majority of the beneficiaries remaining
choose, with the parent or legal guardian voting for minor beneficiaries. There must
always be at least two Trustees serving jointly.
In the discretion of the Trustees, additional Trustees may be added in the
succession above indicated if more than one trustee is desired. If an institutional trustee
is appointed Trustee, then no successor Trustee to said institution need be appointed.
An exception to the above has to do with the Trusts which are established
as lifetime trusts for the benefit of the children of the Undersigned. At such time as both
the Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse have died, and at such time as each child
of the Undersigned who is a Trust beneficiary attains age 40, then the Trustee of the Trust
established for each such child shall be the child who is the beneficiary of each respective
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Trust ifsa.id child elects to be Trustee. By way of example, on the death of the
Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse, the Trustee for the benefit of the Trust to be
established for Gary E. Patterson shall be Gary E. Patterson, if he elects and if he is at
least age 40 or when he becomes age 40. If any of the above children cease to serve as
trustee, then a successor trustee shall be appointed as described above except that each
said child may require trustees on said child's trust once said child is age 40.
7.7
Dissent Among Trustees. A majority of the Trustees, whether individual
or corporate, shall have the power to make any decisions, undertake any action, or
execute any documents affecting the Trust created herein. In the event of a difference of
opinion among the Trustees, the decision of the majority of them shall prevail, but the
dissenting or non-assenting Trustee shall not be responsible for any action taken by the
majority pursuant to such decision. After the death of the Undersigned, if only two (2)
individual Trustees are in office, they must act unanimously. If an individual and a
corporate Trustee are in office, the determination of the individual Trustee shall be
binding.
7.8
Delegation of Authority. Any Trustee may from time to time delegate to
one or more of the remaining trustees, any powers, duties or discretions. Every such
delegation shall be in writing delivered to the delegate or delegates, and shall remain
effective for the time therein specified or until earlier revocation by a further writing
similarly delivered. Everyone dealing with the Trustees shall be absolutely protected in
relying upon the certificate of any Trustee as to who is the acting Trustee or Trustees at
the time and as to the extent of their authority by reason of any delegation or otherwise.
7.9
Independence of Court Supervision. In the absence of a breach of trust, no
Trustee shall ever be required to qualify before, be appointed by, or account to any court
or obtain the order or approval of any court in the exercise of any power of discretion
herein given.
7.10 Removal. While the surviving spouse of the Undersigned is a Trust
beneficiary under this Trust, said spouse shall have the power to require any existing
Trustee to resign, whereupon a successor Trustee shall be appointed as appointed by said
spouse, or if the spouse does not appoint a successor then a successor shall be appointed
pursuant to paragraph 7.6.
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ARTICLE Vni
GENERAL TRUST PROVISIONS
8.1

Insurance

8.101 Power of the Undersigned. The Undersigned reserves the right,
without the consent or approval of the Trustees, to sell, assign or hypothecate any policies
of life or accident insurance made payable to the Trustees hereunder, to exercise any
option or privilege granted by such policies, including but without limiting the generality
of the foregoing, the right to change the beneficiaries of such policies, and to receive all
payments, dividends, surrender values, benefits or privileges of any kind which may
accrue on account of such policies during the Undersigned's lifetime. Furthermore, the
Trustees agree to deliver to the Undersigned any of sucfy policies deposited with the
Trustees hereunder.
8.102 Duties of Trustees. The Trustees shall hold any policies of life or
accident insurance which may be deposited with the Trustees, but without any obligation
to pay premiums, assessments or other charges upon any of the policies or otherwise to
preserve them or any of them as binding contracts of insurance. Upon the death of the
insured, or upon the maturity date of any policy assigned or payable to the Trustees, the
Trustees shall take such proceedings in their judgment they shall deem necessary to
collect all proceeds due on the policies and they may, if they so elect, exercise any
settlement options available under the policies. The Trustees are authorized to
compromise and adjust claims arising out of such insurance policies, upon such terms and
conditions as the Trustees shall deem advisable, and, to the extent necessary, may
maintain or defend any dispute; provided, however, the Trustees shall be under no duty to
maintain or enter into any litigation unless their expenses, including attorneys fees and
costs, have been advanced or guaranteed in an amount and in a manner reasonably
satisfactory to the Trustees. The Trustees may repay any advances out of the principal or
income of this Trust. The receipt of the Trustees to the iijisurer shall be a full discharge of
the insurer and the Trustees alone shall thereafter be required to see to the application of
the proceeds.
8.2
Spendthrift Clause. The interest of each beneficiary in the income or
principal of any Trust created hereunder shall be free from the control or interference of
any creditor of the beneficiary or any spouse of a married beneficiary and shall not be
subject to attachment or susceptible of anticipation or alienation. Nothing contained in
this Section shall be construed as restricting in any way the exercise of any power or
discretion granted hereunder.
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8.3
Perpetuity Savings Clause. In any event, and anything to the contrary
herein contained notwithstanding, the Trusts created in this Agreement shall terminate
upon the day of twenty-one (21) years after the death of the Undersigned and the
Undersigned's children and grandchildren living at the time this Trust becomes
irrevocable, in the event these Trusts shall not have previously terminated in accordance
with the terms hereof. In the event of the termination of these Trusts as provided for in
this Section, the Trustees shall distribute to the Trust Estate as it shall then be constituted,
together with any net income, to the beneficiaries then entitled to the income from the
Trust Estate, in the same proportion in which they are entitled to such income.
8.4
Governing Law. This Agreement shall be construed as regulated by the
laws of the State of Utah.
8.5
Definitions. The following are various terms used in the Trust Agreement
and the definitions which the Undersigned intends for such terms:
(a)
Children. "Children" means the lineal descendants in the first
degree of the Undersigned or of such other persons specifically named or indicated by the
text or context. "Child" means a single such descendent. The Undersigned intends, for
all purposes whatsoever, adopted children of the Undersigned or any other person shall
have exactly the same status as natural bom children; provided, however, adopted
children shall be treated as natural children only if the adoption occurs before the adopted
person's 21st birthday. Provided further, however, adopted issue who are also natural
issue shall take only in one capacity, such capacity being the one which grants to such
issue the larger share.
(b)
Issue. "Issue" means children and other lineal descendants of the
Undersigned or of such other persons specifically named or indicated by the text or
context.
(c)
Child in Being. A child who is born alive shall be treated as a
child in being during the actual period of gestation for purposes of (i) determining if a
person (that is, the Undersigned or any other person) died without children or issue
surviving; and (ii) determining if a person is entitled to share in a distribution of Trust
principal. All of the rights of such a child shall commence at birth.
(d)
"Spouse", "Surviving Spouse", or "Spouse of the Undersigned",
shall be deemed to refer to Rex E. Patterson.
8.6
Invalid Provisions. If any provision of this Trust is held invalid, none of
the other provisions shall thereby be rendered invalid or inoperative, but such provisions
shall be given full force and effect as herein provided.
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8.7
Survivorship. In determining the beneficiaries of the Trust created herein,
a beneficiary shall be deemed to have survived the Undersigned, or any other person, a
point in time, or an event, as the case may be, only if such survivorship is for at least
thirty (30) days. Provided, however the preceding sentence shall not apply in any case
where its application would cause an otherwise valid provision of this Trust to be void
because of the rule against perpetuity, the rule limiting suspension of the power of
alienation, the rule against accumulation, or any similar rules.
8.8
Age. A person attains a specific age (for example, age 21) at the
beginning of the day that forms the coordinate birthday commemoration (for example,
21st birthday). Any person whose birthday falls on February 29 shall be deemed to have
a birthday on February 28 for all purposes of this Trust.
8.9
Number and Gender. The singular shall be interpreted as the plural and
vice-versa, if such treatment is necessary to interpret this Trust in accordance with the
manifest intention of the Undersigned. Likewise, if either the feminine, masculine or
neuter gender should be one of the other genders, it shall be so treated.
8.10 Paragraph Headings. The paragraph and other headings used herein are
merely indices for convenience and shall not be used in the interpretation of this
instrument.
8.11 Notification of Attorney. If the Undersigned has a serious illness or
operation, the Undersigned requests that the Trustees contact their attorney, Mark D.
Palmer, to obtain instructions in case the Undersigned should die.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Undersigned has executed this Trust Agreement.

DARLENE PATTERSON, Undersigned

DARLENE PATTERSON, Co-Trustee

REXTi PATTERSON; Co-Trustee

21

STATE OF UTAH
( ss.

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

On the 30th day of July, 1999, personally appeared before me a Notary Public in
and for said County and State, Darlene Patterson and Rex E. Patterson, known to/toe to
be the persons whose names are subscribed to thej foregoing Fan>i|y Protection T/ust, and
acknowledged to me that they executed the same/

Syracuse, Utah
£sionExpires:08/29/01

(SEAL)

HQTMPVBUC- S W E of UTAH
i ™

oonP
320
E 200 SO.
SO
CLEARFIELD UTB4015

COMM ~' r * 8-29-:
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SCHEDULE"A"
SEPARATE PROPERTY OF THE
DARLENE PATTERSON
FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST
FOR TEN DOLLARS ($10.00), and other good and valuable considerations, the
Undersigned, as Grantor, hereby transfers, sells, assigns, and conveys the below listed
property with all right, title, interest and obligations pertaining thereto, to the Trustees,
subject to the terms and conditions of The Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust,
dated the 30th day of July, 1999.

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION
1.

DATE
PLACED
INTO TRUST

GRANTOR'S
INITIALS

Any and all personal property now
owned or hereafter acquired by the
Undersigned.

3.

DARLENE PATTERSON
STATE OF UTAH

)
( ss.

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

On the 30th day of July, 1999, personally appeared before rne/Darlene Pattersor
whose name is subscribed to the foregoing_Schedu^p "A/, and acknowledged to me thp
she executed the same.

IC
yracuse, Utah
sion Ekpires:08/29/01
(SEAL)

$&&&. NOTARYPUBUC'STXTEolUTAh
# $M$- %
320 E. 200 SO.
ft M E )S} CLEARFIELD, UT 84015
\v>
COMM. EXP. 6-29-2001

We hereby certify that we have read the foregoing Trust and that it correctly states
the terms and conditions under which the Trust estate is to be held, managed, and
disposed of by the Trustees. We approve the declaration of Trust in all particulars and
request the Trustees to execute it.
We further state that any properties transferred to this Trust which constitute
community property pursuant to the laws of any community property state having
jurisdiction over such property, then such property shall retain its character as community
property while held in said Trust until the earlier of the date of the death of the person
who created this Trust, or said person's spouse. In addition, if any property is removed
from this Trust such property shall continue to maintain its character as either community
or separate property depending upon what kind of property it is.

DARLENE PATTERSON

fly £Ai^gY*h
REXE. PATTERSON

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

( ss.
On the 30th day of July, 1999, personally aipeare&before m^Darlene Patterson
and Rex E. Patterson, known to me to be the persqgs >yKp execffieype foregoing
instrument.

MyQ
(SEAL)

/£«?>.
MARK D PALMER
(#$&$&
NOTARY PUBUC* STATE of UTAH
8
gPm }
320 E. 200 SO.
^.&^,,0
'<:^&AP'

CLEARFIELD, UT e4015

COMM. EXP. 8-29-2001

C
acus^ Utah
fonExpires:08/29/01

TabG

FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE
DARLENE PATTERSON
FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST
This First Amendment to the Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust is made and
entered into this 31st day of May, 2000, by and between Darlene Patterson, the Undersigned
and Darlene Patterson, Trustee.
Darlene Patterson, pursuant to the authority granted in the Darlene Patterson Family
Protection Trust, does hereby amend said Trust as follows:
1.
Article V, of the original Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust is hereby
amended to add a Section 5.202 to read as follows:
5.202 Specific Distribution. Notwithstanding the other provisions
of this Article V, regarding equal shares to children, the Trustees shall distribute to Ronald
S. Patterson the five acre portion of the property in Davis Cfounty identified as Serial #14040-0067. Such portion shall be five acres only (from this 14.34 acre parcel), and shall be
the approximately five acres located in closest proximity to the North side of Ronald S.
Patterson's home. This is a specific devise and shall not alter or otherwise diminish the share
of the balance of the Trust Estate to be distributed to Ronald S. Patterson.
2.
Except as specifically herein amended, I hereby ratify and confirm the Darlene
Patterson Family Protection Trust dated the 30th day of July, 1999.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Undersigned and Trustees have executed this First
Amendment to the Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust the day and year first above
written.

UNDERSIGNED:

DARLENE PATTERSON
TRUSTEE:

DARLENE PATTERSON

STATE OF UTAH
( ss.
COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged befon
Undersigned whose identity is known to me or gfevgi on
this 31st day of May, 2000.
~
'

' Darlene Patterson, the
oLsatisfactory evidence,

Residing at: Syracuse, Utah
ffLy Commission Expires: 08/29/01
(SEAL)

MARK D PALMER
mmPWUC»STATE

ctifTAH

320 E 200 SO,

CLEARFIELD, UT 64015

COMMEXP. 8-29-2001

EXHIBIT H

RESTATEMENT OF
THE DARLENE PATTERSON FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST

I, the Trustor, Darlene Patterson, hereby amend and restate in full The Darlene Patterson
Family Protection Trust dated July 30, 1999 and signed by me as Trustor and Trustee This
Restatement shall be effective as of the date of its execution.

ARTICLE I
TRANSFER INTO TRUST
A Transfer of Property For valuable consideration, I, the Trustor, Darlene Patterson, of
West Point, Utah, hereby transfer and deliver to the Trustee and the successor Trustees the
property listed in the Property List (Schedule A), annexed hereto ahd incorporated herein by
reference. The Trustee is to hold the property, and any other property which the Trustee may at
any time hereafter hold or acquire, for the uses and purposes and upon the terms and conditions
set forth herein. All of such property is referred to collectively as the "Trust Estate."
B. Present and Future Property. It is specifically my intention that all real and personal
properties now owned and later acquired by me are to automatically be a part of this Trust I, or
any other person, may grant to the Trust additional real and personal property However, the
Trustee may decline to accept such property by sending written notice of nonacceptance to such
grantor by first class mail addressed to the last known address of sucji grantor or delivered to
such grantor in person.

ARTICLE II
REVOCATION AND AMENDMENT
I reserve the right to amend or revoke this Trust in whole or in part. Such amendment or
revocation shall be by written instrument and shall be effective upon the signing thereof by me
without notice to any successor Trustee. At my death this Trust shall be an irrevocable trust and
will be administered and distributed as set forth herein While this Trust remains revocable, I
reserve the right to make such use of the funds and properties of the Trust as I may deem prudent
Such use shall be deemed to have been made with the consent and approval of the Trustee

ARTICLE III
LOCATION OF DOCUMENTS
This Trust has been prepared in duplicate, each copy of which has been executed as an
original. One of these executed originals is in my possession. I have deposited the other original
for safekeeping with my attorney, David Ray Carver, at his office in Kaysville, Utah. Either of
these copies may be used as an original without the other. If only one copy of this Trust
Agreement can be found then it shall be considered as the original and the missing copy will be
presumed inadvertently lost.

ARTICLE IV
ATTORNEY NOTIFICATION
If I have a serious illness or operation, I request that the Trustee call my attorney, David
Ray Carver, to obtain instructions concerning this Trust If my death makes this prior
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conversation impossible then the Trustee should call the attorney as soon after my death as is
possible.

ARTICLE V
GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Certified Copies. To the same effect as if it were the original, any person or institution
may rely upon a copy certified by a Notary Public to be a true copy of this Agreement and any
schedules or exhibits attached hereto.
B. Present Interests. The interest of the beneficiaries is a present interest which shall
continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated.
C. Spendthrift Provision. After any of the trusts created herein becomes irrevocable, the
interests of each beneficiary in income and principal of the trust shall be free from the control or
interference of any creditor of such beneficiary, the spouse of a married beneficiary, and the
parent of a child beneficiary, and shall not be subject to attachment or assignment either
voluntarily or involuntarily.
D. Rule Against Perpetuities Savings Clause. In any event, this Trust shall terminate not
later than twenty-one (21) years after the death of the last survivor of the group composed of me
and those of my descendants living at my death. The property held in trust shall be discharged of
any trust and shall immediately vest in and be distributed to the persons then entitled to the

discretionary payments from the income or principal of any particular trust is entitled to receive
the full income and that any class of persons so entitled is entitled to receive all such property, to
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be divided among them equally per stirpes. No power of appointment granted hereunder shall be
so exercised as to violate any applicable Rule Against Perpetuities, accumulations, or any similar
rule or law. Any attempted exercise of any power which violates such rule or law shall be void,
notwithstanding any provision of this Trust to the contrary.
E. Trust Contest. If any beneficiary under this Trust shall, directly or indirectly, contest
this Trust or any of its respective parts or provisions, any share or interest given to that
beneficiary shall be revoked and augment proportionately the shares of the beneficiaries that have
not joined or participated in the contest.
F. Invalidity. If any provision of this Trust Agreement is unenforceable, the remaining
provisions shall, nevertheless, be carried into effect.
G. Gender. In all provisions of this Trust Agreement, the masculine includes the feminine
and the neuter and vice versa. Where applicable, the singular includes the plural and vice versa.
H. Natural and Adopted. Whenever used herein, the terms "issue," "child," "children"
and "descendants" include those natural and adopted. The term descendants means the same as
the term issue.
I. Jurisdiction. This Agreement shall be construed and regulated by the laws of the State
of Utah.

ARTICLE VI
TRUSTEE PROVISIONS
A. Parties Dealing with Trustee Protected No purchaser or issuer of any stock, bond or
other instrument evidencing a deposit of money or property, or other person dealing with the
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Trustee with respect to any property hereunder, shall be under any obligation to see to the
disbursing of money or other property delivered to the Trustee or to the due execution of this
Trust in any particular. Such persons shall be absolutely free in dealing with the Trustee as
though the Trustee were the absolute owner of the property. Evefyone dealing with the Trustee
shall be absolutely protected in relying upon the certificate of any Trustee as to the extent of the
Trustee's authority by reason of any delegation or otherwise.
B Insurance. In the event the Trust is named a beneficiary under any policy of insurance,
the Trustee shall hold the policy, subject to order of the owner of the policy. The Trustee shall
have no obligation regarding any insurance policy other than the safekeeping of any policy which
may be delivered to the Trustee. The owner of the policy retains all rights, options and privileges
with respect to the policy. Upon proof of death of the insured, or upon maturity of the policy
prior to the death of the insured, the Trustee shall use reasonable efforts to collect all sums
payable on the policy for which the Trust is designated a beneficiary or owner. All insurance
proceeds received by the Trustee shall become principal of the Trust Estate, except interest paid
by the insurer, which shall be classed as income.
C. Bond. No Trustee named herein need give bond in any jurisdiction. If a fiduciary's
bond may not be dispensed with, I request that the bond be accepted without surety and in the
lowest possible amount.
D Majority Decision. Whenever more than one Trustee is designated to act
concurrently, a majority of the Trustees shall have the power to make any decision, undertake any
action, or execute any documents affecting the trusts created herein. In the event of a difference
of opinion among the Trustees, the decision of the majority of them shall prevail, but a dissenting
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Trustee shall not be responsible for any action taken by the majority pursuant to such decision If
only two individual Trustees are in office, they must act unanimously. If an individual and a
corporate Trustee are in office, the determination of the individual Trustee shall be binding.
E. Prior Trustee Misfeasance. No successor Trustee shall be liable for any misfeasance of
any prior Trustee
F. Resignation. Any Trustee may decline to act or may resign as Trustee of any trust by
delivering a written resignation to the beneficiaries thereof
G. Delegation. Any Trustee may, from time to time, delegate to any remaining Trustee
any powers, duties or discretions. Every such delegation shall be in writing and delivered to the
delegate or delegates. The delegation shall remain effective for the time specified therein or until
earlier revoked. Such revocation shall be in writing and delivered to the delegate or delegates.
H. Trust Expenses. From the income of the trusts or, if that is insufficient, from the
principal thereof, the Trustee shall pay and discharge all expenses incurred in the administration of
the trusts.
I. Compensation. The Trustee shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for services
rendered by the Trustee or counsel retained by the Trustee, including services in connection with
the transfer of assets to beneficiaries or a successor Trustee and the appointment of a successor
Trustee.
J. Annual Accounting. With respect to each trust created herein, the Trustee shall render
at least annually an account of income and principal, including a statement of all receipts,
disbursements and capital changes, to all beneficiaries then eligible to receive income, or to the
natural or legal guardians of such beneficiaries.
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ARTICLE VII
POWERS OF THE TRUSTEE
The Trustee shall have full power to do everything in administering the trusts that the
Trustee deems to be for the best interests of the beneficiaries including, but not limited to, the
following:
A. Investments. To buy, sell and trade in securities. To maintain and operate accounts
with brokers. To pledge any securities held in trust as security for loans and advances. To buy,
sell and trade personal property, real estate, and interests therein, including business interests and
investments, all without diversification as to kind or amount, without being limited to investments
authorized by law for the investment of trust funds. To hold or take title to property in the name
of a nominee.
B. Sell Property. To sell, exchange, pledge, or otherwise dispose of any real or personal
property in such manner and upon such terms as the Trustee deems appropriate.
C. Distributions in Kind. To make distributions as authorized in this Trust Agreement,
including distributions to the Trustee, in kind or in money or partly in each, even if shares are
composed differently. For such purposes, the valuation of the Trustee shall be given effect if
reasonable.
D. Distributions to a Special Need Beneficiary. The Trustee may, in the sole discretion of
the Trustee, distribute personal property items to a minor before any age limitations outlined in
this Trust unless expressly provided otherwise. In addition, if the Trustee, in the sole discretion of
the Trustee, determines that any beneficiary (whether a minor or of legal age) is incapable of
making proper disposition of any sum of income or principal that is payable or appointed to the
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beneficiary, the Trustee may apply the sum on behalf of the beneficiary by any of the following
methods:
1 By payments on behalf of the beneficiary to a parent, custodian, guardian, or an
adult person with whom the beneficiary resides. The Trustee shall not be liable for any
such payments made.
2. By payments in discharge of the beneficiary's debts or obligations.
3. By paying an allowance to the beneficiary directly.
E. Adjustments between Income and Principal To determine whether and to what extent
receipts should be deemed income or principal, whether and to what extent expenditures should
be charged against income or principal, and what other adjustments should be made between
income and principal. Such determinations shall be within the well-settled rules therefore.
F Agents. To delegate powers to agents, remunerate them and pay their expenses,
including accountants, investment counsel, appraisers, legal counsel, and other experts. To
employ custodians of the trust assets, bookkeepers, clerks and other assistants.
G. Legal Documents and Claims. To execute contracts, deeds, agreements or any other
documents which the Trustee deems necessary or desirable. To assign, alter, compromise,
release, with or without consideration, or submit to arbitration or litigation, obligations or claims
held by or asserted against the Trustee, my agents, or the trust assets.
H. Borrow Money. To borrow money for the payment of taxes, debts or expenses, or for
any other purpose which, in the opinion of the Trustee, will facilitate the administration of any
trust created herein. To pledge or mortgage property as security for any such loans. To pay
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0. Trustee as Interested Party. To exercise all the foregoing powers even though the
Trustee is personally interested in the property that is involved, notwithstanding any rules of law
relating to divided loyalty or self-dealing.

ARTICLE VIII
DISPOSITION DURING MY LIFETIME
During my lifetime, the Trustee shall hold, manage, and invest the Trust Estate, collect the
income, and dispose of the net income and principal as follows:
A. Income and Principal. The Trustee shall pay to me all of the net income of this Trust
at least semiannually. The Trustee may pay or apply for my use and benefit such amounts of the
principal as the Trustee deems necessary or advisable.
B. Competency. I shall continue to be deemed mentally competent unless determined not
to be competent in writing by two physicians selected by the successor Trustee. The physicians
shall not be liable for any determination made as to my competency if the determination is made in
a reasonable manner.
C. Incapacity. If, in the Trustee's judgment, I am so incapacitated by reason of illness,
age, or other cause that I am incapable of handling funds for my own use and benefit, or if I am
unable to give prompt attention to my financial affairs, the Trustee may use so much of the net
income and principal as the Trustee deems necessary or advisable:
1. For my comfort, support, maintenance, health and education and any person
who, in the judgment of the Trustee, is dependent upon me.
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2. For the discharging of any debt or obligation incurred by me and believed by
the Trustee to be a valid debt including home rental and mortgage payments, utilities,
installment obligations, insurance premiums and established charitable contribution
customs.

ARTICLE IX
DISPOSITION AT MY DEATH
At my death, after payment of currently due debts, expenses and costs of last illness and
funeral out of the estate, the Trustee shall dispose of the Trust Estate as follows:
A. Personal Property List. Ail personal properties listed on the attached Personal
Property List are to be distributed to the named beneficiaries in addition to their respective
distributive shares of the Trust Estate.
B. Specific Distributions. The Trustee shall make the following specific distributions:
1. Gary E. Patterson. Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) shall be set aside for Gary
E. Patterson, my son. If Gary E. Patterson has predeceased me then this share shall be
divided among the descendants of Gary E. Patterson by right of representation.
Distribution of this share shall be subject to the restrictions provided in paragraphs CI and
C2 below.
2. Judy Ann Henry. Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) shall be set aside for Judy
Ann Henry, my daughter. If Judy Ann Henry has predeceased me then this share shall be
divided among the descendants of Judy Ann Henry by right of representation. Distribution
of this share shall be subject to the restrictions provided in paragraphs CI and C2 below.
11

3. Rex A. Patterson. Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) shall be set aside for Rex A
Patterson, my son. If Rex A. Patterson has predeceased n)te then this share shall be
divided among the descendants of Rex A. Patterson by rigjit of representation.
Distribution of this share shall be subject to the restrictions provided in paragraphs CI and
C2 below.
4. Vicky D. Romero. All of the California real estate shall be distributed to Vicky
D. Romero, my daughter. If Vicky D. Romero has predeceased me then this property
shall be divided among the descendants of Vicky D. Romero by right of representation.
Distribution of this share shall be subject to the restrictions provided in paragraphs CI and
C2 below. This distribution is in addition to the share of the Trust Estate to be distributed
in paragraph C below.
5. Ronald S. Patterson. The home and five (5) acres of real estate shall be
distributed to Ronald S. Patterson, my son. The five (5) acres is a portion of the property
located in Davis County currently identified as Serial No. 14-040-0067. Such portion
shall be five (5) acres only (from this 14.34 acre parcel) and shall be the approximately five
(5) acres located in closest proximity to the North side of the current home of Ronald S.
Patterson. If Ronald S. Patterson has predeceased me then this property shall be divided
among the descendants of Ronald S. Patterson by right of representation. Distribution of
this share shall be subject to the restrictions provided in paragraphs CI and C2 below.
This distribution is in addition to the share of the Trust Estate to be distributed in
paragraph C below.
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6. Ricky A. Patterson. Ten Thousand Dollars ($103000) shall be set aside for
Ricky A. Patterson, my son. If Ricky A. Patterson has predeceased me then this share
shall be divided among the descendants of Ricky A. Patterson by right of representation.
Distribution of this share shall be subject to the restrictions provided in paragraphs CI and
C2 below.
7. Randy D. Patterson. All of the Cache County real estate shall be distributed to
Randy D. Patterson, my son If Randy D. Patterson has predeceased me then this
property shall be divided among the descendants of Randy D. Patterson by right of
representation. Distribution of this share shall be subject to the restrictions provided in
paragraphs CI and C2 below. This distribution is in addition to the share of the Trust
Estate to be distributed in paragraph C below.
C. Division of Trust Estate. Theremainder of the Trust Estate shall be equally divided by
the Trustee among my following three (3) children: Vicky D. Romero, Ronald S. Patterson, and
Randy D. Patterson. If one of these three (3) children has predeceased me then the share of the
Trust Estate for that child shall be divided among the descendants of that child by right of
representation.
1. Each beneficiary that has attained (or when the beneficiary does attain) age
twenty-five (25) years shall have their share distributed to them.
2. Until a beneficiary has attained age twenty-five (25) years, the share for such
beneficiary shall be held in a separate trust for the benefit of that beneficiary Each trust
may be used for the support and education of the beneficiary. Education shall include, but
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not be limited to, musical education, dancing lessons, grammar school, secondary school,
college, graduate school, trade school and vocational training school
D. Disclaimed and Unclaimed Interests. Except as provided otherwise, if any of the
above beneficiaries are unable or unwilling to take any portion of the Trust Estate then the
Trustee shall distribute that portion of the property of that beneficiary to his or her descendants by
right of representation and, if none, then to the other beneficiaries proportionate to each
beneficiary's interest in the Trust. If there are no remaining beneficiaries then the Trustee shall
distribute the property to my hving heirs at law in the same priority and distributive order as listed
in the law of intestate succession of the state of Utah as in force on the date of the signing of this
Trust Agreement.
E. Contingent Vesting. If any interest in any part of the Trust Estate would vest in any
person if he or she were alive upon the occurrence of any contingency, such as the death of an
individual or the obtaining a specified age, and that person dies under conditions that it would be
difficult or impossible to determine whether or not he or she was ahve upon the occurrence of the
contingency, that person shall be deemed to have died prior to the occurrence of the contingency.

ARTICLE X
FAMILY MEMBERS AND TRUSTEES
A. Children. My present living children are:
Gary E. Patterson
Judy Ann Henry
Rex A. Patterson
Vicky D. Romero
14

Ronald S. Patterson
Ricky A. Patterson
Randy D. Patterson
B. Trustee. The following people will act as Trustee in the following order of succession:
1. Darlene Patterson.
2. Ronald S. Patterson (my son) and Randy D Patterson (my son), jointly. If one
of these Trustees are unwilling or unable to serve then the remaining Trustee shall serve as
a Co-Trustee with Vicky D. Romero (my daughter), jointly or the survivor.
3. A Trustee chosen by the majority in interest of the beneficiaries (in proportion
to each beneficiary's interest in the Trust Estate). A parent or legal guardian shall be
entitled to vote for minor beneficiaries.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this Restatement on the ) ^ day of
MtfrrM

20_0j_ as Trustor and Trustee.

Darlene Patterson
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State of Utah

)

/?
County of

'

sWA/to,

:SS

'

)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this /2~ day of
stf&njrJ}

20_£?/_ by Darlene Patterson.

OA&CARVER~~1

„ 116 W. 575 N.
I
.Kaysvilte, Utah 84037 I
My Commission Expires I

StS&uSh

I

mA*/&y

Notary Public
r> J +
Residing at:

M

/

y Commission Expires:
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Tab I

AMENDMENT TO
THE DARLENE PATTERSON FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST

I, the Trustor, Darlene Patterson, of West Point, Utah, hereby amend The Darlene
Patterson Family Protection Trust dated July 30, 1999 and signed by me as Trustor and Trustee.
This amendment shall be effective as of the date of its execution.

Article IX paragraphs B and C are hereby amended and restated in full as follows:
B. Specific Distributions. The Trustee shall make the following specific distributions:
1. Vicky D. Romero. Vicky D. Romero, my daughter, shall be distributed all of
my real estate located in California in addition to her share of the Trust Estate as provided
in paragraph C below. If Vicky D. Romero has predeceased me then this share shall be
divided with the remainder of my Trust Estate as provided in paragraph C below.
2. Randy D. Patterson. Randy D. Patterson, my son, shall be distributed all of my
real estate located in Cache County, Utah, in addition to his share of the Trust Estate as
provided in paragraph C below. If Randy D. Patterson has predeceased me then this share
shall be divided with the remainder of my Trust Estate as provided in paragraph C below.
3. Judy Ann Henry. Judy Ann Henry, my daughter, shall be distributed one-half
of the value of my home (or one-half of the proceed of my home if I sold it) located at
4056 West 1300 North, West Point, Utah, in addition to her share of the Trust Estate as
provided in paragraph C below. If Judy Ann Henry has predeceased me then this share
shall be divided with the remainder of my Trust Estate as provided in paragraph C below.

4. Gary E. Patterson. The share that will be distributed to Gary E. Patterson shall
be treated as having received an inheritance advancement in the amount of Twelve
Thousand Dollars ($12,000). This amount shall be deducted from the share that would
have been distributed to him pursuant to the provision in Article IX paragraph C below.
However, should he have predeceased me then any share to be distributed to his
descendants shall not be charged with this inheritance advancement.
C. Division of Trust Estate. Subject to the inheritance advancement in paragraph B4
above, the remainder of the Trust Estate (including any remaining real estate) shall be divided by
the Trustee among my following children on a per stirpes basis: Gary E. Patterson, Judy Ann
Henry, Rex A. Patterson, Vicky D. Romero, Ricky A. Patterson, and Randy D. Patterson. I have
intentionally not provided anything for my son Ronald S. Patterson (or his descendants) since I
have already properly provided for this son during his lifetime as I felt was appropriate. Any
share set aside for the descendants of a deceased child shall be divided among the descendants of
that child by right of representation.
1. Each beneficiary that has attained (or when the beneficiary does attain) age
twenty-five (25) years shall have their share distributed to them.
2. Until a beneficiary has attained age twenty-five (25) years, the share for such
beneficiary shall be held in a separate trust for the benefit of that beneficiary. Each trust
may be used for the support and education of the beneficiary. Education shall include,
but not be limited to, musical education, dancing lessons, grammar school, secondary
school, college, graduate school, trade school and vocational training school.
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Article X paragraph B is hereby amended and restated in full as follows:
B. Trustee. The following people will act as Trustee in the following order
of succession:
1. Darlene Patterson.
2. Judy Ann Henry and Randy D. Patterson (two of my children), jointly or
the survivor.
3. A Trustee chosen by the majority in interest of the beneficiaries (in proportion
to each beneficiary's interest in the Trust Estate). A parent or legal guardian shall be
entitled to vote for minor beneficiaries.

This Amendment is attached to the above referenced Trust and by reference incorporated
therein. All other provisions of the Trust not inconsistent with this Amendment remain in full
force and effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have executed this Amendment on the 7?0 day of
2006 as Trustor and Trustee.

Darlene Patterson
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State of Utah
:ss.

County of

&//tAfU>

)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this _§£?day of
M/iY

2006 b

y Darlene Patterson.

Notary Public
DAVO RAY CARVER
180 S O * 300 W»et Sto 218
SaftlatoCftft Utah 84101
My CotwnlMlon Expires
JUV3.2008
State of Utah

Notary Public
/
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:
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Can You Amend That Revocable Trust? Utah Estate Planning Lawyers Face a Trap for $he
Unwary
by Charles M. Bennett
Revocable living trusts have become a ubiquitous estate planning tool in Utah. Thousands! of
Utahns have such trusts, most prepared by Utah lawyers. One of the benefits of revocable living
trusts is the ability to easily amend them prior to the death of the trustor. Several recent Utah
Supreme Court decisions, however, require revocation rather than amendment under certain
circumstances. As such an amendment will likely not be questioned until after the death of the
trustor - when it is too late to go back and repair anything -attorneys who have prepared revocable
trusts or who represent those who have such trusts need to carefully review these trusts in light of
the recent rulings.
In Banks v. Means, J{ 9-16, 52 P.3d 1190, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2002 UT 65 (2002), the Utah
Supreme Court had to determine whether a trustor was entitled to amend her revocable living
trust agreement to change the remainder beneficiaries. Shortly before the trustor's death, she
amended her trust, removed her children as primary beneficiaries upon her death, named her
sister as the primary beneficiary, and named her children as contingent beneficiaries. Id. at |5.
Although the circumstances surrounding the amendment were unusual, 1 the court assumed the
amendment was properly executed. The issue before the Court was whether the trustor had the
power under the trust agreement to amend the trust and divest the beneficiaries' interest, t h e
relevant part of the trust agreement provided:
3.1 Rights of the Undersigned. As long as the Undersigned is alive, the Undersigned reserves the
right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in part, including the principal, and ^he
present or past undisbursed income from such principal. Such revocation or amendment of this
Trust may be in whole or in part by written instrument. Amendment, modification or revocation of
this instrument shall be effective only when such change is delivered in writing to the then acting
Trustee. On the revocation of this instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to the
Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the instrument of revocation, all of the Tr^JSt
property.
3.2 Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested interests
subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by
death. As long as this Trust subsists, the Trust properties and all the rights and privileges
hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by the Trustee named herein in their fiduciary
capacity.
(Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court ruled that the italicized language in the second paragraph
authorized the trustor to divest the beneficiary's interest only if the trustor revoked the trust in its
entirety. Banks v. Means at ,'16. "[A J trust that specified revocation of a vested beneficiary interest
through divestiture could only divest those beneficiary interests through a complete revocation of
the trust." In re Estate of Flake, J16, 71 P.3d 589, 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2003 UT 17 (2003)
(interpreting Banks v. Means). Although the trustor in Banks expressly reserved the right "to
amend, modify or revoke this Trust," the Court ruled that an amendment could not divest a
beneficiary's interest. Thus, the purported amendment was void.
The Court's ruling in Banks might be construed to limit the trustor's otherwise plenary reservation
of the right to amend the Trust to amendments that did not modify the beneficial interests oft a
beneficiary, such as changing trustees, increasing or decreasing trustee powers, and other
administrative issues. Any amendment that changed beneficial interests would necessarily divest a
beneficiary's interest, at least in part. However, as discussed below, in the 2003 Flake decision, the
Supreme Court approved an amendment to a trust with substantially identical language to that in
Banks where the amendment reduced, but did not eliminate, the unhappy beneficiary's interest in
the trust.
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In Flake, J17, the Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of the vesting language in the
paragraph entitled "Interests of the Beneficiaries" was to insure that the revocable living trust was
not deemed to be an illusory trust. Historically, lawyers creating revocable living trusts were
concerned that the trust could be voided if the trustor had the power to revoke the trust. See e.g.
MacGregor v. Fox, 114 N.Y.S.2d 286, 280 A.D. 435 (N.Y. App. 1952) (holding trust illusory and
"void in its entirety"); but see In re Estate of Groesbeck, 935 P.2d 1255, 1257-58 (Utah 1997)
(holding a revocable trust with either contingent or vested remainder beneficiaries was not
illusory). Thus, the purpose of the language was not to protect the beneficiary's interest from being
deleted by an amendment, as seems to be the perception in Banks, but rather to insure that the
revocable living trust was not deemed illusory.
The Banks analysis is thus revealed to be seriously flawed. It is illogical to believe that a trustor
reserves the power "to amend, modify or revoke" only to restrict the right to amend, but not the
right to revoke. Such a reading truly exalts form over substance Under general contract law, "an
interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only where the contract so
expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no other reasonable interpretation to be
given it." Peirce v. Peirce, |19, 994 P.2d 193, 386 Utah Adv. Rep 38, 2000 UT 7 (2000) (citations
omitted). Far from requiring an unreasonable interpretation, the Banks trust language supports the
opposite conclusion. The trustor in Banks did not retain just the power "to amend, modify or
revoke." Instead, she retained the right "to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in
part." Indeed, the trust document reiterated that the revocation could be in whole on in part in the
very next sentence: "Such revocation or amendment of this Trust may be in whole or in part by
written instrument." The Court should have recognized that an amendment that deletes one
beneficiary and adds another is a revocation of the Trust "in part" as to the deleted beneficiary's
rights in the trust.
The harshness of the holding in Banks, however, is somewhat ameliorated by the Supreme Court's
2003 Flake decision, 2003 UT 17 at J J16-22. There, the Supreme Court held that the language in
the Flake trust permitted an amendment partially divesting a beneficiary's interest in the Trust.
The relevant language of the trust agreement in Flake was:
Revocation and Amendment
As long as the Undersigned is alive, he reserves the right, without the consent or approval of any
other, to amend, modify, revoke, or remove from this Trust the property that he has contributed,
in whole or in part, including the principal and the present or past undisbursed income from such
principal. (Emphasis [in Court's opinion]).
Id. at |5.
Vested Interest of Beneficiaries
The interest of the beneficiaries is a present vested interest which shall continue until the Trust is
revoked or terminated other than by death.
Id. at 117. Interpreting this language, the Supreme Court held:
This language at issue [in Flake] lacks any reference to a complete divestiture. The beneficial
interest of Mrs. Flake was merely amended, and not completely divested as was the case in Banks.
The dispositive issue in the present case is whether there was a complete divestiture of a beneficial
interest as in Banks, or whether there was simply a change in the quality, or scope, of the
beneficial interest. We held in Banks that revocation was required when terminating a vested
beneficial interest. Here, we find that there is no requirement of revocation where the beneficial
interest is simply modified or amended but not terminated. Therefore, Mrs. Flake's beneficial
interest, as amended, was completely outlined in the 1998 Restatement, inasmuch as the 1998
Restatement contained all of the operative provisions of the Almon J. Flake Family Trust. The
purpose and primary effect of Article XIV in the 1987 Trust Agreement is to save the Trust from
the doctrine of merger and to prove that the Trust is not illusory. 1
Id. at |j22 (emphasis in Court's opinion). The Court's declaration that "[t]he dispositive issue in
the present case is whether there was a complete divestiture of a beneficial interest as in Banks, or
whether there was simply a change in the quality, or scope, of the beneficial interest" would seem
to indicate that a trustor can amend a trust with the Banks language if the amendment only
modifies, rather than eliminating, a beneficiary's beneficial interest. On the other hand, the Court
noted that the language "subject to divestment" was not present in Flake, nor was there any
"reference to a complete divestment." It was the Supreme Court that italicized these terms in its
opinion.
While the language of the trusts regarding the vesting of beneficial interests is different, there is
no logical distinction to be drawn between the language of the two trusts In Flake, an amendment
terminating a beneficiary's interest in the trust would constitute a complete divestment whether or
not the trust said the beneficiary's interest was "subject to divestment" as in Banks. Nevertheless,
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with language identical to Banks could modify, but not delete, a beneficiary's beneficial interest in
the trust.
What prompted this article, and makes this more than just a mere academic analysis of two
Supreme Court rulings, was a concern that there may be tens of thousands of trusts extant in Utah
with language identical to that found in Banks. During a period of over ten years, spanning the
1990's, one Utah lawyer created several thousand trusts using language identical to that
interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Banks. This lawyer has since retired from the practice of
law. Thus, when this lawyer's clients seek to update their trusts, another Utah lawyer will need to
deal with trust language identical to that found in the Banks trust. Knowing how to revise a trust
with language identical to that in Banks, without running afoul of that decision, is a key purpose of
this article.
Moreover, not only are there numerous trusts containing the precise language of the Banks trust,
there are perhaps thousands more that contain very similar language. The form used in Banks was
one that had been developed with input from a number of Utah lawyers. To the extent other
lawyers used that same form language, or even to the extent they used language slightly different,
such as the trust language in Flake, these two cases could torpedo amendments to those trusts as
well.
The lesson all estate planning lawyers must learn is thus twofold. First, each lawyer should take a
careful look at his or her own forms. Note that the Court in Banks probably would have allowed the
amendment had the trust used the following language:
Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested interests
subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is amended, revoked or terminated
other than by death. As long as this Trust subsists, the Trust properties and all the rights and
privileges hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by the Trustee named herein in their
fiduciary capacity.

The addition of the word "amended" will specifically allow divestment through amendments and
would apparently resolve the problem the Supreme Court found with the Banks trust provisions.
Whether the estate planning lawyer solves this problem as suggested or in some other way,
however, it is an issue that demands careful attention.
The second lesson for the estate planning lawyer is to be careful when amending someone else's
trust (and perhaps even when amending one's own older trusts). In the case of the Banks trust,
the reservation of the right to amend or revoke and the vesting of the interests of the beneficiaries
were in two adjoining paragraphs of the trust agreement. In Flake, the revocation language was in
Article XIII while the vesting language was in Article XIV. Since both the revocation and vesting
provisions are common boilerplate provisions, they may show up together, as in Banks; closely
connected, as in Flake; or separated by several pages, articles, sections, or paragraphs. Thus, if a
lawyer is asked to amend another lawyer's trust agreement, the revising lawyer should carefully
review the entire trust agreement. Simply determining that the trust is subject to a power to
amend or revoke is no longer sufficient after Banks and, to a lesser extent, after Flake. For Utah
estate planning lawyers, it is an unfortunate trap for the unwary, but the trap can be avoided by
careful attention to detail.
1. The amendment was made by removing certain pages from the trust agreement and replacing
those pages with new pages stating the trustor's revised plan. Id. at |5.
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I.

Introduction

Over the centuries that wills have been used to dispose of testators' property at
death, the law of wills has developed to address issues that arose.1 Similarly, over the
centuries that trusts have been used for non-testamentary purposes, the law of trusts has
developed to resolve resulting issues.2
In recent decades revocable trusts have become the most commonly used trust in
the United States.3 To avoid estate administration, particularly in states in which
administration involves cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive court supervision,
settlors make inter vivos transfers of assets that otherwise would be subject to
administration on their deaths in trust.4 Typically, the trust instrument provides that the
settlor may revoke the trust at any time, in which case its assets are to be returned to the
settlor, and designates beneficiaries to whom the trust assets are to be distributed, or held
for the benefit of in one or more now irrevocable trusts, following the settlor's death.
Professor of Law, the University of Akron School of Law. B. Acct., 1977, The University of Oklahoma;
J.D., with Honors, 1980, The University of Oklahoma. Professor Newman is an Academic Fellow of the
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel.
1
See generally, THOMAS E. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS (2nd ed. 1953).
2
See generally, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT & AMY MORRIS HESS, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § § 2 - 7 (3rd ed.
3

).

See David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67
MISSOURI L. REV. 143, 186 (2002). Note that with inter vivos trusts being used so commonly as will
substitutes in recent years, the fundamental question of whether a trust is revocable or irrevocable is being
answered differently than it was in the past. Under the UTC, unlike at common law, trusts are revocable
unless expressly made irrevocable. See UNEF. TRUST CODE § 602(a) & cmt. (2005).
4
"Pour over" wills that devise part or ail of the testator's probate estate to the revocable trust usually also
are part of the plan.

III.

The Interest of a Non-Settlor Beneficiary in a Revocable Trust While the
Settlor is Living

Generally, during the lifetime of a testator, a devisee under the testator's will has
a mere expectancy with respect to, and not an interest in, the testator's property.41 By
contrast, traditionally a remainder beneficiary of a revocable trust42 was viewed as
receiving a beneficial interest in trust property upon creation of the trust.43 Because
revocable trusts are used primarily to avoid estate administration and provide for the
management of property in the event of the settlor's incapacity without the need for a
court supervised conservatorship, the trend increasingly is to treat the interest of a
remainder beneficiary in a revocable trust during the lifetime of the settlor as an
expectancy.44
A.
Duties of the Trustee to Remainder Beneficiaries. A fundamental issue
raised is whether the remainder beneficiary is entitled to information about the trust, and
able to enforce it, while the settlor is living. If the settlor is competent, as a practical
matter it often will be of little consequence whether a remainder beneficiary is owed
enforceable duties. Often, a remainder beneficiary will not know of the trust or her
interest in it, or will consider the trust and its assets as belonging solely to the settlor and
not seek information about the trust or to enforce its terms. If a remainder beneficiary
demanded information or otherwise attempted to enforce the trust over the objection of
the settlor, the settlor could amend the terms of the trust to eliminate the remainder
beneficiary's interest. If the settlor agreed with the remainder beneficiary's position with
regard to the enforcement of the trust against a non-settlor trustee, the settlor could
enforce the trust herself. Presumably, such reasons explain why there appear to be few
cases in which a remainder beneficiary has attempted to enforce the terms of a revocable

41

See, e.g., Meeks v. Kirkland, 187 S.E.2d 296 (Ga. 1972).
Non-settlor beneficiaries of a revocable trust sometimes are permissible, or less frequently mandatory,
distributees of income, principal, or both during the settlors lifetime. Because of the settlor's retention of
complete ultimate control over the trust through the power to revoke or amend, however, and for the sake
of simplicity, non-settlor beneficiaries of revocable trusts generally are referred to in this article as
remainder beneficiaries.
2

43

See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT & AMY MORRIS HESS, THE LAW OF TRUSTS

AND TRUSTEES § 104 (2d ed. 1983); First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Tenney, 138 N.E.2d 15 (Ohio 1956).
44
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. a (2003); John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate
Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1113 (1984) (stating "[t]he
owner who retains both the equitable life interest and the power to alter and revoke the beneficiary
designation has used the trust form to achieve the effect of testation. Only nomenclature distinguishes the
remainder interest created by such a trust from the mere expectancy arising under a will"). Consistent with
that position, under the Restatement creditors of a remainder beneficiary of a revocable trust may not reach
her interest in the trust during the settlor's lifetime. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 56 cmt. b (2003).
Note, though, that in a recent Colorado case, a remainder beneficiary's interest in the revocable trust of a
living settlor was considered in determining the division of property of the beneficiary and the beneficiary's
spouse in their divorce. In re Marriage of Gorman, 36 P.3d 211 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). Shortly after
Gorman was decided, however, it was effectively overruled legislatively. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10113(7)(b)().
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trust while the settlor is living. More fundamentally, given that the settlor of a revocable
trust has complete ultimate control over the trust and its assets, the right to enforce the
trust, at least while the settlor has capacity, should belong only to the settlor.46 For that
reason, the general rule under the Uniform Trust Code ("UTC") is that during the
settlor's lifetime, the trustee of a revocable trust owes no duties to remainder
beneficiaries, who thus may not enforce the trust.47
That result is consistent with viewing revocable trusts as the functional equivalent
of wills and subjecting them to the law of wills. During a testator's lifetime, devisees
under her will have no interest in her assets and thus no enforceable rights with respect to
their management. That is the case even if the testator has become incapacitated. If the
settlor of a revocable trust becomes incapacitated, however, the analogy to a testator and
devisees with mere expectancies breaks down.

For one such case, holding that remainder beneficiaries lacked standing to sue the trustee of a revocable
trust for breach of duty during the settlor's lifetime, see Hoelscher v. Sandage, 462 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa App.
1990). In Linthicum v. Rudi, 148 P.3d 746 (Nev. 2006), remainder beneficiaries whose interests were
eliminated by the settlor amending the terms of a revocable trust challenged the validity of the amendment
by alleging that the settlor lacked capacity and acted under undue influence. In upholding the lower court's
granting of the successor trustee's motion to dismiss, the Nevada Supreme Court held that remainder
beneficiaries of a revocable trust have only contingent interests that do not vest until the settlor's death, and
thus do not have standing to challenge the trust during the settlor's life. Similarly, in Moon v. Lesidar, 230
S.W.3d 800 (Tex. App. 2007), a remainder beneficiary of a revocable trust was held to lack standing to sue,
after the settlor's death, a non-settlor cotrustee of the trust with respect to a sale of stock by the settlor to
the cotrustee. See also Lewis v. Star Bank, N.A., 630 N.E.2d 418 (Ohio App. 1993) (holding that remainder
beneficiaries of a revocable trust could not sue the trustee after the settlor's death with respect to conduct of
the trustee before the settlor's death).
46
In a Florida case, a competent settlor's revocation of her revocable trust was challenged by the trustee on
the ground that the settlor was acting under undue influence. Florida Nat. Bank v. Genova, 460 So.2d 895
(Fla. 1984). In upholding the revocation, the Florida Supreme Court held that undue influence cannot bar a
competent settlor from revoking a revocable trust. Id. Relying, in part, on Genova, a lower court in a
subsequent Florida case rejected the attempt of the guardian of an incompetent settlor of Totten trust
accounts to disaffirm the trusts. Ullman v. Garcia, 645 So.2d 168 (Fla. App. 1994). For criticism of broad
dictum in Ullman arguably indicating that a conservator of an incompetent settlor of a revocable trust could
not pursue a breach of trust claim against the trustee of a traditional revocable trust, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74 cmt. a(2) and e (2003).
47

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (2005). See Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank, 152 P.3d 115, 122 (Mont. 2007)
(applying a Montana statute similar to § 603(a) of the UTC). For a discussion of whether, under the UTC,
the trustee owes duties to remainder beneficiaries during the settlor's incapacity, see infra notes __-__ and
accompanying text. In re Malasky, 736 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2002), a case not decided under the UTC, involved a
joint revocable trust the decedent and his wife had created and of which they served as cotrustees. Children
of the decedent from a prior marriage were remainder beneficiaries. Id. at 152. Following the decedent's
death, the children objected to the surviving spouse/trustee's accounting for the period from the creation of
the trust until the decedent's death. The court held that the children, "having no pecuniary interest in the
revocable trust until decedent's death, lack[ed] standing to object to the account..." Id. at 153. By contrast,
a Florida court, applying New York law, held that remainder beneficiaries of a revocable trust could pursue
a claim against the trustee of the trust, who was not the settlor, with respect to the administration of the
trust during the settlor's lifetime. See Siegel v. Novak, 920 So.2d 89 (Fla. App. 2006). Similarly, in Cloud
v. U.S. Natl Bank of Oregon, 570 P.2d 350 (Or. 1977), remainder beneficiaries were able to bring a claim
against the trustee of a revocable trust after the settlor's death for disbursements that allegedly were
improperly made to the settlor after she had become incapacitated, or that were made to her as a result of
requests she made while under undue influence.
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For example, assume that the terms of a revocable trust provide that if the settlor
becomes incapacitated, the trustee shall make distributions to one or more other
beneficiaries. A settlor who creates and funds such a trust is attempting to accomplish
more than providing for the management of her property without the need for a
guardianship, if she becomes incapacitated, and disposing of her property at death
without an estate administration. Accordingly, section 603(a) of the UTC, as initially
promulgated, provided that the trustee's duties are owed exclusively to the settlor only
while the settlor has capacity.48 Section 603(a), however, has not been well received.49 As
a result, in 2004 it was amended to place brackets around its language making its rule
applicable only while the settlor has capacity to revoke the trust.50 The accompanying
comment notes that enacting jurisdictions are free to strike the incapacity limitation on
the section's general rule, in which case the trustee's duties would be owed exclusively to
the settlor regardless of whether the settlor had capacity to revoke the trust.51 At least
when the terms of the trust provide for others to be current beneficiaries of trust income
or principal if the settlor becomes incapacitated, and particularly if distributions to others
are mandated in that circumstance, the UTC's original approach to section 603(a) is the
appropriate one. If the trustee's duties in such a case are owed exclusively to the settlor,
the trustee apparently could ignore the settlor's clear intent that others be current
beneficiaries of the trust, and such other beneficiaries not only would be unable to
enforce the trust, they might not even know of their interests in it.

48

See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (2000).

49

From a review of four charts collectively titled, "Significant Differences in States' Enacted Uniform
Trust Codes," prepared as an unofficial in-house National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) document, it appears that of the first 20 jurisdictions to have enacted a version of the
UTC, 12 provide that the duties of the trustee of a revocable trust are owed exclusively to the settlor even if
the settlor lacks capacity (Kansas, Nebraska, Maine, Virginia, South Carolina, Oregon, North Carolina,
Florida, Alabama, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and North Dakota); seven provide that the trustee's duties also are
owed to other beneficiaries if the settlor lacks capacity (Wyoming, New Mexico, Utah, Tennessee, New
Hampshire, Missouri, and Arkansas); and one provides that the trustee's duties are owed only to the settlor,
but allows other beneficiaries to enforce the settlor's intent to benefit them (the District of Columbia). The
charts may be accessed through links on a NCCUSL UTC website:
http://utcproj ect.org/utc/DesktopDefault. aspx.
50
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (2004).
51
Id. cmt. In explanation, the comment noted not only the desire to treat revocable trusts similarly to wills,
but also the issue of how to determine the settlor's capacity, or lack thereof, if the trustee's duties are owed
to other beneficiaries if the settlor becomes incapacitated. That issue has been addressed by Missouri's
version of the UTC, which provides, in relevant part:
1.
While a trust is revocable and the settlor has capacity to revoke the trust, rights
of the beneficiaries are subject to the control of, and the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively
to, the settlor.
2.
A settlor is presumed to have capacity for the purposes of subsection 1 of this
section until either the settlor is adjudicated totally incapacitated or disabled or the trustee has
received an affidavit of incapacity...
5.
In this section, an "affidavit of incapacity" means a written certificate furnished
by at least one licensed medical doctor that states that the settlor lacks capacity to revoke the trust.
Mo. STAT. ANN. § 456.6-603 ( ) .
52

For further discussion of this issue, see Alan Newman, The Ohio Trust Code and Revocable Trusts:
Duties of the Trustee While the Settlor is Living, 17 PROB. L. J. OF OHIO 103 (Jan./Feb. 2007).
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Moreover, if the settlor becomes incapacitated and the trustee's duties are owed
exclusively to the settlor, presumably the trustee would be accountable only to the
settlor's guardian, or agent under a durable power of attorney, for a breach. If the
guardian or agent recovered damages from the trustee, the recovery often should belong
to the trust for ultimate distribution of any amounts remaining at the settlor's death to the
trust's remainder beneficiaries. If the trustee's duties are owed exclusively to the settlor,
however, arguably any such recovery would belong to the settlor to be managed by the
guardian or agent during the settlor's life, with what remains at the settlor's death
distributed under the terms of the settlor's will. While this issue may be of little or no
consequence if the settlor's will pours over the residuary estate to the trust, settlors of
revocable trusts do not always employ pour over wills, but occasionally provide for
different dispositions of their probate estates and trust assets.5^
If the settlor becomes incapacitated and the trustee thereafter owes duties to the
trust's remainder beneficiaries as well as to the settlor, a breach by the trustee while the
settlor was incapacitated would be actionable by both the settlor's conservator or agent
and by the remainder beneficiaries. Less clear is whether the remainder beneficiaries
could hold the trustee accountable for breaches that occurred while the now incapacitated
settlor had capacity. Under the UTC, arguably they could not, as it provides that "[w]hile
a trust is revocable and the settlor has capacity to revoke the trust, rights of the
beneficiaries are subject to the control of, and the duties of the trustee are owed
exclusively to, the settlor."54 If no duties are owed to remainder beneficiaries while a
settlor has capacity to revoke the trust, a breach of the trustee's duty that occurs while the
settlor has capacity would seem to be actionable only by the settlor (or her conservator or
agent). A UTC comment, however, indicates otherwiseFollowing the death or incapacity of the settlor, the beneficiaries would have a
right to maintain an action against a trustee for breach of trust. However, with
respect to actions occurring prior to the settlor's death or incapacity, an action by
the beneficiaries could be barred by the settlor's consent or by other events such
as approval of the action by a successor trustee.55
Because the comment's implicit assumption - that after the settlor has become
incapacitated, remainder beneficiaries may maintain an action against the trustee for

Ohio's recently enacted version of the UTC addresses this issue by providing that the allocation of such a
recovery between the settlor, if living, the settlor's estate, if the settlor is not living, and the revocable trust
is left to the discretion of the court. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5806.03(A) (West 2007). The comments to
the UTC address it by noting that an action brought by the conservator or agent of an incapacitated settlor
would be to have property restored to the trust. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603 cmt. (2005). That may not always
be the case, however. To illustrate, if the trustee breached its duty by not making payments on mortgage
indebtedness of an incapacitated settlor on property specifically devised by the settlor's will to a non-trust
beneficiary, the recovery should not belong to the trust.
54
UNEF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (2005). As discussed in note _ , supra, § 603(a) was amended in 2004 to
place brackets around the language limiting its general rule to settlors who have capacity to revoke their
trusts.
55

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603 cmt. (2005).
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breaches that occurred while the settlor had capacity - arguably is inconsistent with the
UTC itself, a court might reject its position.56
B.
Revocation or Amendment. With the proliferation in the use of
revocable trusts in recent years have come many cases in which the issue was whether the
settlor had effectively exercised her reserved power to revoke or amend.57 Generally,
wills law is not applied in resolving such issues.
Two recent Utah Supreme Court decisions illustrate the extent to which some
courts will strictly apply trust law to the issue of whether a revocable trust, used as a will
substitute, has been revoked or amended. In Banks v. Means,5* the trust instrument, which
named the settlor's children as joint beneficiaries following her death,59 provided that the
settlor "reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in part.. .On
the revocation of this instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to the
[settlor].. .all of the Trust property."60 The instrument further provided that: "The
interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested subject to divestment which shall
continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death."61 Years after
creating the trust, the settlor executed an amendment to its terms that provided for the
trust assets to be distributed to her sister on her death.62 If the settlor's sister predeceased
her, the trust assets were to be distributed to the settlor's children.63
When the settlor died, her children's challenge to the validity of the amendment
was upheld.64 The court acknowledged that the settlor had reserved the power to revoke
or amend the trust, but found that not only had she created vested interests in her
children, she had specifically provided that while those interests could be divested, they
were to continue until the trust was revoked or terminated.65 Thus, the court concluded
that "a complete revocation was required to divest the beneficiaries of their vested

56

See American Ins. Co. v. Cuyahoga Community College District, 774 N.E.2d 802 (Ohio Ct. CI. 2002).
See generally, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 cmts. h and i and rptr. notes thereto (2003)
(characterizing the case law in this area as "somewhat unclear and troublesome"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 cmt. e (2003); Annotation, Exercise by Will
of Trustor's Reserved Power to Revoke or Modify Inter Vivos Trust, 81 A.L.R.3d 959 (1977). Note that
action taken by a settlor to revoke a revocable trust in accordance with the terms of the trust will be
effective to do so even if title to trust assets is not formally transferred back to the settlor before her death.
See State Bank of Parsons v. First Nat. Bank in Wichita, 504 P.2d 156 (Kan. 1972).
58
52 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2002).
59
/^.atll91.
60
Id.
61
Id In an earlier decision, In re Estate ofGroesbeck, 935 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1997), Utah's Supreme Court
had held that "a revocable trust can be created, without being deemed illusory, as long as title to the
property passes to the trustee and vested interests are created in the beneficiaries, even if these interests are
subject to divestiture." Banks, at 1193. In Banks, the settlor's sister unsuccessfully argued that the provision
in the trust instrument specifying that vested interests were created in the children was intended to establish
that the trust was not illusory, not to restrict the settlor's ability to divest the children's interests. Id.
62
M a t 1192.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1191.
65
Id at 1193-94.
57
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interests." Because the amendment did not revoke the trust, it was ineffective to affect
the children's interests. The rationale for the court's holding emphasizes the traditional
distinction between revocable trusts, under which remainder beneficiaries have vested
interests (though subject to divestment by exercise of the settlor's power of revocation)
during the settlor's lifetime, and wills, under which devisees have expectancies rather
than interests in the testator's property during her lifetime:
Once the settlor has created the trust he is no longer the owner of the trust
property and has only such ability to deal with it as is expressly reserved to him in
the trust instrument. Thus, a settlor has the power to modify or revoke a trust only
if and to the extent that such power is explicitly reserved by the terms of the trust.
Furthermore, the creation of a trust involves the transfer of property interests in
the trust subject-matter to the beneficiaries. These interests cannot be taken from
[the beneficiaries] except in accordance with a provision of the trust instrument.67
The Utah Supreme Court is not alone in limiting the ability of settlors of
revocable trusts to revoke or modify them on the ground that remainder beneficiaries of
such trusts have interests defined by, and subject to change only in accordance with, the
terms of the trust instrument.68 Such decisions, while supported by traditional trust law
doctrine, not only are intention defeating, but also exalt form over substance in ignoring
the practical reality that settlors of revocable trusts commonly use them as will substitutes
and consider the trust assets as their own, without limitation. For such reasons, the UTC
relaxes considerably the rules followed in some jurisdictions xmder which, if the terms of
the trust prescribe a method for revoking or amending it, the settlor may do so only by
employing the method so specified.69
Under the UTC,70 a revocable trust may be revoked or amended by "any.. .method
manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent,"71 unless the terms of
the trust not only specify a method, but also expressly make it exclusive. Further, even
66

/d. atll93.

67

Id. at 1192-93 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The court's decision in Banks created significant
concern among Utah estate planners. See Charles M. Bennett, Can You Ame\nd that Revocable Trust? Utah
Estate Planning Lawyers Face a Trap for the Unwary, 17 UTAH BAR J. 32 (Aug./Sept. 2004) (speculating
that 'there may be tens of thousands of trusts extant in Utah with language identical to that found in
Banks"). A year after Banks, the Utah Supreme Court, while not overruling Banks, limited its effect
significantly. See In the Matter of the Estate of Flake, 71 P.3d 589 (Utah 2003) and its discussion in Mr.
Bennett's Utah Bar Journal article cited above. See also Hoggan v. Hoggan, 169 P.3d 750 (Utah 2007).
68
See, e.g., In re Estate and Trust of Pilafas, 836 P.2d 420, 423 (Ariz. App. 1992) (stating that "[e]ven a
revocable trust vests the trust beneficiary with a legal right to enforce the terms of the trust... The terms of
the trust also limit the powers of the settlor and trustee over the trust corpus, even when the settlor declares
himself trustee...").
69
See, e.g., In re Reid, 46 P.3d 188 (Okla. App. 2002); Salem United Methodist Church v. Bottorff, 138
S.W.3d 788 (Mo. 2004). If a trust may be revoked or amended, but its terms do not provide a method for
doing so, the settlor may revoke or amend by any method that sufficiently evidences the settlor's intent. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330 cmt. i (1959).
70
The new Restatement's rules are similar to the UTC's. See RESTATEMENf (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 cmts.
h & i (2003).
71
UNBF. TRUST CODE § 603(c)(2)(B) (2005).
72
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(c)(2) (2005).
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if the trust terms expressly provide an exclusive method of revocation or amendment,
substantial, rather than strict, compliance will be sufficient.73 Specifically authorized
(unless the terms of the trust expressly provide an exclusive alternative method) is a
revocation or amendment by a later will or codicil, but only if it "expressly refers to the
trust or specifically devises property that would otherwise have passed according to the
terms of the trust."74
The UTC's trust revocation and amendment rules, while clearly intent furthering,
do not track those applicable to wills. For example, while the UTC recognizes the right of
a settlor to specify an exclusive method of revocation or amendment, the methods of
revoking or revising a will are set by statute. Further, the UTC is silent on the effect, if
any, of the inability to find the original trust instrument on the death of a settlor of a
revocable trust. In most jurisdictions, if a testator had possession of the original will and
it cannot be located at her death, a presumption arises that the testator destroyed it
intending to revoke it.75 Application of that presumption to revocable trusts would be
problematic. Because a will generally has no legal effect until the testator's death, it can
be presumed to have been revoked when it was in the testator's possession and cannot be
located at her death without affecting property rights during the testator's lifetime. By
contrast, if the original instrument creating a funded revocable trust was in the settlor's
possession and cannot be located at her death, treating the trust as having been revoked
would raise such questions as when it was revoked and what effect its revocation had on
transactions the trustee had engaged in with respect to its property.76
Another revocation issue that differs for wills and revocable trusts is the effect of
a divorce on provisions in the instrument in favor of the testator's or settlor's spouse.
73

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(c)(1) (2005).
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(c)(2)(A) (2005). Thus, a residuary clause in a will that disposes of the estate
differently than does the trust instrument will not effect a revocation or amendment of the terms of the trust.
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603 cmt. (2005). Many non-UTC cases have addressed the issue of whether a
revocable trust can be revoked or amended by will or codicil. The decisions typically turn on such issues as
whether the trust instrument specified the means by which the settlor could revoke or amend; if so, whether
the specified means was followed; or whether the subsequent will or codicil simply made a general
disposition of the decedent's estate without making a specific reference to the trust or its assets. See, e.g., In
re Last Will and Testament of Tamplin, 48 P.3d 481 (Alaska 2002) (not allowed); In re Estate of Furst, 55
P.3d 664 (Wash. App. 2002) (not allowed); One Valley Bank, Nat. Ass'n v. Hunt 516 S.E.2d 516
(W.Va.1999) (not allowed); In re Estate of Davis, 671 NE 2d 1302 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (allowed); Estate
of Sanders, 929 P.2d 153 (Kan. 1996) (not allowed); In re Estate of Lowry, 418 N.E.2d 10 (111. App. 1981)
(allowed); Conn Gen'1 Life Ins Co, 262 N.W.2d 403 (Minn. 1977) (not allowed); Estate of Kovalyshyn,
343 A.2d 852 (N.F. 1975) (not allowed). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 cmt. h (2003);
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 7.2 cmt e (2003); John

P. Ludington, Annotation, Exercise by Will ofTtrustor's Reserved Power to Revoke or Modify Inter Vivos
Trust, 81 A.L.R. 3d 959 (1977).
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See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. j . (1999).

For a statute reversing that common law presumption, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.26 (West 2007).
76
For a case in which the argument was made that the lost will presumption should be applied to a
revocable trust, see In re Estate and Trust of Pilafas, 836 P.2d 420 (Ariz. App. 1992). In Pilafas, the court
held that because the settlor had reserved the right to revoke the trust by a written instrument delivered to
the trustee, he could not revoke it by physical act. Id. at 425. Consequently, the court did not decide
whether the lost will presumption could be applied to a revocable trust. Id.
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Most, if not all, jurisdictions have statutes under which provisions in a will for a spouse
are revoked by a divorce or annulment of the marriage. 7 Such statutes are based on the
assumption that a testator most likely would not intend for her former spouse to take
under her will. If she did not revoke or revise her will to delete provisions in favor of her
former spouse, the assumption is that the reason she did not do was oversight,
inadvertence, or procrastination. Consistent with that rationale being equally applicable to
revocable trusts, at least two courts have applied such wills statutes to revocable trusts.
Neither court, however, broadly held that the jurisdiction's revocation-by-divorce wills
statute applied to revocable trusts.79 While the preferable approach clearly is for
legislation specifically applying to revocable trusts (and other will substitutes),80 under
the Restatement wills revocation-by-divorce statutes ordinarily should be applied to
revocable trusts.
C.
Lapse; Antilapse Statutes. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, if a
will devisee predeceases the testator, the gift lapses (i.e., fails).82 Thus, unless the will
provides otherwise, the devisee's gift is conditioned on the devisee surviving the testator.
If the jurisdiction's antilapse statute applies, generally the gift will pass to the
predeceased devisee's descendants, by representation.83 By contrast, generally, at
common law, a condition of survivorship is not implied on a gift of a future interest in
trust.84 Rather, upon creation of a trust, its remainder beneficiaries receive interests that,
unless the instrument provides otherwise,85 pass as a part of the remainder beneficiary's
estate to her intestate heirs or will devisees. When a revocable trust is used as a will
substitute and a remainder beneficiary dies before the settlor, the question is thus raised
77

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1, rptr. notes
(1999).
78
Miller v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 637 P.2d 75 (Okla.1981); Clymer v. Mayo, 473 N.E.2d 1084
(Mass. 1985).
79
In Miller, the court found that a pour over provision in favor of the trust in the decedent's will
incorporated the trust by reference into the will. Miller, at 77-78. In Clymer, the court relied on the fact that
the trust was unfunded (other than by being designated as the beneficiary of an insurance policy on the
settlor's life and as the beneficiary of the settlor's retirement plan interest) in finding that the legislative
intent with respect to the revocation-by-divorce wills statute was equally applicable to the trust. Clymer, at
1093. See generally, Susan N. Gary, Applying Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes to Will Substitutes, 18
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 83 (2004).
80
See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (1990).
81
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. e(l) (2003).
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See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WELLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.5 cmt. a (1999).
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See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603 (1990).
84
See JESSE DUKEMINIER, STANLEY M. JOHANSON, et. al, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, at 638
(7th ed. 2005).
85
In Burkett v. Capovilla, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 817 (Cal. App. 2003), a revocable trust instrument, on a form
prepared by a paralegal service, provided that upon the settlor's death, certain trust assets were to be
distributed to the settlor's daughter. Id. at 818-19. A subsequent provision in the instrument provided that:
"For all gifts under this instrument, the beneficiary must survive for sixty (60) days before entitlement to
such gifts." Id. at 819. Applying a California statute under which the same rules of interpretation are
applied to wills and trusts, the court rejected the argument that because trust beneficiaries acquire an
interest in the trust immediately on its creation, the 60 day period should run from the date the trust was
created. Id. at 820-21. Rather, the court construed the survivorship condition to require that the daughter
survive the settlor by 60 days. Id. at 821.
86
See, e.g, First Nat'l Bank v. Anthony, 557 A.2d 957 (Me. 1989).
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